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This dissertation examines the early works of the Russian artist Ilya Kabakov and 
traces the beginning of a linguistic trend in the development of Moscow Conceptualism.  
Analyzing the drawings and paintings that the artist created between 1962 and 1966, I 
place Kabakov‟s artistic style and ideas in the context of the cultural, theoretical and 
scientific phenomena that affected Soviet art and society in the early 1960s.  Kabakov‟s 
works are shown as evolving in a process that renders the artist‟s techniques increasingly 
polysemantic, dialogic and conceptual.  The dissertation then demonstrates that 
Kabakov‟s visual images and linguistic titles participated, indirectly yet actively, in the 
cultural debates of Moscow‟s artistic underground and the Soviet society.  The dynamic 
correspondence between a fervent cultural context, growing interest in linguistic and 
scientific ideas, increasing conceptualization of visual means of expression and 
intellectualization of the artistic approach to the image led to the appropriation of 
language in the works of Moscow underground artists.  The dissertation establishes such 
a development in the early works of Ilya Kabakov, proposing that his earliest 
“conversational” work Whose Fly is This? was the first conceptual painting to display 




of the depicted discourse are examined as an ironic gesture that takes its genesis from the 
polyphonic theory of Mikhail Bakhtin and reverses the official non-dialogical imperatives 
of Soviet newspeak and ideology.  The main figural image of the painting—the fly—is 
seen as articulating the utopias and anti-utopias of avant-garde figures such as Kharms or 
Malevich and interpreted as alluding to a key contemporaneous scientific discovery—the 
chromosomes of the drosophila.  In the end, the words and the image of Whose Fly is 
This? form the two mutually exclusive and mutually complementary aspects of a 
compound conceptual signifier.  That is the signifier of the free artistic spirit, evanescent 
human existence and mundane, yet resilient human nature that ironically survives—
against all odds and despite all absurdities—beyond the boundary of the social utopia and 
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This dissertation took as its point of departure two initial questions: Why did 
conceptualists begin using language as a means of artistic expression in the 1960s and 
what teleology did such an artistic gesture imply.  The framework of this inquiry was 
predicated upon two corresponding presumptions: (1) there is a firmly established 
conventional notion of what conceptualism, as a term, signifies and (2) there was a 
movement or a phenomenon in the Soviet Union in the 1960s that can be properly 
described by using such Western terminology.  Due to the narrow scope of its pursuit, 
this dissertation leaves aside the issues of whether there was Russian conceptualism; what 
artists or genres it included; what were its major locations or centers and whether 
Western notions adequately translate its local characteristics and cultural specificities. 
Nestled within a plethora of Western scholarly publications on conceptual art, this 
project borrows Henry Flynt‟s term in its general sense as a reference to artistic practices 
that emphasize the meaning or ideas of the work rather than its material or visual form.
1
  
What in the West was articulated as a visual rejection of formalism, the critical writing of 
Clement Greenberg or the aesthetic of modernist monochromatic painting, in Eastern 
Europe was seen as a reaction to different cultural and historic conditions.
2
  Russian 
                                                 
1
 For instance, Alexander Alberro, Conceptual Art and the Politics of Publicity.  (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2003); Idea Art: A Critical Anthology.  Ed. Gregory Battcock (E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc, 1973); Ann 
Goldstein and Anne Rorimer, Reconsidering the Object of Art: 1965-1975.  (Los Angeles: The Museum of 
Contemporary Art, 1996); Rewriting Conceptual Art.  Ed. Michael Newman and Jon Bird.  (London: 
Reaktion Book, 1999); Ursula Meyer, Conceptual Art.  (New York: E.P.Dutton, 1972) and Wood, Paul. 
Conceptual Art.  (London: Tate, 2002). 
2




unofficial art of the 1960s, for instance, emerged partly in response to the rigid rules of 
the Party nomenklatura and the Soviet Academy, as an alternative to the clichéd style of 
official art or propaganda and as an escape from the cultural isolationism of Stalinist 
politics.  In contrast to Western conceptualism, the Soviet artists had neither an easy 
access to the venues of the Western cultural tradition or the earlier Russian avant-gardes 
from the 1920s-1930s, nor the freedom to purchase high-quality artistic materials, to 
exhibit nonconformist art or to participate in national or international markets and 
exchange of ideas.  Throughout all chapters, this dissertation exploits familiar Western 
terminology that has been adopted or modified by East European and Russian scholars; 
e.g., conceptualism, linguistic conceptualism or Moscow Conceptualism.
3
  However, 
those notions are employed with the awareness that they discard, at least 
terminologically, various cultural, regional and local specificities.
4
 
A third set of preconceptions that I borrow pertains to the established notion that 
Ilya Kabakov was as a key figure of the Russian conceptual movement, a leading 
member of Moscow conceptualism and a beginner of the linguistic trend in Moscow 
conceptual art; i.e., linguistic conceptualism.  Although the examination of Russian 
                                                 
3
 For slight modifications of the Western notion of “conceptualism” that were coined to reflect the 
specificity of the Moscow movement see Boris Groys‟ proposition of “romantic conceptualism” or Victor 
Tupitsyn‟s use of “Moscow communal conceptualism” and “communal postmodernism.”  Boris Groys, 
“Moskovskii romanticheskii konseptualizm,” in A-Ia 1 (1979): 3-11; Victor Tupitsyn, “Moscow Communal 
Conceptualism,” in Parachute 82 (April-June 1996): 24-29; and Victor Tupitsyn, “Kommunal‟nyi 
(post)modernism”  (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1998).   
4
 For Russian sources appropriating the Western term see Margarita Tupitsyn, “On Some Sources of Soviet 
Conceptualism,” in Nonconformist Art: The Soviet Experience, 1956-1986 ed. Alla Rosenfeld and Norton 
T. Dodge (London and New York: Thames and Hudson, 1995); Margarita Tupitsyn, “About Early Soviet 
Conceptualism,” in Global Conceptualism: Points of Origin 1950s-1980s (New York: Queens Museum of 
Art, 1999), 99-108; Ekaterina A. Bobrinskaia, Kontseptualizm.  (Moskva: Galart, 1994); and Natalia 




conceptualism and, particularly, the Moscow movement remains outside of my scope, the 
project addresses an essential aspect of that phenomenon by analyzing the 
conceptualization of word and image in the art of Kabakov and by tracing the genesis of 
Kabakov‟s “conversational” paintings.  On the basis of the artist‟s early autobiographic 
writing and recent interviews, the dissertation examines the 1965-66 painting Chiya eta 
mukha? (Whose Fly is This?) as Kabakov‟s first instance of using a written dialogue in 
the genre of painting.  Rather than ascribing such novel gesture to its methodological 
derivation—the episteme of conceptualism—which was yet to gain recognition in the 
Russian artistic consciousness in the 1960s, I seek its roots and sources in various artistic, 
cultural and intellectual circumstances.  Following different trajectories of thinking about 
the problem of language in art, the dissertation intentionally employs various 
methodological approaches, ways of interpretation or modes of inquiry—from critical 
assessments and autobiographical writings, to historical overviews and formal analysis.  
The goal is to convey the complexity of the historical and epistemological frames within 
which the conceptual phenomenon took an ideational shape as well as to suggest that the 
issue of language and/or art could only be understood in relation to a multiplicity of 
planes of analysis.   
Positioned as a gradual opening of the problem that is meant to introduce a 
predominantly Western audience to the international conceptual phenomenon and its 
Russian “star” Ilya Kabakov, the first chapter Quartet 1968-2000: the Kernel, the Duo 
and the Voice Behind the Curtain represents a curatorial perspective.  The case in point is 




by Peter Pakesch at the Kunsthalle in Basel in September 2000—a carefully 
choreographed show in which Whose Fly is This?, displayed in a later version and with a 
fluctuating chronological marker, occupied a strategically heightened position.  Giving 
due respect to the masterful marketing and effective rhetoric of the show, the chapter 
unfolds the perplexity of the painting‟s conceptual strategy and charts the dazzle as well 
as the insufficiency of Quartet‟s musical vision in explaining multifaceted issues.  The 
chapter then uses Kabakov‟s essay Ukrivatel’stvo [Concealment] published in Quartet‟s 
catalogue as a transition to the next frame of analysis for the reason that Concealment 
discusses the artist‟s dialogic consciousness as well as his linguistic and artistic premises. 
The second chapter From the “Indexical” to the “Iconic”: How the Shower 
Appeared in the Early 1960s employs a different line of approach—a personal trajectory 
that is aligned more directly with the 1960s—and a different mode of inquiry.  It 
concentrates on Kabakov‟s earliest published autobiographic writing: his memoir 60-e—
70-e… Zapiski o neofitsial’noy zhizni v Moskve [1960s-1970s… Notes on the Unofficial 
Life in Moscow] written in the early 1980s and published in 1999 in German and in 
Russian.  Reading closely the language and methodology used by the artist, the chapter 
identifies some of the key factors that affected the drastic change of Kabakov‟s artistic 
approach to the image and led to the sudden appearance of the Shower series in 1962.  
Some of the factors are autobiographical—e.g., in 1962 Kabakov met the artists Yuri 
Sobolev and Ülo Sooster, the leading members of the so-called Znanie [Knowledge] 
circle.  Thereby, Kabakov became closely associated with, what seemed to be by all 




factors discussed are methodological—in the early 1960s Kabakov‟s articulation of his 
visual perceptions shows an increasing awareness of the semiotic composition of the 
artistic image, and, after 1962, he more actively employs an apparatus associated with the 
structural-semiotic movement and its formalist forerunners; e.g., sign, emblem, emblem-
symbol, faktura [facture] and ostranenie [defamiliarization].  A third set of factors 
demonstrates an inner development in Kabakov‟s phenomenology of the visual in which 
the form becomes separated from the content and refers to it only symbolically by way of 
“shells,” “clouds,” “associations” and cognitive memories.  By the same token, the 
authorial acts of creation and interpretation, in Kabakov‟s words, become an “active 
investigation” or “departure” into “distant areas of culturology, philosophy, social 
psychology.”   
The third chapter Cybernetics, the Structural-Semiotic Movement and the Man-
Machine Analogy follows the direction projected by Kabakov‟s own structural metaphors 
and offers a historical overview of the fervent influx of intellectual movements and ideas 
that affected Soviet culture and society in the early 1960s.  Among those trends, the 
chapter devotes a special attention to the rubrics dealing with language—structuralism, 
semiotics, cybernetics (or cybernetic linguistics), automation, theory of information and 
mathematical linguistics.  To signal the cultural overlap and interdependence between 
structuralism and semiotics in Soviet Russia, I adopt the term “structural-semiotic 
movement.”  The chapter traces the genesis, impact and development of the international 
scientific and “linguistic turn” in both Eastern Europe and the West to cast particular light 




of Stalin and through the early 1960s.  The analysis appropriates Slava Gerovitch‟s 
notion of cyberspeak—i.e., the “technical,” “precise” language of cybernetics employed 
in the 1960s as a counteraction against the newspeak or the ideological language of the 
communist system—and demonstrates that cybernetics was a key player not only on the 
rhetorical and scientific fronts, but also in cultural and artistic circles.  In those spheres, 
the cyberspeak or cybernetic ideologeme served as an umbrella encompassing and 
protecting novel ideas, avant-garde methods and nonconformist phenomena. 
The fourth chapter The Birth of the Conceptual Image: Kabakov’s Works in the 
Early 1960s returns to the use of language in art and reconsiders the process of 
conceptualization of the visual in Kabakov‟s drawings and paintings created during the 
same period.  By way of close visual and linguistic analysis, the chapter establishes that 
Kabakov‟s conceptual works indirectly participated in the cultural battle between 
ideological languages (newspeak, literary clichés and poetic metaphors) and the influx of 
new scientific and theoretical notions connected with semiotics, cybernetics and 
structuralism.  Furthermore, those notions created a novel type of visual language, that 
Kabakov described as a “new aesthetic movement,” promulgated by the magazines 
Znanie [Knowledge] and Znanie-Sila [Knowledge is Power] and the magazines‟ artistic 
director Yuri Sobolev.  With their polysemantic layers, Kabakov‟s early paintings and 
drawings engage key signifiers that point to both the cyberspeak and the newspeak of 
contemporaneous Soviet culture—the pipe, the ball, the fly, the automaton (automat), the 
soul and the head (as cybernetic control mechanism).  In the spirit of his friends Sobolev 




artistic absurd, play and irony, reveals the limitations of the scientific laws of logic, 
cause-and-effect or reason.   
The conclusion Whose Fly is This? In Wide Retrospect returns to the conceptual 
work which opened the dissertation‟s curatorial journey and intellectual inquiry.  
Through the lenses of the discussed scientific developments and cultural debates, the 
tantalizing “conversational painting” acquires yet another semantic layer.  Its main figural 
image, the “fly,” is seen as articulating the utopias or anti-utopias of avant-garde figures, 
such as Kharms or Malevich, and interpreted as alluding to a key contemporaneous 
scientific discovery—the chromosomes of drosophilae.  Published in Znanie and Znanie-
Sila in 1965-66, the discovery was made by researchers in genetics—a most provocative 
nonconformist discipline which, after being banned for decades under the regime of 
Stalin, reemerged anew under the banner of Soviet cybernetics.  Similarly, the dialogic 
remarks written on Kabakov‟s painting are read as a coded reference to the theory of 
polyphonic discourse proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin whose book Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics Kabakov read shortly after it was republished in 1963.  In the 
retrospect of such conclusion, the words and the image of Whose Fly is This? form the 
two mutually exclusive and mutually complementary aspects of a compound conceptual 
signifier.  That is the signifier of the free artistic spirit, evanescent human existence and 
mundane, yet resilient human nature that ironically survives—against all odds and despite 
all absurdities—beyond the boundaries of social utopias, cognitive limits and 






Quartet 1968-2000: the Kernel, the Duo and the Voice  
Behind the Curtain 
 
I. Quartet and its Master Conductor 
 
On 9 September 2000 the Kunsthalle in Basel opened a group exhibition that 
featured works by four contemporaneous artists—John Baldessari, Ilya Kabakov, Joseph 
Kosuth and Michelangelo Pistoletto.
5
  In conjunction with the joint event, the museum 
published a small but masterfully orchestrated catalogue that captured the ambitions of 
the exhibition and presented, in bold white letters, the show‟s cumulative title: Quartett 
August 1968 September 2000 Baldessari, Kabakov, Kosuth, Pistoletto (Fig. 1).
6
  As the 
detailed heading demonstrates, the number four assumes a special role in Quartet‟s 
structural and metaphoric logistics.
7
  Playing on the symmetrical overtones of the 
                                                 
5
 The exhibit remained on display for two months, from September 9, 2000 until November 12, 2000. 
6
 The major textual contributions to the catalogue are published in German and in English.  The title of the 
show coincides with the title of the catalogue and, apart from the German spelling of the first word, the rest 
could be seen as polylingual: Quartett August 1968 September 2000 Baldessari, Kabakov, Kosuth, 
Pistoletto (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 2000), unpaginated.  Rendered with white Ariel letters in the middle 
of the catalogue‟s cover, the title stands out in sharp contrast with the dark pictures of the newspaper shown 
in the background (Fig. 1).  Thus, word and image play a key role in the catalogue‟s intermarriage of 
factual and artistic as they simultaneously compete and complement each other, utilizing devices such as 
color, size and spatial positioning.   
7
 Not immediately apparent, the number four figures prominently in both registers of the divided title.  
Marking the beginning of the upper line of text, the idea of quadruple accordance is embedded in the 
musical term quartet, while, in the lower register of the title, the same number corresponds to the family 




quadruple genre, the catalogue essay written by the museum director Peter Pakesch nests 
the curatorial dilemma of geographic expansion and artistic unity into the paradoxical 
palindrome of similarities in dissimilars and differences in similarities.
8
  As a result, the 
divergent artistic phenomena appear tightly intertwined in an ensemble of musical 
harmonies, while the centrifugal/centripetal predicament of the show‟s international 




As Pakesch‟s essay reveals, the “constellation” of the Quartet brings together four 
stars “from four different corners of the earth: Baldessari—from California, Kabakov 
from Russia—then the Soviet Union—Kosuth from the east coast of America, and 
Pistoletto from Italy, in the middle of Europe.”
10
  The symmetrical assemblage of four 
artists/four stars/four terrestrial foundations furnishes with a dazzling rhetorical guise the 
subtle discrepancies in Quartet‟s systematic topography.  Upon a closer examination, 
however, one would soon recognize that two of the four earthly zones are located in the 
same superpower state in North America and that a single East European astral entry may 
                                                 
8
 The short four-page essay, authored by the museum director and printed in German and English, is the 
first text published in the catalogue under the title 20. August 1968 September 2000—ein Versuch, 
translated as 20. August 1968 September 2000—an Experiment.  See Peter Pakesch, “20 August 1968 
September 2000—ein Versuch” in Quartett, unpaginated.  Although the idea of the quartet is replaced in 
the title with the modest denominator “experiment,” the notion of the exhibition‟s musical unity, in fact, 
occupies a central place in Pakesch‟s essay.  Thus, the text not only serves as an introduction to the show‟s 
ideas, but also assumes a leading role in Quartet‟s rhetorical marketing. 
9
 The search for synchronies within the discordance affects various levels of the artistic arrangement: from 
the apt placement of individual artworks and the symmetrical scheme of exhibiting to the ambition of 
uniting future, present and past in the common framework of a balanced geopolitical climate.   
10
 Instead of “from four different corners of the earth,” the German original states “aus vier verschiedenen 
Weltgegenden” or literally “from four different parts [i.e., regions or zones] of the world.”  While the 
allusion to the archetypal terrestrial pillars is less prominent in the original, the use of the German 





appear at odds in the orbit of a predominantly Western governance.
11
  Nevertheless, no 
subtle incongruities can diminish the show‟s infringement of Cold War binaries, and no 
geopolitical inconsistencies can weaken its ambition to expand “the horizon of our 
geography of art” or to “scrutinize our more recent history in general, and the 
development of global art in particular.”
12
 
 Extending the quadruple accordance of the synchronous genre to the structural 
levels of display, the catalogue includes two sets of primary texts—four newspaper 
summaries and four artists‟ essays—which follow (and, by the same token, support) the 
introduction of the museum director.
13
  First, with the intent to picture a “backdrop” of 
historical events and to “provide even more material from this era,” the book assembles 
the brief summaries of the front pages of four daily newspapers, “which the four artists 
might have read on 20 August 1968 and which also served as basic material: the Izvestija 
from Moscow, the Corriere della Sera from Milan, the New York Times and the Los 
Angeles Times.”
14
  Second, the publication presents the four artists‟ essays, 




 In this case, the English translation corresponds almost literally to the original with the exception of the 
milder appeal of the infinitive “to consider” (zu betrachten) instead of “to scrutinize:” “So bedeutet diese 
Konstellation die Möglichkeit, auf unterschiedlichen Wegen unsere neuere Geschichte im allgemeinen und 
die Entwicklung einer globalen Kunst im Speziellen zu betrachten.”  Ibid.   
13
 The essay of Peter Pakesch explicates the parameters of the catalogue‟s structure and makes evident the 
motivation behind such a highly organized arrangement.  Ibid. 
14
 Ibid.  The four newspapers summarized in the catalogue were published in the native countries and in the 
languages of the four artists on 20 August 1968.  The importance of this date is briefly addressed by Peter 
Pakesch as “just one day in an uneasy time, one day before a historically far-reaching effect.”  Ibid.  His 
reflection on the significance of the following day, however, is more eloquent: “The day which followed 
was the day on which that decade lost something of its innocence: The invasion of Prague by Warsaw Pact 
troops represented a further climax in the Cold War, and, as we know with hindsight, was the beginning of 
the end of the Iron Curtain and with it the division of the world into ideological systems.” Ibid.  Whether 
August 20
th
 was “just one day in an uneasy time” is, in retrospection, debatable since that was the day in 
which the military rhetoric of the two ideological systems and the political propaganda of the Cold War 




correspondingly, one text for each one of Quartet‟s stars and their mapped geographic 
locations.
15
  The primary sources are then followed by a comparable number of 
reproductions, which—arranged as a “kernel” of four contemporaneous artworks—
feature one masterpiece by each contributor and open the joint installation (Figs. 3, 4, 6 
and 7).
16
  Finally, the catalogue‟s small gallery provides two wide shots of the 
installation‟s main venue—the skylight room (Figs. 2 and 8).  The gallery then closes 
                                                                                                                                                 
August 20
th
 as a “point of reference” for the exhibit puts an emphasis on the common propaganda 
techniques of the Cold War enemies, rather than on their historical actions.   
15
 Published in German and English and arranged in an alphabetical order, the artists texts are as follows: 
“Zehn Parabeln” (Ten Parables) by John Baldessari, “Das Verbergen” (Concealment) by Ilya Kabakov, 
“Kunst nach der Philosophy” (Art after Philosophy) by Joseph Kosuth and “Ein Brief” (A Letter) by 
Michelangelo Pistoletto.  Quartett.  Remarkably different in their genres, tone and subject matter, the 
essays seem to have certain commonalities.  Thus, according to the director, they are “either written in that 
particular year [1968] or dealing of aspects of that time, so that they communicate an impression of where 
the artists then stood.” Op. cit., Pakesch. 
16
 In all fairness, this figurative designation of the foursome assemblage should be attributed to the 
translator Pauline Cumbers as the German original uses the more neutral “four works in the center of the 
skylight room installation”: “Ein gemainsamer Aspekt ihres jeweiligen Standorts manifestiert sich mit vier 
Werken im Zentrum der Austellung im Oberlichtsaal.”  Op. cit., Pakesch.  Arranged alphabetically on four 
subsequent catalogue pages, the kernel includes the following multilingual number of titles in the way and 
order in which they are published: Place a Book in a Strong Light and This is What You Will See by John 
Baldessari (Fig. 6), Wem gehört diese Fliege? by Ilya Kabakov (Fig. 3) , Titled (A.A.I.A.I.) by Joseph 
Kosuth (Fig. 4) and Metrocubo d’infinitito by Michelangelo Pistoletto (Fig. 7).  Encompassing a variety of 
techniques and genres, from drawing and photography, through painting and photostats, to sculpture 
composed of mirrors, the works are united, in Pakesch‟s view, because they exhibit a “common feature of 
their [the artists‟] respective stands” and therefore “are located in the skylight room.”  Furthermore, 
according to Pakesch, the “four artworks—at least in the initial versions—all date from the year 1968, 
bring the artists into close proximity, and lead into the joint installation.  All four artworks have something 
similar about them; that moment when the conceptual begins to ask about the content.  We encounter four 
approaches about thinking of art as a concept.  These are clearly different in origin and do not disavow the 
cultures they spring from, indeed, they can be conclusively explained from out of those cultures.”  Ibid.  
Subsequently, I refer to Kabakov‟s painting with its more common English title Whose Fly is This?, which 
is the literal equivalent of the Russian original Chiya eta muha? and is closer to it than Pauline Cumbers‟ 
translation “Who own this fly?” in Quartett. The latter phrase changes the linguistic agency and the 
grammatical subject of the sentence and, through this, shifts the emphasis from the fly to its owner and the 
relation of the ownership.  Whose Fly is This?, in contrast, puts the accent back on the main component—
the fly—on the deictic gesture; i.e., the linguistic “pointing” performed by the pronoun (this), and on the act 
of inquiring.  In the Russian title, the emphasis is evenly distributed between the relation of attribution or 
possession (chia i.e. whose), the grammatical act and pointing (eta i.e. is and this) and the subject (mukha 
i.e. fly) because each lexical unit receives a syntactical accent for being in the beginning, in the end or in 








 To its credit, the catalogue does not only rely on musical harmonies and 
cosmogonic implications to conjure up the map of a new world balance.  Neither does the 
show simply combine micro-artistic (four artists) and macro-historic factors (four 
geopolitical contexts) to envision the horizons of an expanded art geography.  The 
centrifugal rhetoric of cultural expansion implemented in the show‟s marketing and in the 
beginning of the director‟s essay is bound to encounter, on at minimum four occasions, 
                                                 
17
 What seems to be a random selection of images on the last five pages suggests, in fact, a keen 
compositional thinking.  The first long shot of the skylight room—the establishing shot—includes full or 
partial views of works by each one of the artists: 20 August 1968 by Kabakov, in the background, 
Metrocubo d’infinito by Pistoletto, to the left in the middle, Per Cola et Commata by Kosuth, installed on 
the skylight-roof window above, and Five 1968 Films (new) by Baldessari which is projected in the dark 
room the door to which, slightly open, is visible in the middle section to the right of Pistolleto‟s sculpture 
(Fig. 8).  That such an assembly of works is not accidental becomes clear when one looks at the preceding 
and subsequent pages.  Pistoletto‟s cube, rendered as a close up, emerges on the adjacent left page to echo 
the central positioning of the same artwork in the skylight room on the right page (Fig. 7).  When the 
viewers turn the recto with the establishing shot of the skylight room, on its verso they would encounter a 
full-blown version of 20 August 1968, Kabakov‟s installation from the background of the previous page 
(Fig. 2).  Through a sharp contrast of white and black, the viewer is then transitioned to a dark room and a 
still from Baldessari‟s films projected on the large screen in the middle.  Once adjusted to the change in the 
setting and color, the viewer discovers a slightly open door to the left through which one can see the 
brightness of the skylight room and a tiny portion of the Kabakov‟s 20 August installation.  The reversed 
(positive) image of the same ajar door refers to the Kabakov‟s work on the verso of the adjacent page and 
to the negative version of the same door that leads to the dark room in the establishing shot.  Continuing 
with the ambiance of dimmed light which takes over the skylight room, the next page presents a close view 
of Kosuth‟s neon installation (Fig. 11).    This work could be seen only in darkness as it is composed of 
neon lights-words installed on the roof window of the skylight room.  After three close-ups showing works 
of Kabakov, Baldessari and Kosuth, the catalogue then devotes one page to Pistoletto‟s two installations 
Outdoor and Office (Fig. 10).  Taking as its point of departure the dark setting of the neon work on the 
opposite page, the eye path moves from left to right and from the top to the bottom of the picture.  The 
motion starts with the dim skylight room seen on the upper left, through the three sculptures echoed in both 
Pistoletto‟s installations—the green door, the globe and the car—to the show‟s last room Office and, 
ultimately, out of the exhibit.  The symbolic departure or exit from Outdoor to the Office seems to be ironic 
because it leads to a darker and enclosed space the orientation of which points back to the lighter Outdoor 
and reverses the dead-end Office perspective.  Metaphorically, this visual return to Outdoor reverses the 
trajectory of the triangular desk to point back, through the open door, to the wide world of travel (the globe 
and the car) and the darker historical memories (the dimmed skylight room and Kabakov‟s installation on 





the mighty counterpart of the exhibition‟s union.  The first and most discernible instance 
of such an encounter takes place at the threshold established by the theory of discourse 
analysis as one of the two most important margins of the text—the text‟s title.  Hence, in 
the heading Quartett August 1968 September 2000 Baldessari, Kabakov, Kosuth, 
Pistoletto the idea of individual and cultural diversity carried by the sequence of four 
proper nouns (i.e., four names of artists) is balanced by the harmonious connotations, 
figurative effect and compositional prominence of the musical metaphor—Quartet.
18
   
 Not immediately apparent, yet similarly important, the other demonstrations of 
Quartet‟s centrifugal/centripetal contrapposto take on the three main aspects of the 
exhibit‟s taut coherence—the thematic, the chronological and the aesthetic—to form the 
central impetus of Pakesch‟s rhetorical dialectic.  By way of dynamic transpositions, once 
enthralled by the breath of Quartet‟s “new geography,” the reader of the essay is then 
bound to comprehend the strong foundations of the constellation‟s union.
19
  The first 
degree of integration is time-specific because, as the director of the museum confers, all 
                                                 
18
 In the traditional paradigm of reading as a linear progression in time, the title occupies a special place, 
comparable only to the text‟s ending.  Designating the boundary between text and presupposition or text 
and silence, the title is the first linguistic sign that accosts the reader and often conveys the theme or the 
summary of the text.  Placed between the text and the reader, the title has been seen as a paratext 
(supplementary text) or a metatext (commentary text) in relation to the work.  In the context of the 
catalogue, the first word of the heading carries a special syntactical weight as it is the first linguistic sign to 
confront the text‟s recipient.  Versed in rhetorical eloquence, the designer of Kunsthalle‟s Quartet has 
chosen an apt discursive strategy, because, with its position in the beginning of the title, the catalogue and 
the show, the musical metaphor asserts the show‟s vision of harmony and unity.  (Fig 1) 
19
 Pakesch‟s essay credits the four artists with “expanding the horizon of our geography of art:” “The 
significance of those events has changed yet again from today‟s viewpoint, above all since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  This has also had an impact on the geography of art, which has altered considerably in the 
meantime, not least due to the significant involvement and influence of the four artists united here…  
Whereas Kosuth and Pistoletto have always been intent on making an impact internationally, in the course 
of the years Baldessari and Kabakov have made decisive contributions towards expanding the geography of 




of the works in the show are “firmly rooted in the 1960s.”
20
  The second display of 
Quartet‟s unison, to follow more or less promptly in the German original and in the 
English translation, combines the show‟s chronological and thematic aspects in order to 
ascertain that “an important role [is] being assumed by their [the works‟] specific 
treatment of the theme of utopia, for which that period also stands.”
21
  Semantically broad 
and somewhat ambivalent, Quartet‟s theme, utopia, is bound to remain as non-specific as 
it seems feasible to encompass the variety of pieces in the exhibition.
22
  The show‟s 
chronological span, instead, undergoes gradual temporal contractions from “the 1960s,” 
through “the year 1968,” to “the 20 August [1968] in particular,” as the latter mark 
becomes “the point of reference for the installation.”
23
 
 As mentioned, the third aspect of the show‟s apt coherence pertains to the 
aesthetic characteristics of the displayed phenomena.  In this regard, the so-defined 
“kernel of the exhibition”—an ensemble of four artworks by the four artists arranged in 
                                                 
20
 In the original statement, which coincides with the second sentence of the Pakesch‟s essay, the four 
artists and important parts of their works are anchored in the 1960s: “Die vier Künstler sind mit wichtigen 
Teilen ihres Werkes fest in den 60er Jahren verankert.”  Ibid.  In the English translation the same statement 
is combined with the following sentence to compose a compound argument: “Important works by the four 
artists involved are firmly rooted in the 1960s, an important role being assumed by their specific treatment 
of the theme of utopia, for which that period also stands.”  Ibid. 
21
 In German, the argument of thematic unity stands as a separate syntactic entity—a third sentence in the 
text: “Dabei spielt der spezifische Umgang mit der Utopie, für den diese Zeit auch steht, eine besondere 
Rolle.”  Ibid.  
22
 For example, according to the Compact Oxford Dictionary, utopia refers to: (1) an imaginary island 
depicted by Thomas More as enjoying a perfect social, legal and political system, (b) any imaginary, 
indefinitely remote region, country or locality, (2) a place, state or condition ideally perfect in respect to 
politics, laws, customs and conditions, (b) an impossibly ideal scheme, especially for social improvement.  
In other words, the term refers simultaneously to three ideas and their semantic overlaps: a perfect place, an 
imaginary or unknown location and impossible ideal conditions.  See The Compact Oxford English 
Dictionary, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 2207. 
23
 “As already mentioned, our point of reference was the year 1968, and in that year, the 20 August in 
particular…” and “…we decided to make the 20 August 1968 the point of reference for the installation.”  




“close proximity” in the museum‟s skylight room—embodies an emblem of musical 
synchrony because, as the catalogue essay confers, “All four works have something 
similar about them; that moment when the conceptual begins to ask about the content.”
24
  
Rendered rather poetically, this initial reflection on the ensemble‟s homogeneity unfurls 
somewhat equivocal due to, among other causes, the difficulty of capturing the inception 
of conceptual inquisitiveness on the matter of meaning.  In contrast, the second line of 
reasoning on the state of the quadruple union combines artistic complexity with a 
dialectical approach and rhetorical amplification.  In brief, the seeds of the kernel “are 
clearly different in origin” as they demonstrate different “approaches to art as a concept” 
and “can be conclusively explained from out of those [their original] cultures”; yet, 
despite their cultural divergences, these artworks are deeply united because in “all four 
cases the question asked is about art, about the function of art.”
25
  As a “major 
preoccupation at that time,” the question about art plays, in Pakesch‟s view, a central 
place in Kunsthalle‟s exhibit because it “lends the works an aura of self-reference, self-
reflection” and establishes the featured artists as “personalities who started something 
new and in their capacity as innovators influenced later generations of artists.”
26
  
                                                 
24
 Ibid.  This statement immediately follows and supports the earlier claims of the kernel‟s unison given in 
the preceding two sentences: “A common feature of their [the artists‟] respective stands is manifest in four 
works that form the kernel of this exhibition and are located in the skylight room.  These four works—at 
least in their initial versions—all date from the year 1968, bring the artists into close proximity, and lead 
into the joint installation.”  Ibid.   
25
 “We encounter four approaches to thinking of art as a concept.  These are clearly different in origin and 
do not disavow the cultures they spring from, indeed, they can be conclusively explained from out of those 
cultures.  In all four cases the question asked is about art, about the function of art, a question we know was 
a major preoccupation at that time.”  Ibid. 
26
 “This lends the works an aura of self-reference, self-reflection.  Yet they also point beyond that to 
question the function of art, the altered meaning and contents of any future practice of art.  In these four 




Embodying the show‟s synchrony, the kernel epitomizes the “aura of self-reference, self-
reflection” and concentrates the question “about art, about the function of art” in the 
dialogue of the two artworks placed in its compositional center.  
 
II. A Duo in the Kernel‟s Nexus 
 
 Convened in the installation‟s main venue—Kunsthalle‟s skylight room—the 
kernel comprises the visual and conceptual motto of the exhibit (Figs. 3, 4, 6 and 7).  
Therefore, the four heterogeneous works not only harbor the seeds of Quartet‟s 
chronological, thematic and aesthetic chromosome, but also, as the essay of the director 
explains, compose a harmonious and close family relationship.  Positioned strategically 
in the skylight room, the masterworks flesh out the show‟s spatial dialectic because, in 
Pakesch‟s words, they “bring the artists into close proximity, and lead into the joint 
installation.”
27
  As aptly as such kernel performance conforms to the democratic creeds of 
the exhibit, the linear communication of the viewer with the illustrated catalogue 
establishes a different set of inner bonds and spatial relations.   
                                                                                                                                                 
influenced later generations of artists.  This is particularly evident in the current part of the overall 
installation, which was conceived specially for the skylight room at the Kunsthalle in Basel.”  Ibid. 
27
 Ibid.  In fact, the original text of the essay suggests that the four works were positioned in the “center” of 
the skylight room, although one may still ponder whether the director referrers to the physical or 
compositional center of the installation: “Ein geinsamer Aspekt ihres jeweiligen Standorts manifestiert sich 
mit vier Werken im Zentrum der Austellung im Oberlichtsaal.  Die vier Werke, die alle von 1968 datieren, 
zumindest in ersten Versionen, bringen die Künstler in eine unmittelbare Nähe und führen in die 




The catalogue‟s reproductions suggest that the combination of image and text 
comprises the chief installation strategy of the exhibit.
28
  In the book, the employment of 
the same key media follows two types of rules—a compositional progression from 
printed words to visual illustrations and an alphabetic sequence from Baldessari, through 
Kabakov and Kosuth, to Pistoletto.  Placed in the beginning of the catalogue‟s nine-page 
gallery which constitutes the book‟s final section, the kernel representations mark the 
transition from text to image and implement the pre-established alphabetic sequence.  
The impact of the catalogue‟s kernel, therefore, echoes the role of the kernel-referent in 
the exhibit: it brings the artists into “close proximity” and leads “into the joint 
installation” of the illustrations.
29
 
In the context of a close correspondence between word and image or between 
object and representation, even small inconsistencies are likely to obtain some structural 
signification.  Such a barely perceptible “accident” occurs in the photographic 
representation of the kernel; i.e., in the catalogue‟s iconographic analogue of the kernel‟s 
actual assembly.  To make the “accident” more palpable, Quartet‟s final five pages of 
illustrations present six photographic images, all of them, long shots, mid shots and close 
shots of the show‟s installation (Figs. 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11).  The first four pages of the nine-
                                                 
28
 That was especially prominent in the skylight room in which Kabakov‟s 20. August 1968, an assembly of 
newspaper clippings, notes, and other ephemera (Fig. 2), faces Kosuth‟s Per Cola et Commata, a grid of 
personal names installed as neon lights on the frame of the skylight room‟s roof window (Figs. 11 and 8).   
29
 The term referent is employed here and subsequently in its semiotic meaning as “that to which a 
linguistic expression or symbol refers—a thing, process or state of affairs.”  The referent is not part of the 
initial, Saussurian, model of the linguistic sign which includes only a signifier (form) and signified 
(content).  On the basis of that, the Saussurian model has been seen as non-referential or purely conceptual; 
i.e., regarding the external reality as an unnecessary complication.  Later structuralist and post-structuralist 
theories make that model more complex.  Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, ed. C. 





page gallery, instead, provide close views of the kernel members shown as individual 
pieces on subsequent pages, each one on a separate page, and outside of the context of the 
installation (Figs. 3, 4, 6 and 7).  The viewers/readers of the catalogue, thereby, are not 
only deprived of “direct” encounters with the kernel‟s assemblage; they are also left with 
a photographic simulacrum which may or may not reflect the architectonics (and 
architecture) of its physical analogue.  Moreover, to be examined in the book, the 
simulacrum demands a sequence of time and space and eye motion.  In other words, the 
fractured body of the simulacrum requires, at least, three subsequent glances, that put the 
emphasis on the individual flat images/pages, rather than on their three-dimensional 
spatial relationship.
30
  By the same token, the simulacrum‟s temporal progression creates 
another sequential effect which, although it seems like a product of the show‟s marketing, 
could be also genre-specific to the format of the book or generated by its master 
designers.  That is the dialogue between the only two members of the kernel that unfold 
in the book simultaneously—Whose Fly is This? by Ilya Kabakov (Fig. 3) and Titled 





                                                 
30
 To put it differently, if the catalogue had presented a group image of the factual kernel‟s assemblage, this 
would have emphasized the central position of the works within the room, their impact as a foursome three-
dimensional composition and their mutual spatial relationship.  By the same token, the kernel‟s 
representation on four individual images/pages disconnects the perception of the two outer pieces from the 
simultaneous appeal of the two middle entries.   
31
 Even though the juxtaposition of Kabakov and Kosuth follows the pre-established alphabetic order of 
artists and works, a close juxtaposition is, by no means, unavoidable.  The four kernel members could have 
been displayed as smaller images on fewer pages, or their individual pages-images could have been 
arranged differently within the same alphabetical order; e.g., as two visual pairs juxtaposed on two 




III. The Duo‟s Discordant Accordance 
 
As indicated previously, the structure of the simulacrum echoes the pre-
established alphabetic sequence.  In that regard, the first signature work, Place a Book in 
a Strong Light and This is What You Will See by John Baldessari, succeeds the two 
clusters of texts and faces a page that contains the abbreviated bios of the artists (Fig. 6).  
As a result, Baldessari‟s piece performs a gradual transition from language to pictorial 
representation as it combines written words, printed letters, a depicted book and a 
reproduction of the image and the text on the book‟s front cover.
32
  Similarly well-placed 
in relation to its adjacent image and page is the illustration of the last kernel work—
Metrocubo d’infinito by Michelangelo Pistoletto (Fig. 7).  Purely figural and devoid of 
any references to written texts, it connects with the subsequent view of the skylight room 
and leads into the picture installation.
33
  Thus, in the constellation of signature works, the 
first and the last images become thresholds of the kernel‟s orbit as they intersect, by way 
                                                 
32
 As natural as such an arrangement may seem, the impact of the first image that accosts the viewer after a 
long sequence of printed pages appears simultaneously surprising and anticipated.  The picture comes 
without a formal introduction and faces the page in which the bio of the same artist occupies an uppermost 
position.  At the same time, Baldessari‟s work facilitates the transition from printed page to photographic 
illustration by combining image and text and by reenacting their dual relation.  The drawing appears on the 
top of the work, however, its image refers to language as it depicts a printed book which, in turn, points 
back to art, because it represents a publication of Art Fundamentals.  In the end, Baldessari‟s work, placed 
in the beginning of the catalogue gallery, functions as an ironic and self-referential gesture, that points to 
the depicted art book, to itself as an image and text, to the other works in the exhibit and in the skylight 
room and to the catalogue as a printed medium. 
33
 Pistoletto‟s cube is the visual connection between the last image/page of the kernel and the establishment 
shot of the skylight room.  The repetition of the image facilitates the zooming out effect and the transition 
from the individual close-ups of the kernel to the long shots of the installation.  However, the same close 
juxtaposition of the cube‟s pictures also makes evident the fact that the two views are shot in different 
places or galleries.  On the left page, the work is positioned in the corner of a room (Fig. 7), while, on the 
right, it appears in the middle of the skylight hall, amidst other exhibition objects (Fig. 8).  Most noticeably, 




of compositional analogy, to form a frame that remains somewhat isolated from the 
kernel‟s nexus.  There, in the center or in medias res, as if to sculpt a homophony of 
incongruent cultural voices, the catalogue composes a duo of disparate works: Whose Fly 
is This? by Ilya Kabakov and Titled (A.A.I.A.I.) by Joseph Kosuth (Fig. 5).
34
 
Strategically placed, one next to the other, on the open recto and verso of two 
adjacent pages, Whose Fly is This? and Titled surmount vast cultural and geographic 
distances to overcome established linguistic, artistic and geopolitical barriers.  The axis of 
the catalogue kernel, therefore, creates a symbolic Russian-American diptych which, to 
use the ars poetica of Pakesch‟s essay, expands “the horizon of our geography of art” and 
celebrates “the end of the Iron Curtain and with it the division of the world into 
ideological systems.”
35
  Left to “speak” for itself in the heart of the kernel‟s quartet, the 
duo seems too much in sync with the show‟s avid marketing to be, in any compositional 
or visual way, accidental.
36
  Furthermore, upon a closer examination, it could be safely 
conjectured that the strategic intermarriage of Kabakov and Kosuth in the crest of the 
kernel‟s arrangement promulgates, in an iconic way, Quartet‟s geopolitical dream, 
aesthetic principle and philosophical dialectic. 
 The twofold diptych relation unveils an array of differences and similarities.  
Most evidently, the two conjoined parties differ in style, medium, color, shape, technique, 
                                                 
34
 In contrast to the other kernel works, these center pieces ought to be viewed simultaneously as a diptych 
that unfolds as soon as the viewer turns the first sheet of the kernel.  In medias res originally refers to, 
among other sources, Horace‟s Ars Poetica and describes the opening of a story “into the middle of things” 
as an ancient technique of epic narration.   
35
 Op. cit., Pakesch.   
36
 Apart from its footnote on the dates of Kabakov‟s and Pistoletto‟s pieces, Pakesch‟s essay does not 




measurements and iconography.  Most unexpectedly, they converge in all of the above, in 
addition to their appropriation of texts and references to the genres of books and 
paintings.  For instance, Kabakov‟s work is a middle-size rectangular painting rendered 
on wood (26 x 40 in.), framed and executed by hand with careful and lucid brushstrokes.  
Employing a traditional artistic technique, it features bright green, carmine red, 
aquamarine blue and black enamel that are symmetrically applied and superimposed on 
the surface of the industrial masonite.
37
  In comparison, Kosuth‟s piece is larger (47 x 47 
in.), square in shape and rendered with a reduced—black and white—palette.  With its 
flatness, geometric quality and graphic countenance, it playfully recalls the traditional 
pictorial genres and, more particularly, the model of monochromatic modernist painting.  
However, unlike Kabakov‟s colorful work, Titled discards any painterly technique in 




The iconographies of the two works also seem discordant.  Combining discursive 
and figurative elements, the painted work depicts a miniscule fruit fly, rendered in detail, 
in the center of a vast blue background.
39
  This tiniest, but prominently fashioned insect is 
                                                 
37
 The picture frame, painted in green, encloses the blue background, which similarly envelops the two 
green boxes positioned in the upper corners.  The two boxes are filled with a symmetrical sequence of 
black and red letters. 
38
 Kosuth has repeatedly insisted, on various occasions, that his Photostats are not paintings.  Kabakov, in 
comparison, has repeatedly referred to Whose Fly is This? and his other “conversational” works as 
paintings, although an official painter would have fiercely disagreed with such an abuse of the traditional 
Soviet genre. 
39
 The fly is, in fact, positioned slightly to the left, which reinforces the trajectory and the direction of its 
suggested forward motion.  However, two visual factors counter the effect of such implied dynamic—the 
static quality of the green boxes, though they are not precisely rectangular, and the spatial indeterminacy of 




flanked from above by the mirror presence of two rectangular boxes.  Painted in the same 
green hue and filled with similar rows of black and red text, the boxes are symmetrically 
placed in the painting‟s upper left and right corners.  Their Cyrillic letters are rendered by 
hand, each one executed in the same controlled, calligraphic and informal manner.  Such 
a manner signifies personal attention and individual touch in the application of a 
standardized cursive style of writing.  In the boxes, the function of each linguistic 
syntagma is marked by its color and spatial positioning, while the meaning of each 
lexical unit similarly corresponds to its size, placement and coloring.
40
   
The black words in the upper two rows give the full names of two individuals—a 
woman and a man—with the name and the surname placed on the top and the family 
name singled out in the lower black register.
41
  Ending with a colon, each person‟s name 
is succeeded by a direct-speech quotation: “Whose fly is this?” under the woman‟s name 
on the left and “This is the fly of Yuri,” below her companion‟s name in the right section.  
Connected by a paradigmatic relation, these two verbal remarks are clearly distinguished 
from the upper black letters by their larger size, carmine color, discursive function and 
strategic positioning.  As a result, by way of linguistic conventions, the painting conjures 
up a two-part anecdote: on the left, Irina Mihailovna Korobova asks: “Whose fly is this?”  
                                                                                                                                                 
geometric incongruity less perceptible and heightens the optical accommodation; i.e., the impression that 
the miniscule fly is not only visible, but it also appears “in focus.”   
40
 As a sequence of linguistic units, usually words or phonemes, the syntagma signifies a horizontal type of 
relation.  Thus, the syntagmatic axis of each box reflects the linear combination of words, while the 
paradigmatic axis involves the relation between the two boxes. 
41
 Such a manner of introducing a person, although fairly common in official settings, sounds notably 
formal and carries a slightly ironic tone of bureaucratic preciseness.  The woman‟s name, Irina Mihailovna 
Korobova, is written on the left, while, on the right, her male counterpart is listed in a similar fashion as 




On the right, German Ignatievich Berestezky answers “This is the fly of Yuri.”
42
  Since 
the primary subject of both dialogic remarks coincides with the little figure in the middle, 
the viewer of the work is prompted to recognize that Irina and German are discussing the 
fly in the center.
43
 
Placed next to Kabakov‟s painting, Titled seems not only color-deprived, but also 
fairly homogeneous, because instead of a two-way relation between image and word it 
features a single text with a simple paragraph organization.  Similarly to Whose Fly is 
This?, Kosuth‟s piece also presents a coherent sequence of language signs arranged 
syntagmatically and paradigmatically in a horizontal and vertical progression.  However, 
if a singular figural effigy marks the center of the painting, while the letters in the boxes 
remain fixed in its margins, the photostat places a massive body of text—shaped as a 
box—in the middle of the empty background.
44
  Similarly to its dialogical partner, Titled 
is also concerned with the issue of linguistic communication, the process of information 
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 Although the English translation of the painting‟s title is fairly close to the Russian original, it looses 
some of the additional syntactic, graphic and compositional bonds between the question and the answer.  
For instance, all lexical units written in Cyrillic are of a similar length, each one comprising three to four 
letters (3-3-4 in the first case and 3-4-4 in the second), which playfully coincides with the number of body 
parts in the image of the fly.  In addition, both sentences consist of three words, with the second and the 
third words of the question repeated as the first and second word in the answer; i.e., “Whose this fly [is]” 
and “This fly Yuri [of Yuri is].”  Flanking the margins of this compositional duplication, the Russian 
equivalents of “Whose” and Yuri” connect not only grammatically and syntactically by their possessive 
relation and mirror position, but also poetically as they rhyme in the beginning and the end of the twofold 
dialogic exchange.  The compositional correspondence, imbedded on this level of communication, takes 
part in a larger scale of symmetries that link together the dialogic boxes of the painting as the boxes are 
completely identical in terms of the number of words depicted in each horizontal sequence: 2-1-3.  (Even 
the spatial pattern consisting of two wider parts separated by a narrow middle section of the text in the 
boxes reverses the shape of the cross implemented in the miniscule form of the insect.) 
43
 The first level of semiosis (or establishing a connection between sign and meaning in a certain context) 
seems fairly straightforward: the grammatical subject of both locutions is a fly, so their linguistic referent 
could very well coincide with the painted fruit fly in the middle.  Positioned between the characters‟ names 
and the small image, the question and the answer also point to the fly in their capacity of verbal gestures. 
44
 The green boxes create the impression that the Cyrillic text is framed, enclosed and static and, therefore, 
fixed in the margins.  The paragraph‟s composition in Titled recalls the shape of a box; however, this shape 




exchange and the role of language.  Thus, the mutual preoccupation of both works, to 
expand on Pakesch‟s premise, is the act of questioning, the question about art or the 
function of art and the agency of the question as a tool and vehicle of analysis.
45
   
The linguistic synchronies between the paired works set the stage for some 
significant dissonance.  In contrast to the painting, Titled does not contain any 
handwritten elements and its “depicted shape” (the printed paragraph) takes over—
monolithic and unchallenged—the middle section of the black square.  In Kabakov‟s 
work, the green boxes echo the proportions of the painting and isolate the text from its 
blue background.  In Kosuth‟s piece, on the contrary, the tension between the “literal” 
square and the “depicted” (rectangular) shape triggers a more complex spatial and 
compositional dynamic.  For instance, the lacy composition of the paragraph creates the 
simultaneous impression of a lucid rectangular block, an interrupted white space or a 
screen of parallel lines superimposed over the background.  Thus, the lace of letters can 
be read simultaneously as one continuous entity-shape and as a framework of separate 
graphic elements.
46
  Lastly, both parties of the kernel duo play, in their genre-specific 
ways, on the format of an open book and page.  Kabakov‟s piece, for instance, recalls a 
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 In both pieces, the word “question” (on the left hand side of Titled) and the act of questioning (on the left 
hand side of the painting) are emphasized by their large size, bolder letters and spatial position in the 
beginning of the text or the communication.  This heightens the importance of the question “about art, 
about the function of art” evoked in Pakesch‟s essay.  The fact that the kernel‟s innermost works literally 
and metaphorically embody the director‟s central premise could also explain their visual pairing in the book 
and strategic placement in the installation.   
46
 Due to the incongruity of “literal” and “depicted” shapes, if the eyes focus on the text they are likely to 
superimpose its dimensions upon the proportions of the outer dark space and thus to read the black square 
as a black rectangle.  The negative image also leaves the viewer somewhat uncertain whether the letters 
project forward, remain still or recede in relation to the dark background.  For a discussion on “literal” and 





children‟s book illustration and employs the traditional painting technique to imitate the 
page format.  In comparison, Kosuth‟s photostat reproduces the negative image of a 
printed page, using a mechanical process and a photographic way of representation.
47
   
The most significant differences between the language-based works are connected 
with their communicative situations.  In each case, there are at least two venues of 
linguistic exchange: the first one is internal and pertains to the depicted discourse, while 
the second one is of extra-pictorial nature and involves the linguistic contact between the 
work and the viewer.  In the first regard; i.e., on the level of depicted communication, 
Kabakov‟s painting is fairly laconic and fairly dialogical.  It includes the minimum 
number of participants required, according to speech theory and simple logic, to conduct 
an active verbal exchange and to perform a successful interpersonal dialogue.  The two 
communicators (a speaker and a receiver) are arranged horizontally from left to right in 
accordance with their discursive roles and “chronological” succession.  On the left, the 
addresser Irina Korobova initiates language contact with an actively dialogical speech 
act; that is, an illocutionary inquiry heightened with a verbal deixis.
48
  On the right, 
German Berestezki steps in as the responsive addressee of her request and presents what, 
by all grammatical means, appears to be the question‟s logical answer.
49
  The linguistic 
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 In the catalogue, this relationship acquires an additional layer since it presents a page (dictionary) on a 
page (photostat) on a page (catalogue illustration). 
48
 The deixis and its deictic signs specify identity and spatial or temporal location from the perspective of 
the speaker or the hearer in the context in which the communication occurs.  In this case, the deictic role is 
performed by “whose,” “this,” and “of Yuri.”  On linguistic deixis see David Crystal, A First Dictionary Of 
Linguistics And Phonetics. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 103. 
49
 That is, if the viewer presumes: (1) that the personages indeed utter the written remarks, (2) that they 
converse about the same “fly” and (3) that German reacts in response to Irina‟s question.  Another 
complexity emerges when one realizes that the linguistic and the visual fly function as signs which may or 




convention, therefore, proposes a time relation in which the verbal gesture posed in the 
pictorial left/past evokes a right-positioned (future) answer.
50
  The timelessness and static 
quality of the depiction, however, challenges such a temporal presumption, because the 
progression of time has long been connected to the second protagonist in Lessing‟s 
dichotomy of painting and poetry.
51
  The endless quality of the painting‟s temporality, 
therefore, creates a repetition of questions and answers that forms a locutional circle in 
the open time/space of extra-pictorial communication.   
In regard to the semantic aspects of Kabakov‟s depicted dialogue, the situation 
seems fairly straightforward since the messages deployed are factual and informational 
and concerned with an insect that is present in the painting.  However, from the 
perspective of the extra-pictorial exchange between the image and the viewer, the 
information provided seems absurd or, at least, insufficient, because it asserts that a 
certain fly belongs to somebody called Yuri.
52
  Linguistically, the pictorial event and the 
possessive relation exceed the provided frame of reference, because, unlike the other 
three protagonists, Yuri remains unfamiliar to the viewer and, figurally, “left out” of the 
picture.  Such a gap between depicted discourse and linguistic frame of reference creates 
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 Placed in the middle, the fly ought to, in this regard, embody the painting‟s linguistic present. 
51
 Gotthold Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, trans. Edward McCormick 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
52
 Linguistically, the reference to Yuri acts as an exophora; i.e., an expression referring to an extralinguistic 
(and, in this case, extrapictorial or extracontextual) referent.  See R.R.K. Hartmann and F.C. Stork, 





the unsettling impression that Irina and German may both know or may not know 
something that is clearly left unknown to the viewer.
53
 
Titled also takes on the speech genre of question-and-answer but exhibits quite 
different intentions, as it eliminates the separation of the two verbal acts and conflates 
their dynamic in one static, monophonic and non-dialogical utterance.
54
  In Kabakov‟s 
work, the two speakers share the stage so that the discursive agency is evenly distributed, 
while the viewer remains excluded from their insider‟s perspective and outside of their 
frame of reference.  In Titled, the rhetorical power belongs to the one and only agent of 
the communication.  That is the voice of the artwork which, addressing the reader 
unilaterally and monologically, contains all questions and answers.
55
  In the end, the main 
discursive feature that unites the diptych‟s wings is their quotational quality as each one 
of the works quotes voices or texts recorded as a written performance.  In Kabakov‟s 
case, the quotational mode seems non-hierarchical and conversational, since both 
individuals exercise epistemological authority—one, by the ability to ask the question, 
the other, by knowing the answer.  However, the true democratic quality of the painted 
citation is evoked by the absolute lack of authorial authority; that is, the lack of explicit 
(or implicit) omnipotent voice that can explain the absurd and clear all ambiguities.   
                                                 
53
 This impression is intensified by the ambiguity of the various explicit and implicit deictic signs in the 
dialogue: “whose,” “this,” and “of Yuri.”  If, in the context of the painting, the first two signs could be seen 
as visual and verbal gestures pointing to the fly, the third sign, respectively, serves as a double, visual and 
verbal, exophora. 
54
 To unravel the semantic overlaps of such a conflation, one ought to consider the following layers: the 
definition of the word “question” gives an answer to the question about the meaning of the word “question” 
and the act of questioning.  “Speech genre” as a term originates in the discourse theory of Mikhail Bakhtin.   
55




Titled, in contrast, does not leave room for freedom of thought and, by the same 
token, for epistemological wavering since it gives stage to the voice of the social norm 
and, by way of its sheer size, monumentalizes the linguistic convention.  As if to 
eliminate any questions on the meaning of the word “question” and the act of 
questioning, it presents the viewer with a final and definitive answer; i.e., quotes the 
definition of the noun—directly, formally and properly—with the erudite tone of a 
standardized dictionary authority.  Quoted verbatim and photographically, the literary 
code assumes a dubious place in the diptych.  Pictured on the left wing, Kabakov‟s 
painting grants voice to the ordinary people who, cited as individuals, silence the 
omnipresent classical author or the omnipotent anonymous editorials.  The American 
counterpart, seen on the right, takes all power away from everyday utterance and gives it 
to the official rule and depersonalized voice of the linguistic canon.  Since the dictionary, 
as a means and form, embodies the established norm and instills the logic of the 
convention, the quoted ordinance can impose, with a proper educational tone, the power 
of authority and the status quo of a certain social order.  Lastly, even though it is divided 
into two individual parts, the voice of the painting maintains its compositional unity 
through the common theme and continuous conversational dynamic.  Presented as 
monolithic, monumental and monological, Kosuth‟s photographic image, instead, carries 
in its compositional center a subtle, yet important division.
56
   
                                                 
56
 This semantic unity within the syntactic division of Kabakov‟s work is flanked by a semantic division 
within the compositional unity of Titled in a way that recalls Pakesch‟s dialectic of commonalities in the 




The first impression of Titled, in the close presence of its diptych partner, is that 
of thematic and textual coherence.  Shaped as a long rectangle that demarcates the middle 
of the back square poised within the vertical rectangle and white frame of the catalogue 
page, the photostat appears as a highly organized union of parts and sequence of 
geometric entities.  This visual unanimity is coupled with semantic uniformity, because, 
from the beginning to its end, the text appears devoted to one deductive theme and 
purpose—to present a compact, thorough and lucid definition of a word that evokes 
different meanings.  Yet, if the viewers read the quoted text, they would discover a 
discrete antinomy in the omnipotent stature of the social authority.  The upper half of the 
paragraph is thematically and compositionally devoted to the primary meaning of the 
term “question” as an “action of inquiring,” “stating of investigation of a problem,” 
“inquiry into a matter” and “discussion of some doubtful point.”  The nexus uniting these 
variants of denotation lies in the idea of intellectual reflection, which, according to the 
dictionary text, takes shape in a discussion, utterance of a problem, verbal investigation, 
action of inquiring or, in other words, through the action, agency and application of 
language.  As a result, even though in the diptych‟s duet the photostat stands for a static, 
omnipotent and monological countenance, the opening part of its verbal performance 
carries the potentiality of discussion, doubt and linguistic action.
57
 
Similarly to its Russian counterpart, Titled contains a second voice/perspective, 
which appears to undercut the work‟s quotational homophony with its unannounced but 
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 The notion of linguistic potentiality is used here not in its literal sense as the effect of grammatical 
conditionals, but in terms of syntactical structure.  Since major parts of the definition do not contain actual 
verbs, the closest to the effect of action is the performative potentiality carried by gerunds and verbal 




sizable presence.  This second protagonist emerges in the center of the printed paragraph 
to take over and dominate the bodily half of the dictionary countenance.
58
  Semantically, 
this bottom register pertains to the secondary designation of the word “question,” which 
brings a political spin to the process of cognition and interprets the noun as an “action of 
interrogating, or examining a person,” “the fact of being questioned” and “the application 
of torture as part of judicial examination.”
59
  The semantic dichotomy ingrained in the 
word‟s double referentiality, creates a silent ethical dilemma, which, compressed in a 
short middle pause, questions the paragraph‟s harmony and apparent uniformity.  
Dividing the text‟s body into two equal halves, this split reflects the antithetical nature of 
language and, through it, the inherent duality entrenched in our language-dependent 
cognition and in the structure which, according to structuralism, creates the model for all 
human systems—the system of language.
60
 
                                                 
58
 The second voice is introduced with the number two (2) which marks the secondary meaning of the 
word.  The lower bodily half refers to Nietzsche‟s ill-fated theory on the origins of tragedy.  According to 
his genealogy, tragedy was generated by the synthesis of idealized plastic arts (i.e. sculpture) as a 
representation of the intellectual Apollonian view of the world and the wild physical Dionysian element 
found in festivals and music.  See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).  The Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin connects the ecstatic and transformative nature 
of the medieval carnival found in Rabelais with the same Dionysian element and wild Bacchanal forces.  
Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press), 1968  Both theories originate in 
the antithetical Greek myths of the birth of Athena who sprung from the intellectual part of Zeus‟ body—
his head—and the birth of Dionysius/Bacchus from Zeus‟ lower physical half—his leg.   
59
 The fact that the photostat‟s synthesis of ideas, in the philosophical sense, and the second most important 
boundary of its text—the end—coincides with a reference to “application of torture” conveys a certain 
outlook on human history and language. 
60
 Whether thinking impacts language and how language impacts thinking is a long-standing dilemma, 
however, to add some recent evidence, forty one years after the date of Kosuth‟s Titled, the question 
whether torture as a tool of interrogation is judicially questionable is still a valid question for public dispute 
and discussion.  Articulated most notably by Barthes, the conviction that all social and cultural systems are 
modeled after their prototype and mother-system—the system of language—has been subsequently 




As much as it imitates the standardized dictionary format, Titled is a hybrid work 
that functions simultaneously as text and as image.  Thus, resembling an open thesaurus 
page, the photostat quotes a printed paragraph, which appears—photographed, replicated 
and oversized—as the negative copy of the actual original.  As a result, the enlarged 
color-stripped representation not only draws attention to the tangible quality and 
constructed character of the textual rendition, but it also challenges the paragraph‟s 
conventionalized sequence in space and time and questions its established linearity.
61
  In 
such a genre overlap, the text of the image, on the one hand, leads from intellectual 
inquiring to the physical application of torture as a judicially sanctified practice and a 
factual historical reference (“the application of torture as part of a judicial examination 
1583”).  The image of the text, on the other hand, creates a circular relation between the 
antithetical aspects of the word and their respective social realms or parts of human 
nature.  This discrete compositional cycle, which surfaces as soon as one finishes reading 
the text to grasp the whole of the picture, reenacts not only the innate dualism of the 
human genome, but also, perhaps, the dialectic of the human condition.  In the end, 
within the context of the diptych‟s duet and Pakesch‟s geopolitical vision, Kabakov‟s 
circular dynamic on the horizon of continuous dialogic exchange conveys the resilience 
of the people, while the cyclical vertical continuity of Kosuth‟s philosophical antithesis 
reflects the duality of the system.  The question that follows as a logical epilogue to the 
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 The technique makes obvious the hidden imperfections of the graphic image, which are due to 




kernel‟s duet performance is how the synchronous iconography compares to the double 
account of the historical evidence and the artists‟ voices.   
  
IV. On the Opposite Sides of the Curtain 
 
As mentioned, the photographic gallery of the catalogue is preceded by four 
newspaper summaries and four artists‟ essays.  In addition to echoing the symmetries 
embedded in the rest of the book, these primary texts provide insights into the historical 
and cultural context of the works and support Pakesch‟s argument of Quartet‟s 
multifaceted unity.  Positioned immediately after (and thereby supporting) the 
geopolitical vision of the curator‟s text, the summarized front pages of the four daily 
newspapers, Izvestija, Corriere della Sera, New York Times and Los Angeles Times, 
successfully fulfill the director‟s objectives.  Placed between the newspaper summaries 
and the catalogue gallery, the quartet of four artists‟ essays, instead, offers primary 
insights into the illustrated artworks.  In the end, bringing together the four stars and the 
“four different corners of the earth,” the voices of journalists and artists demonstrate the 
impact of the global theme “utopia” and capture the political climate of 20 August 1968 
as a chronological denominator of the catalogue and the show.
62
 
                                                 
62
 “For example we decided to make the 20 August 1968 the point of reference for the installation.  The day 
which followed was the day on which that decade lost something of its innocence: The invasion of Prague 
by Warsaw Pact troops presented a further climax in the Cold War, and, as we know with hindsight, was 
the beginning of the end of the Iron Curtain and with it the division of the world into ideological systems.”  




The dialectic of similarities and dissimilars paradoxically unites the front pages of 
the four featured newspapers as all of them address the same political issues and key 
events of the day through opposite ideological lenses.
63
  The two common themes in the 
antagonistic dissonance of journalistic warfare are the Vietnam War and the intense 
political situation in communist Czechoslovakia.
64
  In response to the two coincidental 
military invasions—one evolving as a continuous war in Asia, the other captured on the 
brink of its escalation in Central Europe—the four newspapers compose their own duet of 
distinguishingly antiphonic voices: the Russian Izvestija and the American The New York 
Times.
65
  It is hardly accidental that such a thematic duet within the journalistic quartet 
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 Interestingly, the newspaper sequence does not conform to the rule of alphabetic sequence and puts an 
emphasis on the first paper—the Russian Izvestija—which is followed by the Italian Corrierre dela Sera, 
the American The New York Times and Los Angeles Times.  In this arrangement, the two longest paper 
summaries Izvestija and The New York Times precede the two shorter ones.  
64
 Although the four publications address similar issues, they arrange the events in a different way and use 
divergent rhetoric.  For instance, Izvestija discusses the tensions in Czechoslovakia in its foremost 
paragraph under the title “Key to European Security.”  Corrierre dela Sera begins with the Vietnam War 
and the American elections in a section that discusses the Vietnamese attacks in south of Saigon titled 
“New Offensive by Hanoi.”  This precedes the second key section of the Italian newspaper, “An Illusory 
Aggressiveness: The Mistaken Strategies of Breshnev Against Prague,” which states that “The 
Czechoslovak crisis has revealed the deep interior weakness of the USSR, and even more showed the 
modest stature of the head of the Kremlin when facing the logic of the events.”  In The New York Times the 
issues of the election (first paragraph) and the Vietnam War (first and second paragraph) appear before the 
Russian news which is mentioned in the sixth paragraph.  The summary of the Los Angeles Times lacks any 
news on Russia and centers on the Vietnam War and the American elections in the opening paragraph 
“President Johnson rejected a complete halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and promised Monday night 
his Administration never will „move down that slippery slope” of one-sided steps toward peace.  And Mr. 
Johnson predicted that whoever succeeds him in the White House will take the same stand.”  Similar 
ideological battle between text and image unfolds on the masterfully designed cover of the catalogue.  On 
the front cover, the title of The New York Times is placed on the top countered by the lower but slightly 
larger title of Izvestija (Fig. 1).  Then, the front page propaganda images of the Russian paper showing a 
factory worker and gigantic machinery, that resembles a weapon, is overlapped (and verbally echoed) by a 
clipping from The New York Times.  The clipping discusses Eisenhower‟s pacemaker, the attacks in South 
Vietnam and the presentation of the Vietnam plank to the Democratic platform committee.  Similarly, on 
the back cover of the catalogue, a clipping from Los Angeles Times, with a central section titled “Rival 
Democrats Prepare for Test on Viet Plank,” is superimposed over the page of Corriere della Sera.  Ibid.   
65
 In the rhetoric of ideological propaganda, it is important that Izvesija’s first paragraph Key to European 
Security does not attack openly the liberalized regime in Prague and the legitimate calls of Czech 




recalls the diptych in the gallery of the kernel.  However, although it seems fairly 
compelling, the direct link between the four newspapers and the four artists or, by the 
same token, their constellation of four quartet works, seems far less experiential.  Such a 
link is evoked by the symmetrical correspondence of similar numbers of texts and 
established in the essay of the director as a potentiality.
66
  However, whether they were 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conference of the Communist and Workers‟ Parties,” the results of which “continue to command the 
attention of the world public” as the speakers “stressed the importance of European security, because many 
sources of international tensions originate there.”  Thus, in order to preserve European security (not to 
merely enforce Soviet interests) an action has to be taken.  The urgency of the situation is recognized, 
according to the paper, by all Czechoslovak workers (in reality, only by loyal Slovak officials), because 
“Imperialist reaction has stepped up its provocations recently.”  To make the threat more evident and the 
action clearly necessary, the third sentence pictures the global character of a conspiracy: “The revanchist 
forces in West Germany, helped by their American patrons, seek a revision of the European boundaries and 
harbor aggressive plans against the GDR, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries.”  As a result, there 
is only one mighty force that can stop the destructive ambitions of the evil peril: “The Warsaw Treaty 
remains to be a mighty factor of peace and a reliable instrument to defend sovereignty and independence of 
the fraternal state.”  Thus, Izvestija‟s first paragraph answers firmly to the threat, shows readiness to defend 
the fraternal sanctity of the status quo and gives legitimacy to the illegal foreign invasion of Prague that 
would take place on the following day.  The Russian coverage of the Vietnam War comes after six 
paragraphs on the Soviet economic accomplishments.  Starting with the Vietnamese side in the conflict, the 
paper celebrates the calls of the “press of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam” to the Vietnamese people 
“to make every effort in order to defeat the American aggressors.”  The next paragraph praises the 
“offensive launched by units of the People‟s Liberation Army of South Vietnam” that “resulted in 600 
enemy losses including 450 Americans.”  After this, much less than glorifying, mentioning of the American 
forces, Izvestija turns to the Vice-President Humphry‟s speech “in favor of continuing the bombing of 
North Vietnam” and to the speaker of the US Air Force who, as if in response to the Vice-President, “said 
that due to a „technical failure‟ they lost contact to the 12 satellites launched yesterday with one Atlas 
rocket.”  The front page of The New York Times reverses the Russian ideological language.  For instance, 
the Vice President Humphrey appears in the first paragraph which discusses the “Vietnam plank”: “Backers 
of Vice President Humphrey presented to the Democratic platform committee today the outlines of a 
compromise Vietnam plank that that would accept, but not demand, a cessation of the bombing of North 
Vietnam and formation of a coalition Government in South Vietnam.”  This official party position is 
backed by the public support summarized in the second paragraph: “A Louis Harris poll has indicated that 
the American people, by 61 per cent to 24, oppose a cessation on the bombings of North Vietnam.”  
Casting such bright light on the massive approval of the Vietnam war, the American front page turns to the 
dimmer situation in Czechoslovakia to assess the ideological propaganda of the Soviets: “The Soviet Union 
maintained its propaganda pressure on Czechoslovakia today, intensifying accusations that the reform 
leadership appeared unable or unwilling to give „the necessary rebuff‟ to anti-Communist plotters.”  Ibid. 
66
 In this sense, the potency that “the four artists might well have read” the four newspapers is left as open 
as long-drawn-out seems to be the argument that the 20
th
 of August led to the Prague invasion that, in turn, 
led to the end of the Iron Curtain and its “division of the world into ideological systems” and all of that 
prompted a new geography of art, which was facilitated by the involvement of the artists in the exhibition.  




read or not read by the artists, the newspapers remain a “backdrop” that illuminates the 
historical context of the time, but does not explain the specificity and ambiguity of the 
artworks. 
A more direct venue into the artistic language of the works is offered by the 
second textual cluster—the four artists‟ essays.  Among them, the parables of Baldessari 
and the letter of Pistoletto, which open and close the alphabetic sequence of the texts, 
relate to one another and differ from the middle essays because both the parables and the 
letter feature imaginary characters in fantastic situations.
67
  The two middle entries—the 
writings of Kabakov and Kosuth—also entertain a mutual bond of subject and language 
as they discuss, with a more serious tone, analogous questions of philosophical, artistic 
and linguistic nature.
68
  Within this duet of texts, Kabakov‟s essays assume the most 
intimate and self-revealing stature in a section that is designed to sound personal; i.e., to 
narrow the wide political stage of the newspaper front and to quote the voice of each one 
of the four individuals.
69
  However, the stance of honest disclosure of one‟s thoughts and 
emotions as a most typical feature of Kabakov‟s writing contradicts the historical reality 
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 Positioned in the beginning of the artists‟ texts, the Ten Parables by Baldessari resemble short stories or 
fables, in the center of which there is an art-related subject and at the end of which there is a “moral.”  For 
example, the subject of the first fictional narrative is the fate of “a little known painting by Ingress,” which 
was not kept well by its owners, so it gradually faded away and disappeared to leave only the nail, on 
which it was displayed, and some “well-kept” provenance records.  The moral, recorded at the end of the 
fable, presents a reflection of conceptual nature: “If you have an idea in your head, the work is as good as 
done.”  Pistoletto‟s Letter interprets the contemporary technology, media and methods of communication as 
a reality that was foreseen in the past “by men who wrote sci-fi stories.”  Pistoletto, “Letter” (Ein Brief) and 
Baldessari, “Ten Parables “(Zehn Parabeln) in Quartet. 
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 Kabakov‟s text is, in fact, a sequence of three essays: “Concealment” (Das Verbergen), “The Word and 
Image as Equals” (Die Gleichberechtigung von Wort und Bild), and “A Bad Thing” (Das Schlechte Ding).  
Kosuth‟s long essay “Art After Philosophy” (Kunst nach der Philosophie) appears after Kabakov‟s text and 
consists of, similarly, three numbered section.  Ibid.  
69
 The subject of Kabakov‟s three essays is the same—art and language—as phenomena affecting all 




and the subject of his first essay and appears largely misleading.  In reality, the artist‟s 
honest exposure often conceals an intense dynamic between thought and language and a 
complex relation between the views that become articulated and the intentions that are 
not (and shall not be) uttered.  Therefore, it seems hardly irrelevant that Kabakov‟s first 
essayistic entry is, in fact, the text Concealment, which, posed as the essay‟s title and the 
artist‟s first word in the catalogue, carries a special significance.   
 
V. The Voice behind the Curtain: Concealment 
 
The meaning of the verbal noun concealment appears laid out in the first sentence 
of the essay.
70
  In this opening statement, the situation of concealment is not explained, as 
this typically would be the case, by focusing on what is being concealed, the state and 
place of concealment or the verbal and physical act of concealing.
71
  Kabakov approaches 
the word‟s semantics, instead, from a perspective that is absent in the official dictionary 
definition—from the point of view of what is being, though deceivingly, uttered: 
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 Literally, a verbal noun is a noun derived from a verb as an inflection of the verb or the verb stem (e.g., 
concealment and conceal).  These action-nouns appear somewhat dynamic as they still carry, more or less 
explicitly, their etymological and semantic connection with the verb.  The Russian equivalent of 
concealment, used in the essay‟s original text—ukrivatel’stvo—is constructed and functions in the same 
way.  Ilya Kabakov, Dialogi 1990-1994 (Moscow: Ad-Marginem, 1999), 35 
71
 For instance, according to the Wester‟s New Dictionary, concealment means (1) forbearance of 
disclosure; a keeping close or secret, (2) the act of hiding, covering or withdrawing from sight, (3) the state 
of being hidden or concealed; privacy, (4) a place or means of hiding; a secret place, (5) secret knowledge; 
a secret, (6) in law, the suppression of truth to the injury or prejudice of another; the withdrawal of 
knowledge which one is bound in justice to reveal.  Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the 
English Language, Unabridged.  Second edition.  (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 375.  
The latter aspect of the word‟s content presents the semantic antipode to the lower register of Titled’s 




In principle, by this word I understand the situation whereby what is said and 




Accentuated by itself in the position of a single paragraph, this programmatic 
sentence initiates two important premises.  First, it places the linguistic emphasis not on 
the thought or the thing being concealed, but on the articulated words, even if they do not 
express the speaker‟s intention.  Second, it fleshes out a tension that will become 
instrumental throughout this essay and other Kabakov‟s texts—the irrevocable gap 
between “what is said” and what remains (and shall remain) unspoken.
73
  The essay then 
turns an abstract situation into reality by comparing the repercussions of the state of 
concealment in “normal everyday life” and in visual art: 
 
Of course, this situation is often encountered and pursues various goals in normal 
everyday life.  But such a means of communication as applied to graphic art 
appears somewhat strange and in general unpleasant… How is this generally 
possible?  After all, by the very concept of “art” we always imply what is visible, 
manifest, and not what was intended, desired, proposed, etc.  How could such a 




Placed between the opening sentence and the remaining body of the text, this 
paragraph-transition presents an opportunity to build rhetorical momentum and 
anticipation before moving from the general state of the matter to the personal life of the 
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 Ibid.  Cynthia Martin‟s translation of the Russian sentence here is quite literal, with the only exception of 
the fact that the Russian original sounds more conversational, because “one” in the generalized form of the 
subject “one does not” is missing, as this is common in Slavic language, and “whereby” it is substituted 
with “in which”: “V printsipe pod etim ya ponimayu situatsiyu, pri kotoroy govoritsya i vyskazyvaetsya to, 
chto ne imeetsya v vidu.”  Ilya Kabakov, Dialogi, 35 
73
 At this point, the potentiality that the subject has something in mind is left open.  
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artist.  This rhetorical goal is successfully accomplished by three discursive devices: a 
dichotomy, an ellipsis and a gradation of two rhetorical questions.  The dichotomy 
juxtaposes the commonality of concealment in “everyday life” with the same means of 
communication in art where, in contrast, they appear strange and unpleasant.  Marked 
graphically (“…”), the ellipsis separates the initial dichotomy, stated as a common 
knowledge and law, from the lower half of the passage that seems more emotional due to 
the rhetorical questions and the synonym accumulation.
75
  As a result, the paragraph 
suggests in both logical and emotional terms that concealment, which is problematic as “a 
means of communication” in itself, creates an even greater complexity in the field of 
visual art because the latter, by definition, implies “what is visible, manifest, and not 
what was intended.”
76
  To resolve this apparent paradox, without truly resolving it, the 
essay makes a second rhetorical leap.  Changing the setting again, it moves to another 
area contiguous to visual art—the field of language—in which the phenomenon of 
concealment achieves a state-of-the-art presentation: 
 
The thing is that this concealment exists and is ideally realized in an area that is 
contiguous to a graphic endeavor: in today‟s language, the divergence between 
the word and its content is demonstrated beautifully.  We are fortunate witnesses 
to a time of complete rupture between the word and its semantics.  We encounter 
texts which do not mean anything.  In such a situation of rupture, meaning, 
significance, not finding a “coupling” with the designated word, searches for an 
outlet in roundabout, indirect ways of expression, resorting to euphemisms, 
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 Ibid.  The ellipsis indicated by the same punctuation mark in Russian and in English “…” makes the 
logical connection between both parts open and ambiguous.  The rhetorical questions are: “How is this 
generally possible?” and “How could such a formulation come to mind?”  The accumulated semantical 
analogues include: “visible, manifest” and “intended, desired, proposed.” 
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metaphors, but most often to a special figure of suppression, which I would call a 




Referring to, among other things, the impact of state propaganda and the workings 
of ideology on all levels of Soviet life and language, the passage pictures a fundamental 
discordance between linguistic expression and the domain of meaning.  It is also in the 
course of this discussion that the essay raises, for a first time, a most important semiotic 
inquiry—the prospect of that which is being concealed—i.e., the aspects of “semantics,” 
“significance” and “meaning.”
78
  Deprived of access to its “designated word,” the 
concealed content, unexpectedly, acquires linguistic agency and finds an outlet in a 
peculiar way through silence (suppression of utterance) and figurative language.  Such a 
semiosis (as creation of meaning) empowers two of the three participants in the process 
of encoding, transmitting and decoding of linguistic information: the sign and the sign‟s 
creator.  First, the situation bestows a wider freedom upon the addressant of the linguistic 
sign, because it provides a multiplicity of codes—i.e., channels that encode the message 
and ways to evade direct expression.  Second, the process gives leverage to the signified 
(the content) of the sign which, despite the lack of “coupling” with its signifier (“the 
designated word”), entertains a wider variety of “roundabout, indirect ways of 
expression.”  The last protagonist of the semiotic triad—the viewer or the addressee of 
the linguistic message—remains left out or, more precisely, left alone in the concealment 
domain to wonder about and to attempt to decode the concealed signified and the indirect 
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code of the figurative expression.
79
  Denied a key to the author‟s signified; i.e., to the 
speaker‟s intention, the receiver of empty signifiers acquires instead a vast supply of 
“texts that do not mean anything,” euphemisms, metaphors and other signs of language 




 After plunging into a sea of linguistic perplexity, the essay casts a rather personal 
glance on the ramifications of concealment in the works and the life of the artist: 
 
Something similar to this emerged for me as soon as I began to make my large 
works.  They immediately turned out to be in a situation of talking, being a 
depiction of that which is not a “direct” utterance.  Between the thing and me a 
gap had emerged, but not at all in a sense that, well, I couldn‟t express myself, I 




 In contrast to the previous paragraphs, this passage changes the tone and the 
setting, turning to the studio of the artist and the inner voice of thoughts and emotions.  In 
such a context, it is important that the artist steps in again, for a first time after the 
opening statement, to become the linguistic subject of an “I”-discourse and to present 
himself as the addressee of this text and the maker of language-based artworks (“my 
large works”).  The situation of concealment, however, puts into question the maker‟s 
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 In this context, it is significant that “the speaker” of Kabakov‟s essay, announces himself as a linguistic 
subject, for a first time in the third paragraph, at the point in which the text addresses the experience of the 
receiver of empty signs.  Thus, after the “I-subject” of the initial statement (“by this word I understand‟), 
after the impersonal tone of the following generalized observations (“this situation is often encountered”) 
and after joining the plural agent of the general understanding about art (“by the very concept of „art‟ we 
always imply what is visible”), here the speaker identifies with the witnesses and addressees of the empty 
expression: “We are fortunate witness to a time of complete rupture…  We encounter texts that do not 








control of his artistic subjects.  As soon as they are produced, his works become 
independent and start expressing not what the artist has in mind but “that which is not a 
„direct‟ utterance.”
82
  As a result, the diminished agency of the addressee, the addressant 
and the sign undergoes further semiotic reductions, until there is only one agent 
maintaining some sense of linguistic control—the talking sign of the dialogic artwork 
(“my creation”).  However, the same passage reveals that the agency of the artistic sign 
is, as a matter of fact, an illusion, because the artist‟s works do not actively talk, but “turn 
out to be in a situation of talking”; i.e., turn into a vehicle of “that which is not a „direct‟ 
utterance.”  In the end, the artistic sign becomes a tool of what seems to be the only 
active linguistic force—the indirect anonymous utterance.  In all probability, this force is 
related to the only real agent in the state of concealment—the “meaning, content”—that 
is devoid of a “coupling” with a designated word and “searches for an outlet in round-
about, indirect ways of expression.”
83
 
 The personal sentiments of the last passage insinuate an emotional drama 
suggested by the fact that the gap between creator and work does not reflect the language 
skills (or lack thereof) of the artist.
84
  However, instead of expanding on the dramatic 
potential of the moment, the essay inverts the mood again to proceed in a rather 
unexpected direction: 
 




 Ibid.   
84
 Conveyed by the parallelism of analogous syntactical constructions“I couldn‟t… I wasn‟t … I 




The situation between what I do and what I have in mind I immediately perceived 
as normal, moreover, it seemed to me to be most interesting and fruitful.  These 
creations began to „work‟ at the moment when the gap became distinctly 
established, that is, when the thing existed separately from me, when it had been 
finished.  But its separateness in my mind did not mean its life was independent of 
me.  It was just the opposite.  At that moment, what began was some sort of 
special, rather strange dialogue between the finished thing and my consciousness.  




 In the end, despite the rupture between artist and artistic sign, the final creation, as 
it turns out, is not completely independent from the mind of the creator.  More precisely, 
as soon as the identity of the sign (the finished “thing”) becomes established as 
independent and self-sufficient, the artist enters a “rather strange dialogue” with the same 
counterpart of his creation.  In fact, it is not the created thing, but the communication 
between sign and creator that becomes the meaning and the goal of the artwork, as it 
gives agency back to the addressant and steers up his interpretative fervor: 
  
The terrible excitement of the consciousness at the appearance of a painting was 
the main meaning, the main endeavor.  This was not a contemplative state, but on 
the contrary, an active investigation, a departure into various, often distant areas 
of culturology, philosophy, social psychology.  All kinds of associations, 
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 Ibid.  The translation published in Universal System…  is less literal, but it captures the dynamic of the 
original: “These creations began to „work‟ as soon as the gap became distinctly apparent, that is, as soon as 
the thing existed separately from me, as soon as it was finished.  But its separateness in my notion of its life 
was not independent of me.  It was just the opposite.  At that moment, what began was some sort of special, 
rather strange dialogue between the finished thing and my consciousness, a conversation similar to „where 
did it bloom, when, in which spring…‟”  Ilya Kabakov, Universalsystem zur Darstellung von allem (A 
universal system for depicting everything) (Düsseldorf: Richter Verlag, 2002) 
86




 However, the idyll of the dialogic harmony is bound to be short-lived because the 
essay raises doubts about the reality of the author‟s interpretation.  Questioning whether 
the dialogue is part of the work and thereby conveyable to the viewer, the artist realizes, 
once more, that he might be alone in his dialogical journey: 
 
Furthermore, I had this strange impression that all these connections, meanings, 
all the „riches‟ were located in my work.  But this was only an empty hope, since I 
didn‟t do anything for this, I didn‟t work at it, I didn‟t even know how to do this.   
All of this, I said to myself, was just a desire! It was just an intention! Wouldn‟t 
another, a viewer, discover, perceive my „intention,‟ wouldn‟t he understand what 




 The intensity of the moment of self-questioning, doubt and hope is conveyed by 
various discursive devices, among which the syntactical parallelism, the repetition of 
phrases and the rhetorical question acquire a primary emotive significance.
88
  However, 
any possibility that the work may become a conduit of the artist‟s intentions fades away 
in the following paragraph in which, by way of another paradoxical jump, the essay turns 
back to the state of concealment and the posture of logic and reason: 
  
But intention, which is the most important thing according to the law of 
“concealment,” should be torn away from the realization, it gives joy only 
because it is not realized and the possibility of its realization is reserved.  And 
here is apparently the most important point, as it is the essence of the relationship 
between the consciousness and the finished thing.  Let it not realize the intention, 
let it be bad, ridiculous, in general insignificant.  But my consciousness is free 
from this thing, I did not enter into it, I can always stand on the side and discuss 




 Syntactical parallelism refers to the compositional link of syntactical units that are constructed similarly: 




it.  True here arises a special ambiguity.  I made this thing, but I want to and can 
be free from it.   
I don‟t know how to resolve this contradiction.  I like this “non-obligatoriness” of 
the thing for both me, and of course, for the viewer, who has always been free in 




 Bringing the reader back to the state of concealment, this passage comes at an 
important stage in the essay‟s repetitive composition.  First, it puts an end to the 
emotional tirade, the imaginary voyage of the dialogue and the “empty hope” that the 
“riches” of the artist‟s thoughts could be located in his work.  Second, as soon as the 
readers encounter, for a first time in the essay, a glimpse of what the artist has in mind 
(“my consciousness”), they are taken back to the “normal” state of concealment in which 
true communication—the only way into the consciousness—can be “joy” and 
potentiality, but never a real experience.
90
  The Kantinian part of the consciousness, 
which is “is free from the thing” and has the ability to “stand on the side and discuss it,” 
unfolds in a rather elaborate fashion in the essay‟s subsequent paragraph: 
 
But returning to the producer, it should be said that a part of himself entered into 
the finished work, he was „stupefied‟ by it (otherwise he couldn‟t have made it), 
and yet with another part of him he looked at the thing and at himself, not 
entering into the process, reserving to himself the right to discuss the work and its 
author.  It turns out that these two „parts‟, the two „I‟s created two types of 
production: from the first „producer‟ came the thing itself, from the second—the 
judgment about this thing.  But since both of these states can be objectivized, that 
is, become things in their own turn, then the possibility emerged to deal with the 
word and the image as equals.
91
 




 In other words, after the artist has discovered that his artworks are independent of him, he still hopes that 
his dialogue with them is somehow imbedded in his creation, only to realize that, according to the laws of 







 In order to address the gap between the work and its producer, the essay puts 
aside the “I”-tone and the linguistic identity of the artist/speaker/maker to promptly 
assume the more impersonal voice of a third-person discourse.  This occurs at the same 
discursive moment in which the artist‟s personality becomes divided itself into two 
separate identities.  As the essay confers, a part of the artist is “stupefied” by his work, 
because it enters the artistic process and becomes integrated into the final product.  
However, since this occurs in the common state of concealment, the integrated “I” 
corresponds neither to the “consciousness” of the producer, nor to his hidden artistic 
“intentions.”  The second “I” of the artist, in contrast, stands on the side, at a special 
Kantinian distance, from which it observes “the thing” and the stupefied “I” and obtains 
“the right to discuss the work and its author.”   
The abandonment of the essayistic I-discourse heightens the situation‟s 
complexity, because the artist under consideration is simultaneously the creator of the 
essay as well as the subject and object of its investigation.  As the creator of the essay, he 
is simultaneously the text‟s author, narrator and speaker.
92
  As a narrator, he speaks about 
artists, in general, and about himself as the primary subject-speaker (I) or the objectified 
“he” (“producer”) of his “large works” and his essay.
93
  To make the situation even more 
compound, the linguistic subject (I) splits into a creator‟s intention that never enters the 
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 The author is the real historical person writing the text; the narrator is the linguistic subject that narrates 
the event, usually, from a certain point of view; the speaker can coincide with the narrator or with one of 
the literary characters.   
93
 Such an artist‟s “I” that becomes objectified as “he” is, for instance, “the producer” in “But returning to 




work and an intellectual curiosity that starts a dialogue with the finished creation.  The 
linguistic object (the objectified version of the subject; i.e., the artist as “he” or “the 
producer”) undergoes a more explicit transformation, on his own, as “he” becomes an 
objectified “I” that splits into two “I”-identities—one, that enters the work and a second 
one that remains in the position of observing and discussing the work and the author.  In 
the end, whether they are “objectivized,” owned or adopted, all of these language 
identities—the “I” of the speaker, the “I” of the subject and the two “I-s” of the 
objectified subject-object—refer to the same artist and thus create a linguistic analogue-
image of a multiple artistic identity and polyphony. 
 As the next chapter demonstrates, the dialogue between different authorial 
identities characterizes not only the writing of Kabakov but also the art and personality of 
one of his key associates from this period—the artist Yuri Sobolev.  The essay 
Concealment, however, has a more immediate appeal and aesthetic goals in the rhetoric 
of Quartet‟s arrangement.  It gives a voice to Kabakov‟s works displayed in the show 
and, in particular, to the left wing of the kernel‟s diptych.  The section of the essay that 
most closely pertains to Whose Fly is This? is the final sentence in the last citation: 
 
But since both of these states can be objectivized, that is, become things in their 
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 Ibid.  The corresponding translation in The Text as the Basis… reads “But since these judgments cannot 
be objectivized, that is become things on their part…” but the meaning conveyed here is exactly the 
opposite of that in the original “No oba eti sostoyaniya mogut byt‟ ob”ektivirovany...”  See Ilya Kabakov, 
Der Text als Grundlage des Visuellen (The text as the basis of visual expression) (Köln: Oktagon, 2000), 
241; and Ilya Kabakov, 60-e—70-e: zapiski o neofitsial‟noi zhizni v Moskve (Wien: Gesellschaft zur 





 This closing statement, which introduces the theme of the following essay Word 
and Image as Equals, retroactively suggests that the dialogue of Irina and German and 
the effigy of the fly are equally important as visual components of the painting.  The little 
flying object may depict its corresponding physical referent or, as a visual metaphor, it 
may refer to the “stupefied” I of the artist that enters the finished artwork.
95
  The remarks 
of Irina and German, in the same regard, may enact the conversation of two imaginary 
characters or, by the same token, they may reenact the verbal exchange of two real people 
or two viewers.  However, the written words could be also recording the dialogue of the 
artist with the finished work which suddenly turns out to be in a situation of talking.  The 
text could also be describing the “objectivized” judgment of the second “I” that stands on 
the side to discuss the work and its producer.  In the light of such a plural logic, the 
viewers are likely to be encountering “texts that do not mean anything,” a significance 
that has lost its “coupling” with the word or an indirect visual expression.  In the state of 
concealment, however, none of the signs that are depicted or “said” conveys what is truly 
intended; i.e., what is in the mind of the artist.  Left with an artwork the perplexity of 
which matches only the twirled writing of the artist, the viewer of the catalogue can truly 
appreciate the premonition of the Kunsthalle‟s director who admits that the four kernel 
works “do not disavow the cultures they spring from, indeed, they can be conclusively 
                                                                                                                                                 
the essay, presents an elaboration on the same idea: “Gradually the line drawn between the judgment and 
the thing itself engendered two circumstances which I would like to pause upon in detail, recalling the 
1960‟s.  Those are „A Bad Thing‟ and „The Word and Image as Equals‟.”  The latter two quotations render, 
in a reversed order, the titles of the two essays that follow after Concealment in Quartet‟s catalogue and in 
the Kabakov‟s memoir 60-e—70-e. 
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explained from out of those cultures.”
96
  Following the path of that wise piece of advice, 
the next chapter leaves the geography of the Quartet to place Kabakov‟s works into the 
context of Russian art, history and culture.   
                                                 
96






From the “Indexical” to the “Iconic”: How the Shower Appeared  
in the Early 1960s 
 
I. Works “For Them” versus Works “For Oneself” 
 
Acknowledging the issue in passing, the scholarship has attributed the 
appropriation of language in the art of Kabakov to the “literary character” of Russian 
culture, the dominance of Russian literature and the overcrowded atmosphere of the 
Soviet communal apartment.  The artist‟s own reflections on the subject have often 
reinforced such presupposition and explanation.  Though Russian literature and Soviet 
communal life undoubtedly impacted Kabakov‟s approach and left a dialogic imprint in 
his so-called “conversational” artworks, the combination of written and pictorial signs in 
his art points to a far broader nexus of factors.  Furthermore, the dialogue of linguistic 
and visual models also results from internal developments within the architecture of 
Kabakov‟s thought and image.  Therefore, this chapter will widen the scope of inquiry to 
entwine the memories of the artist with an overview of his early production, his 
immediate circle of friends as well as the more general intellectual circumstances in 
which that circle was created.  As a result, such an approach ought to demonstrate that 




formally entered the space of his paintings.  In terms of chronology, this chapter explores 
the late 1950s and early 1960s to trace the process that led to the emergence of text in 
Kabakov‟s art and in, what appears to be, his first painting with words—Whose Fly is 
This?—in the mid-1960s. 
 Kabakov‟s personal account of his work and Moscow‟s artistic underground of 
the 1960s-1970s is given, in a most complete form, in the artist‟s early autobiography 
written two decades later—in the early 1980s: 60-e—70-e… Zapiski o neofitsial’noy 
zhizni v Moskve (1960s-1970s… Notes on the Unofficial Life in Moscow).
97
  Although the 
book concentrates on the two decades mentioned retroactively in the title, the narrative 
commences earlier, in the late 1950s, when Kabakov‟s “true” artistic activities began 
emerging.
98
  The first chapter—Do 1961 goda (Until 1961)—opens with a distinction 
between the work created “for oneself” (dlya sebya) and the work created “for them” 
(dlya nikh), i.e., the authorities—a division that echoes the rupture between the two “I”s 
of the artist in the essay Concealment.  The same opposition, as the author of the memoir 
concludes, was deeply ingrained in the educational system of the Soviet art school and 
the art academy.
99
  In the eyes of the communist leaders, the Soviet society needed artists 
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 Ilya Kabakov, 60-e—70-e… Zapiski o neofitsial’noy zhizni v Moskve.  Wiener Slavistischer Almanach.  
Sonderband 47  (Wien, 1999), subsequently Zapiski.  The first sentence of the memoir, the title of which 
can be translated in English as 1960s-1970s…Notes on the Unofficial Life in Moscow, indicates that it was 
commenced in 1982.  Ibid., p. 9. 
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 Arranged in a chronological fashion, the memoir contains two main sections, the 1960s and the 1970s.  
Each one of them is divided into subsections (chapters).  In a preliminary sentence-motto, “Seychas 7 
avgusta 1982 goda” (Today is August 7, 1982), Kabakov gives a concrete indication of when he started the 
text.  Ibid. 
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 Although it reflects the real conflicted status of the Soviet artist, Kabakov‟s vision and language is 
intensely dualistic in a way that points to a couple of factors.  The first one is the methodological apparatus 
of Russian structuralism (in its two branches—one in Moscow and one in Tartu) in the context of which 




who employed the aesthetic principles of socialism to promote the propaganda of the 
state, therefore, the art education (similarly to education in any other discipline) followed 
strict sets of rules pertaining to the style, form and content of the artwork.
100
  With a 
typical tone of self-irony, Kabakov admits that he quickly learned what was expected 
from him so, “as a trained rabbit” (“kak u dressirovanogo zaytsa”), he began producing 
art “for them”—his teachers, the artistic canon (Raphael and Rembrandt) and the socialist 
system: 
 
Postepenno, kak u dressirovannogo zaytsa, vyrabotalas‟ yasnost‟ togo, chto “im” 
ot menya nuzhno, i, takim obrazom, samo risovanie, kotoroe po vidimosti delal 
“ya”, bylo tselikom “ikh” delom, delom pedagogov i drugikh obraztsov, 




Gradually, as a trained rabbit, I realized what they needed from me, and, in such a 
way, the art that “I” seemed to create myself, was “their” art, in its entirety, the art 
of the teachers and other models, including Raphael and Rembrandt. 
 
 
 As a result, Kabakov explains, he felt a deep sense of alienation and estrangement 
from his artistic creation which was not only “work for them” but, in essence, “their 
work” because it remained foreign to its creator.  The estrangement led Kabakov to 
believe that he was not a “real” artist—a motif that would long dominate his own self-
perception—and a strong desire to discover and express his inner self: 
                                                                                                                                                 
operated on a set of binary oppositions; e.g., “in/out” or culture/non-culture.”  Kabakov‟s binary language 
is also related to the principal conflict between the romanticist subject and the external world—a primary 
motif in Russian literature (e.g., Gogol and Dostoevsky)—or the fundamental ideological dichotomies of 
Soviet socialist propaganda, such as “us” versus “them.” 
100
 The state controlled all official educational and intellectual activities to make sure that they conform to 
its ideology.  The visual arts were especially important as they had the ability to reach the uneducated 
masses.   
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No vnutrennee zhelanie uznat‟, chto ya takoe, zachem ya, chto eto za zanyatie, 
kuda ya vtolknut‟ bez moego “prisustviya”, vse vremya boleznenno muchilo 
menya, i, konechno, ono dolzhno bylo proyavit‟sya prezhde vsego kak 
nekhudozhestvennoe delo, “neiskusstvo”.   
 
Seychas… ya stal chuvstvovat‟ sebya „khudozhnikom”, no togda, v te gody, ya 
dlya sebya byl tol‟ko slepym, bespomoshchnym, zagnannym chelovekom, 





But the inner desire to discover what am I, why am I, what kind of activity is that 
in which I am shoved without being “present,” tormented me painfully all the 
time, and, of course, it had to manifest itself as a non-artistic activity, “non-art.”   
 
Today… I feel I am an artist, but back then, in those years, I saw myself only as a 
blind, helpless outsider, because the artist‟s occupation was “for them,” I was 
creating “art” for their approval. 
 
The personal outcome of this “coming of age” was Kabakov‟s innate resentment 
of any imposed authorities, dogmas or influence: from the official canon of socialist 
realism, through its officialized classic examples (e.g., Raphael and Rembrandt) to the 
unofficially extant Russian avant-grades of the 1920s and contemporary art in the West: 
 
Eto otnoshenie otchuzhdeniya, nesliyaniya potom ostalos‟ navsegda, dazhe i 
togda, kogda ya nashel, vstretil “snaruzhi” ne tol‟ko mertvye muchitel‟nye pravila 
moikh uchiteley, pugayushchuyu, strashnuyu i neponyatnuyu produktsiyu 
poslednikh stalinskikh “khudorlov”, no i sovremennoe nam togda zapadnoe 




This attitude of alienation, detachment remained with me forever, even when I 
found and encountered not only the dead torturous rules of my teachers, the 
frightening, dreadful and confusing production of the last Stalinist artists, but also 
the contemporaneous Western art and the Russian art of the 1920s and the 1930s.  
 








Statements such as this one, reiterated in numerous versions and on different 
occasions by Kabakov, have created a semantic gap between the dissident artist and his 
Western interpreters who, in tune with established art historical notions, have attempted 
to place (and understand) Kabakov‟s phenomenon through the prisms of local and 
international avant-gardes, modernist trends or post-modernist artistic developments.
104
  
Taking as its point of departure the artist‟s early writing, this chapter will shift the focus 
of this contentious dilemma.  The problem is not whether Kabakov ever became aware of 
the early 20
th
-century avant-gardes in the 1960s (Kabakov‟s friends and his own memoir 
attest that he was cognizant, at least to some extent, of the art of Malevich and Russian 
constructivism as early as 1964-65, if not 1962).  The question is how he perceived those 
visual idioms—as a liberating creative force or as the aesthetic dogma of another artistic 
authority.  According to Zapiski, Kabakov approached the Russian avant-garde with the 
same “alienation” and “rejection” with which he treated the “tortuous rules” of the 
socialist educational system.  From the distance of his “alienation,” he began a 
multifarious dialogue with the avant-garde‟s dictatorial voice—a dialogue that is difficult 
to capture in a single expression because it reflects the rupture between the “work for 
them” and the “works for oneself” and echoes the dynamic between the two “I”s of the 
artist. 
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 To the one-sided attempts to attribute his early art to the interrupted tradition of Russian avant-garde and 
the art of Suprematism, Constructivism and Malevich, Kabakov has often responded with a similarly 
extreme answer that in the 1960s he was unaware of Malevich and the constructivists, and when he 
discovered them in the late 1970s, they were “already dead” for him.  Kabakov‟s early resistance to 
interpretative models that saw his art as a continuation of or a result of a local or a global modernist 
tradition was due, in part, to the special significance that artistic originality acquired in a society in which 
one had to blindly and incessantly follow the “dead torturous rules” of official aesthetic dogmas and 
teachers in order to retain the ability to survive and work in the context of the totalitarian bureaucratic 




In his words, Kabakov created the first works “for himself” between 1953 and 
1956 during the winter vacations spent away from the repressive officialdom of the 
Surikov institute:  




This happened in 1953, 54, 55, 56, I did that only in the winters, after coming 
home from the Institute. 
 
At home, the student felt liberated from the expectations of the socialist system 
and the stylistic demands of his art teachers.  There, led by an “unconscious impulse” 
(“bessoznatel‟nogo impul‟sa”), Kabakov created between 600 and 700 non-
representational drawings that he describes as “creations” which are “‟organic,‟ 
„unpremeditated,‟ „uncontrolled,‟ „mine‟” (“Eti „izdeliya‟ byli „organichny‟, 
„nepredusmotrenny‟, „nekontroliruemy‟, „moi‟”).
106
  Although Zapiski notes the 
similarity of these works to the style of Abstract Expressionism, the author quickly 
repudiates the idea that they were a result of such influence: 
… konechno, potom ya uznal, chto kak stil‟ eto imelo nazvanie “abstractny 
ekspressionizm” i svoikh classikov—Soulages, Mathieu, Kline i dr.
107
 
Of course, later on I found out that, as a style, this had a name “abstract 
expressionism” and classical representatives—Soulages, Mathieu, Kline and so 
on. 
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 Ibid., 10. 
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 Ibid., 9-10.  As the memoir reveals the drawings were saved and later were incorporated in Kabakov‟s 
“Gray Albums” and “Four Albums.”  Ibid., 10.  See also Ilya Kabakov, Viisi Albumia, Five Albums.  
(Helsinki: The Museum of Contemporary Art, 1994) and Five Albums. Second Book.  (Helsinki: The 
Museum of Contemporary Art, 1998) 
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Reflecting the artist‟s “unconscious impulse” and the inner desire to understand 
“who am I,” these expressionist drawings signified everything that the official works (the 
“works for them”) could not—they were “free,” “uncontrolled,” non-representational, 
“organic” and, therefore, liberated from any language and ideology; i.e., from any 
ordered systems of rules about style, form, content and meaning.
108
  While Kabakov‟s 
official works were language-bound in the sense that they conformed to the visual and 
verbal cliché of the regime, the drawings “for himself” were “entropic” and full of 
“chaos,” giving outlet to the pre-linguistic impulses of the artist‟s subconscious.  This 
free, non-linguistic quality predisposed their allure as well as their “huge disadvantage:”  
No y nikh byl krupny nedostatok—vernee, u menya po otnosheniyu k nim—v 
nikh ne bylo “refleksii”, chem nadelen ya byl sverkh mery vsegda, no togda v 
osobennosti, i, delaya eti risunochki, ya videl, chto osnovnaya chast‟ menya 
samogo kakby ne prisutstvovala v etom protsesse, a otkazat‟sya of “soznaniya”, 
refleksii ya ne zhelal, u menya nikogda ne bylo radosti osvobodit‟sya i stat‟ 
“estestvennym” idiotom, pust‟ dazhe i “khudozhnikom”.
109
 
But there was a huge disadvantage in them—or, to be pricise, in my attitude 
towards them—they lacked the “reflectivity” that has always been overabundant 
in me but was especially [overabundant] then.  Making these drawings, I realized 
that an essential part of me did not participate in this process, however, I did not 
want to abandon my “consciousness” and reflectivity.  I have never enjoyed being 
liberated as a “natural” idiot, even if such [liberation] meant being “an artist.” 
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 Socialist realist art represented subjects approved by the party in a way established as appropriate 
because the goal of art was to convey the beauty and power of the socialist ideas to the masses.  Works that 
did not conform to such expectations and reflected the individual style or intentions of their authors were 
deemed “formalistic,” unworthy and self-serving. 
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Thus, the short-lived liberation of this “expressionist” enterprise and its excursion 
into the world of the subconscious triggered counterpoising effects.  It caused Kabakov to 
go back to what, according to his new realization, was the artist‟s self-defining 
characteristic—“my consciousness, reflectivity.”  In the essay Concealment, the 
reflective identity of the artist was embodied by the second “I” which, never entering his 
work, remained on the side to judge both the work and its creator.  In Zapiski, born out of 
the failed “expressionist” experiment, the same most “essential part” of the artist reunites 
with his reflective identity to become intermarried with the utmost expression of 
consciousness—writing and language.  In the words of the author, his inner side found its 
first outlet in the “endless notes in the albums” which Kabakov, as any other student at 
the art institute, was supposed to fill with figural drawings and sketches: 
Eta refleksivnaya chast‟ menya nakhodila svoe vyrazhenie v beskonechnykh 
zapisyakh v al‟bomchikakh, kotorye my, ucheniki, dolzhny byli zapolnyat‟ 
nabroskami i eskizami.  Moi (vse al‟bomchiki eti sokhranilis‟) byli napolovinu 
zapolneny myslyami ob iskusstve i zhizni, inogda ambitsioznymi, inogda 
robskimi, zhalkimi.  Seychas vse oni kazhutsya neinteresnymi, no eto uroven‟ 
vnutrennego soznaniya 21-25-letnego molodogo cheloveka, uchivshegosya v 
zakrytoy khudozhestvennoy burse v poslednie gody stalinskoy epokhi.
110
 
My reflective part found its expression in the endless notes in the albums which 
we, the students, were required to fill with drawings and sketches.  My albums 
(all of them have survived) were half filled with thoughts about art and life, at 
times ambitious, at times shy, pitiful.  Now all of them seem uninteresting, but 
that was the level of the inner consciousness of a 21-25 year-old young person, 
studying at the isolated art seminary in the last years of the Stalinist era. 
 






Although Kabakov dismisses those early notes as the scribbles of a student being 
educated at the wane of Stalin‟s cultural isolationism, he admonishes that his inner self 
found an adequate form of expression not in the “abstract pictures” drawn in that period, 
but in his “endless texts in albums.”
111
  Pictures, or at least pictures alone, were incapable 
of conveying the author‟s “reflective” intentions so, as the memoir goes on to further 
suggest, Kabakov‟s prodigal “wandering” into the realm of linguistic expression might 
have led him to the future use of language in pictorial context or the equality of image 
and word in subsequent artworks: 
 
Vozmozhno, chto eto “tekstobludie” privelo potom k idee vvedeniya teksta v 




It is possible, that this textobludie led in result to the idea of including text in the 
representation and resulted in pictures in which image and text were equal. 
 
As we will see later, the appropriation of language or the unity of linguistic and 
visual signs are too complex to be fully explained by a single source of inspiration, but 
the albums of the young student may well have been one of the contributing factors.  
Another artistic circumstance that drove the student away from the traditional genre of 
painting was the state of painting itself and the hierarchical implications of its 
“fetishized” genre.  In the same section of Zapiski in which Kabakov describes the 
emergence of his “works for himself,” the author gives an assessment of the situation of 
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 “Ya opisal dva vida „produktsii‟ togo vremeni: 1. Abstraktnye kartinki i 2. Beskonechnye teksty v 
al‟bomchikakh.” (“I described two types of „production‟ during that time: 1. Abstract pictures and 2. 
Endless texts in albums.”)  Ibid. 
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 Ibid.  “Tekstobludie” is a neologism that has a dual meaning: wandering away into the realm of text and, 
at the same time, textual fornication because the root of the word, the Russian verb “bludit‟,” means both 




Soviet painting in the late 1950s when “fetish etogo slova v vozdukhe togo vremeni byl 
ochen‟ silen, beskonechno obsuzhdalos‟, chto takoe zhivopis‟, podlinnaya, nepodlinnaya, 
kakovo ee otnoshenie s „naturoy‟, s pravdoy zhizni v nature i t.d.”
113
  For Kabakov, who 
at the time neither entertained the idea (“eto voobshche ne prikhodilo v golovu”) nor had 
the courage to reject this fetishized genre (“otbrosit‟ voobshche eto risovanie ya ne 
reshalsya”), the questions had a deeply personal resonance:  
No chto v etom risovanii sushchestvuet deystvitel‟no dlya menya, kak 
vossoedinit‟sya s naturoy cherez “zhivopis‟”, nayti s ney kontakt, to est‟ nayti i 




Does painting contain anything that is real for me, how to connect with nature 
through “painting,” how to find contact with it; i.e., to find both “nature” and 
“painting” that are real for me? 
 
Kabakov sought answers to these questions in the art of his contemporaries 
which, according to Zapiski, offered two extreme solutions: (1) painting dedicated to 
formal problems (texture, color, harmony, etc) and (2) painting representing the “truth of 
life” (“pravdy zhizni”) “to est‟ izobrazheniya togo, chto pered nami, pered kholstom, so 
vsem vozdukhom, prostranstvom, svetoten‟yu…”
115
  The two trends conjectured two 
diametrically opposite views of “nature” (“natura”).  In the first case, nature existed only 
as a “background” (“fon”) which “although it is present, there is no point to talk about 
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 “…the fetish of this word [painting] was very strong in the climate of that time.  There were endless 
discussions about what painting was, original or unoriginal, what was its relation to „nature,‟ to the reality 




 “…i.e., painting of what is in front of us, in front of the brush, with all its atmosphere, space, 






  In the second case, the background—which seems “inevitable, though annoying” 
(“neizbezhnym, hotya i dosadnym”)—turns out to be painting itself, so that the whole 
attention is devoted to how one represents “life” (“zhizni”)—with details, psychological 
depth or in any other way.
117
  Causing furious battles in the 1930s, the conflict, in 
Kabakov‟s estimation, subsided in the 1950s bringing a “complete victory” to the second 
faction and granting a “complete defeat” to the first one which had to retrieve, broken and 
humiliated, to the margins of the Soviet society.
118
  Kabakov attributes the painting 
concerned with formal problems to the art of Vrubel and Impressionism, which, as he 
admits, he barely knew in the late 1950s because they were banned by the regime.  Thus, 
for him the “classical representative” of the formalist type of painting became the 
unofficial artist Robert Fal‟k whom Kabakov met in 1957 after graduating from the 
Surikov.
119
  The painting devoted to the “truth of life,” in contrast, was represented 
everywhere, shown in exhibits and rendered in all genres by the mighty fleet 
(“moshchnoy armadoy”) of Soviet official artists.
120
  Not identifying with any one of 
these two approaches, the young Kabakov decided to unite them in two different “types” 
(“v dvukh vida”) of combinations—in a set of “drawings from nature” (“v pisanii s 
                                                 
116




 Ibid.   
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 Kabakov and his friends—Erik Bulatov, Oleg Vasiliev and Mikhail Mezhaninov—visited Fal‟k twice a 
week and these visits became for them “revelations and contact with Great Painting.”  Kabakov admits that 
he was deeply affected by the “mighty, mysterious canvas painting” because, before that, he had thought 
(“mne togda kazalos‟”) that objects, people and, in general, nature were poorly represented on the canvas 
and their presence was unimportant.  Ibid. 
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 Among the numerous examples of socialist realist art, Kabakov mentions, without expressing particular 
opinion, the “solemn paintings” of Gerasimov and Ioganson, the portraits of Efanov and Kotova, the 
landscapes of Brodsky and Romadin, the genre paintings of Gavrilov and Reshetnikov as well as the still-




natury”) and in a peculiar endeavor that he began in 1957 and subsequently characterized 
as his “picture-masterpiece” (“kartina-shedevr”).
121
  Although both the drawings and the 
“masterpiece” proved unsatisfactory to the artist, they prompted him to realize that 
neither the stylistic concerns of modernist art nor the “truth”-driven and content-oriented 
forms of realism (be it as classical realist art or its oxymoronic distortion—“socialist 




II. The Allegory of the “Masterpiece” 
 
Preoccupying Kabakov from 1957 until 1961, the “masterpiece” was a 
particularly hard-felt experience.
123
  In contrast to the drawings “from nature,” it did not 
result from any direct observations.
124
  Instead, as Zapiski reveals, the artist intended to 
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 The irony results from the heart-felt ambition of the “masterpiece” to “shock the world”—a goal that 
Kabakov attributes to his “state of mind” at the time—and the impossibility of the task which led to “a 
multiplicity of problems and complexities.”  Later, he learned that another generation of Russian artists, 
older than him, was attempting to do the same thing—i.e., to unite “good painting” and “true reality.”  
Those were the so-called “semerki:” Andronov, Nikonov and Egorshin.  Ibid. 
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 The drawings “from nature” included early pastel landscapes and small oil paintings made at the dacha 
of Bulatov‟s family between 1957 and 1961 when Kabakov became increasingly aware that this type of 
painting was “an unnecessary and distracting activity.”  Ibid., 14.  His interest in painting “from nature” 
died in 1966 when the last works of this kind—a still-life with a black bottle and a self-portrait--were 
painted as if to illustrate, as Kabakov concludes, Bulatov‟s statement “This is on the side. It is not my 
work.”  Ibid.   
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 The masterpiece, a large oil on canvas (140 x 200 cm), has not survived.  It exists only in the author‟s 
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Kabakov‟s preparatory pencil drawings.  See Matthew Jesse Jackson, The Experimental Group: Ilya 
Kabakov, Moscow Conceptualism, Soviet Avant-Gardes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 30, 
fig. 13; and Kabakov: Paintings/Gemälde 1957-2008.  Catalogue raisonné, ed. Renate Petzinger and Emilia 
Kabakov (Bielefeld, Germany: Museum Wiesbaden/Kerber Verlag, 2008), 46. 
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combine Fal‟k‟s painterly style with a subject matter of “profound depth and 
significance.”
125
  Announced for a first time in Kabakov‟s memoir, even simply to 
describe a student leaving his “infantile age,” the motif of “profound depth” signifies a 
shift in the artist‟s aesthetic.
126
  The “masterpiece” neither attempts to express the 
subconscious impulses of its creator, nor represents, even in an indexical, modernist way, 
the external “truth of nature.”  Its inspiration is rooted in the realm of mental processes 
because, in Kabakov‟s words, the goal of the work is “to unite the fragmented and 
disconnected experiences happening in different spheres of one‟s consciousness.”
127
  The 
cerebral shift is related to the new source of artistic inspiration—instead of presenting 
one‟s “subconscious” or “nature,” the “masterpiece” invokes the artist‟s consciousness 
and cognition—and reflects the new way in which this source is approached.  The work 
does not “express” impulses or “represent” true life but “connects” and “unites” one‟s 
“experiences” [the Russian word for “experience” (“opyt”) also means “expertise.”]
128
  
Based on cognitive strategies, the “masterpiece” is moving a step closer to the paintings 
that would provoke “all kinds of associations, connections” in the mind of the author of 
Concealment.
129
  However, the piece‟s visual aesthetic is still far away from the “active 
investigation, a departure into various, often distant areas of culturology, philosophy, 
social psychology” prompted by the works that would combine image and language. 
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 In the words of the author, the “masterpiece” offered a personal transition from the “infantile age” to the 
next stage by “bringing together of a number of problems and complexes, mostly psychological.  That was 
the decision to unite in one whole all fragmented and disconnected experiences from different spheres 
located in your consciousness.”  Ibid. 
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 “Eto reshenie sobrat‟ voedino ves‟ kroshechny i razroznenny opyt iz mnogikh oblastey, stoyashchikh v 








The subject of the “masterpiece” is meticulously described in Kabakov‟s 
memoir.
130
  Situated in the abandoned outskirts of a city, the scene showed “an old blue 
circus wagon” that was surrounded by various figures: a clown sitting in the wagon, a 
second clown waiving his hands outside, a ballerina with her leg stretched up, an acrobat 
standing on his hands and two groups of spectators: old women from the city, on the left, 
and a couple from the village, on the right.  In the background, one could see “narrow 
streets,” some “houses” and the “last rays” of the setting sun brightening the sky.  Avidly 
described by the artist, the carefully structured and detailed composition was not 
accidental.  In Kabakov‟s words, everything was imbued with “dead sense and 
metaphysical meaning”—“the old women signified old age in general; the clown—self-
deprecation; the ballerina—„eternal femininity‟”—and the “Fal‟kian” twilight of the 
setting sun contributed to the overall atmosphere.
131
  The “most important thing,” 
according to the author, was that “the deep sense and high significance were 
demonstrated and intergraded into the very, so to say, flesh of the painting.”
132
 
After a long trial of enveloping abstract ideas into clichéd visual allegories, the 
outcome failed to meet the artist‟s own expectations.  Painted with numerous 
interruptions in basement studios and crowded community apartments, the “masterpiece” 
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 The novelty of the subject is also related to the “chief” ambition of the young artist—to announce his 
“extraordinary, amazing qualities which will startle and shock everybody” (“ob‟yavlenie svoey 
neobyknovennosti, izumitel‟nosti, otchego vse vnezapno povernut‟sya, budut potryaseny”).  The irony of 
the mature Kabakov picks up full speed in the following sentence “All of your power, subtlety, depth and 
omnipotence will be manifested in the masterpiece, and it will shine, like a new star among the shining 
stars; from now on, your masterpiece will enter the catalogue of established masterpieces, it will strengthen 
and settle your place in the world, which had been so problematic up until that point.”  Ibid. 
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 “Everything was submersed in the gleaming „Fal‟kian‟ twilight.  (Obviously, it is assumed, that Fal‟k‟s 
painting is the illumination between day and night when twilight occurs.)”  Zapiski, 14. 
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remained “grayish, undefined and helpless.”
133
  As unsatisfactory as it turned out to be, 
the work brought a new realization about the origin of the artistic image.  According to 
Kabakov, the subject of the painting did not represent “nature” or the “subconscious,” but 
originated in the “head” of the artist: 
 
… ves‟ syuzhet vyshel iz golovy, iz voobrazheniya i snabzhen byl tozhe 
golovnymi perezhivaniyami i vpechatleniyami… Dlya ego izgotovleniya ya ne 
pol‟zovalsya nikakimi naturnymi etyudami i materialami, vse vyplylo “iz golovy” 




…the whole scene came out of my head, out of my imagination, and it became 
supplemented with experiences and impressions that also originated in my head… 
I did not use any materials or sketches “from nature,” everything sprung “from the 
head” (I did not even prepare a sketch, I began drawing directly). 
 
However, even though it originated in the thoughts of its author, the scene was not 
a product of the artist‟s imagination—such an outcome would have been foreign to 
Kabakov‟s sensibility and intention.  The image preserves its inner connection with the 
external reality and the presence of “nature” (“natura”).  The connection with “nature,” as 
described in Zapiski, is rather roundabout because it is transmitted through the processes 
of the artist‟s memory: 
Natura zdes‟ byla skoree kak pamyat‟ o nature, uzhe pererabotannaya i 
okruzhennaya vsemi kul‟turnymi i psikhologicheskimi obolochkami, kuda, v eto 














Nature was present here as memory of nature, already processed and covered by a 
whole range of cultural and psychological shells.  In this “cloud,” “mystical” and 
“metaphysical” inconspicuously came together.  
 
Thus, in the course of creating his “masterpiece” and, as it seems, independently 
of any aesthetic credos and theoretical platforms, in the late 1950s Kabakov arrived at 
another important realization—the secondary nature of the artistic image.
136
  As Zapiski‟s 
introspection reveals, the image of the masterpiece is removed twice from the external 
reality-nature—once, through the process of artistic manipulation and, a second time, via 
the mental procedures (memory) of the artist.  It is in the stage of this latter encoding-
processing, that the visual impression of “nature” becomes a complex mental 
construction (“memory of nature”).  That memory is, in the view of its author, so opaque 
and compound that Kabakov employs a range of metaphors to reveal and conceal its 
facture: it is “covered by a whole range of cultural and psychological shells” and appears 
like a “cloud” in which “mystical” and “metaphysical” come together.  The masterpiece 
seems to predate any contact with the theoretical rubric that would soon explain the 
semiotic nature of the artist‟s intellectual inquiries.
137
  In the light of Kabakov‟s own 
artistic trajectory, however, the allegoric “masterpiece” moved away from the “iconic” 
bonds of the works “from nature” and the “indexical” limitations of the “expressionist” 
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III. The Roundabout Language of Symbols 
 
Kabakov attributes the emergence of his first “independent” works—i.e., the 
creations that were his “own,” “original” and satisfying—to the winter of 1961-1962, the 
year in which, as his memoir recalls, Yuri Gagarin flew into space.
139
  Remembering the 
“sudden” appearance of these pieces and the “unusual, true joy” that he felt upon seeing 
them, the artist describes the event in unusually dramatic and emotional terms.  The new 
creation emerged at a point when both the “masterpiece” and the “works from nature” 
had run their course: 
K etomy vremeni vse prishlo k ischerpannosti i “shedevr”, i risovanie s natury.  
Vnezapno kak budto ozarenie, poyavilas‟, narisovalas‟ seriya s dushem, listkov 
15-20 (na parshivoy bumazhke, 20/13, karandashom). Kak-to vo vsem eta seriya 
menya ustraivala: i vnezapno, “bez moego uchastiya”, i “original‟no” (nigde 
takogo ya ne videl), a glavnoe—uverennoe, likuyushchee chuvstvo, chto “moe!”, 
ne ch‟e-to, a moe, i ya deystvitel‟no iznutri svyazan s rezul‟tatom, kakaya-to 
nerazryvnaya nit‟ idet k etim risunochkam iz glubiny menya, i takoe chuvstvo, 
chto svyaz‟ eta ne prervetsya, a budet dal‟she i dal‟she razmatyvat‟sya, nado 
tol‟ko bez ustali vytyagivat‟ i vytyagivat‟.  Tak s togo vremeni eto i ustanovilos‟ 
navsegda: eta nit‟ iz menya, iz temnoy, neizvestnoy glubiny naruzhu, naverh.  
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Richard Shiff, “Performing an Appearance: On the Surface of Abstract Expressionism,” in Michael 
Auping, ed., Abstract Expressionism: The Critical Developments.  (Harry N. Abrams, 1987): 97-98. 
139




Kak, pochemu eto poluchilos‟—ne znayu, no khorosho pomnyu i vnezapnost‟, i 
radost‟ kakuyu-to osobuyu, podlinnuyu.  I kriteriy etoy radosti, ee podlinnosti 
tozhe sokhranilsya kak osoby kriteriy s etoy zhe minuty.
140
 
At that time, everything became exhausted—both the “masterpiece” and the 
drawing from nature.  Suddenly, as if it was a revelation, there appeared, 
materialized itself the “shower series,” drawn in pencil on 15-20 sheets of mangy 
paper (20 x 13 cm).  Somehow, everything about this series worked for me: it 
appeared “suddenly,” “without my participation,” and it was “original” (I had not 
seen anything like that before), but the most important thing was the exultant 
conviction that it was “mine!,” not anybody else‟s, but mine.  I was truly and 
deeply connected with the result; some kind of unbreakable threat run toward 
these drawings from deep inside of me, and I had the feeling that this connection 
would not break but it would stretch further and further; one had to just keep 
pulling and pulling.  From then on, this continued forever: this threat from inside 
of me, from the dark, unknown depth running outward and upward.  How and 
why did that happen—I do not know, but I remember well the suddenness and the 
strange, genuine joy.  And, from that point on, the authenticity of this joy became 
an important criterion for me.   
 
Kabakov‟s excitement about his first “independent” creation can be partially 
attributed to the visual novelty and aesthetic impact of the “Shower series.”  In contrast to 
the “masterpiece,” each “Shower” drawing employs a very limited arsenal of formal 
components to evoke a powerful, immediate effect.  Unified by a recurrent theme-image, 
all drawings in the series depict an identical subject matter from a repetitive point of 
view: a stocky, roughly drawn man stands—frontal, still and naked—under the nozzle of 
a shower (Fig. 12).
141
  With hands folded in front of his bare chest in a manner that 
distances him from the scene and the viewer, the man faces the observer with a blank and 
indeterminate expression.  The only element that seems to fluctuate within the 




 The sexuality of the bather, however, does not appear to be a focal issue in the series because his 




monotonous rhyme of the drawings is the presence, the consistency and the flow of the 
murky substance which drips, pours out or, at times, meanders away from the shower‟s 
nozzle.
142
  The series‟ rhythmic repetition is heightened by the consistent pictorial 




The figure‟s presence also illustrates the contradiction between spatial closeness 
and spatial distance as its rendition increases the tension between physical openness and 
emotional detachment.  The burly body is fully exposed in its frontal complete 
nakedness, and, yet, it remains a-sexual, schematic and sketched in a loosely generalized 
manner that leaves little room for physical and psychological detail.
144
  In the end, the 
drawings do not allow the viewer to determine whether they depict a conceptual rendition 
of an imaginary situation, a quick study of “nature,” a stylized representation or a 
psychological self-portrait.  Thus, the image seems simultaneously simple and complex, 
incomprehensible and self-contained, enclosed and open to endless semantic possibilities.  
In comparison with the “masterpiece,” the Shower’s representation retains the presence of 
“nature” (“natura”) and conveys the “mystical” and the “mysterious” as a “cloud” of 
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 In some of the later drawings, the substance comes down as an opaque mandorla that partially or fully 
envelops the bather without changing his appearance or position.  In other drawings, the water swirls away, 
runs to the side or stops at a mid-point right above the head of the male figure.  In some of the drawings, 
the water is missing altogether; yet, the body seems never affected by its presence or absence.   
143
 Both the bather and the shower are always pushed close to the foreground with a slight gradation in the 
rendition of that “closeness.”  By the same token, their extremities—the legs of the man and the arm of the 
shower—are also consistently cut by the frame—sometimes more evidently, sometimes less drastically.   
144
 For instance, the rough shading gives a sense of the volume of the body but does not reflect a source of 
light.  There is little emphasis on anatomical details; the facial features are visible but they do not convey 
the sense of emotion or individuality.  A comparison between early and later additions to this series 




“cultural and psychological shells.”  In the language of the essay Concealment, the series 
also prompts “an active investigation, departure into various, often distant areas of 
culturology, philosophy, social psychology.”
145
  The reductionist aesthetic and semantic 
density of the image seem to have abandoned the “iconic” limitations, “indexical” bounds 
and “allegorical” preconditions of Kabakov‟s earlier stages.  However, in order to grasp 
the implications of this new figural permutation one needs to examine the context in 
which it became possible and meaningful.
146
  Although Zapiski does not discuss the 
meaning of the Shower series, the memoir shares ample observations on the art and ideas 
of Kabakov‟s new acquaintances. 
 
                                                 
145
 Chapter 1.  The “shower series” have been the subject of a great variety of interpretations.  The series 
have been seen as an embodiment of “Kabakov‟s first conscious meditation of loss and lack,” as “a self-
perpetuating aesthetic-scientific experiment in series,” a transition from “the unitary, significant art object 
toward a fragmented seriality more consonant with the investigation of langue than the mobilization of 
parole” and an example of “semantic density.”  They have been also connected with “the enduring 
anxieties over bodily cleanliness among the Jewish community of Eastern Europe,” with Malevich‟s 
pursuit of aesthetic purity, Stalin‟s chistki (political purges) and Gogol‟s Dead Souls.  See M. Jackson, 
Ibid., 41-43.  The subject has been further related to “the cyberneticist and structuralist‟s own idealized 
„norm‟ of language” and presented as a demonstration of the idea that “one does not simply use a language; 
rather it is always language that “uses” its user.  Ibid. 39-40.  The series readily accommodates all of these 
interpretations and leaves room for endless other possibilities.  In the context of Soviet visuality, Kabakov‟s 
bather embodies the daily existence of “Homo Sovietikus.”  Wallach, Ibid., 41-43.  Standing indifferently 
under a high, mechanized and unpredictable dispenser of goods which, at times, remains dry or, at times, 
releases a murky substance that never reaches the body, the bather exemplifies the Soviet everyman in the 
most typical state of the Soviet everyman‟s daily existence—the state of perpetual waiting and wondering.  
With his fate and wellbeing in the hands of higher forces and authorities, the Homo Sovietikus patiently 
awaits everything—from simple material goods to the promised bright future of communism—and 
perpetually pondered the “big questions” of the universe.   
146
 This dissertation utilizes the term “context” which is largely used in art history and linguistics, although, 
from a philosophical point of view, “frame” would be a more accurate reference point for any inquiries in 
the humanities.  The later term acknowledges the subjectivity of any language reality, scheme of 
interpretation and intellectual construct.  Contemporary writings on frame analysis are loosely rooted in 
Erving Goffman‟s theory.  See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) and Dietram A Scheufele, "Framing as a Theory of Media 





IV. The “Emblem-Symbols” of Sooster and Sobolev 
 
The Shower not only marks a critical stage in Kabakov‟s “coming of age” as an 
artist, but it also coincides with important new developments in his intellectual and 
artistic environment.
147
  In 1962, he met the Estonian Ülo Sooster at the state publishing 
house Detgiz where both of them worked as illustrators of Soviet children‟s books.
148
  
Already established as an important figure in Moscow‟s underground circles, Sooster 
introduced Kabakov to the lead artist of one of the largest and most progressive Soviet 
publishing houses Znanie (Knowledge)—Yuri Sobolev.
149
  Sobolev and Sooster, in turn, 
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 According to Kabakov, two important individuals approved the Shower drawings.  The first person to 
see them was Leonard Danil‟tsev whose opinion, according to Kabakov, never pleased or misled anybody.  
Danil‟tsev praised the series as “authentic, original.”  The second person was Antonello Trombadori, a 
leader of the Italian socialist party, who took some of the drawings to include them in the show that became 
one of the first exhibits of Moscow unofficial art.  Held in L‟Aquila, that was also the first international 
exhibit of Kabakov‟s work (“Actual alternative - 2 ", Castello Spaniolo, L'Aquila, Italy).  See Zapiski, 15. 
148
 At that time, in the summer of 1962, both Kabakov and Sooster needed studios so they decided to look 
together and soon moved into a “horrible dirty basement”—the first one of the three studios they shared in 
the following years.  Ibid., 16.  An Estonian who had spent eight years in the Soviet camps, Sooster, 
according to Wallach, was “already recognized in unofficial artistic circles” and had influence on Kabakov.  
Thus, although Kabakov maintained that there were no “school-ofs,” Wallach suggests that Kabakov‟s first 
drawings in this new studio “appear to be in a manner of an aesthetic and intellectual argument with 
Sooster; a comic response to the comic seriousness of Sooster‟s art.”  See Amey Wallach, Ilya Kabakov.  
The Man Who Never Threw Anything Away.  (New York: Harry N. Adams, Inc., 1996), 37.   
149
 Zapiski, 16.  Founded in 1951 in Moscow, Znanie (Knowledge) was the publishing house of the All-
Union “Znanie” Society of the USSR.  The Society was “a voluntary public organization responsible for 
the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge and for the communist education of the working 
masses.”  It was founded in 1947 as the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific 
Knowledge and has been known as Znanie since 1963.  The All-Union Society united the fifteen separate 
Znanie societies of the Union republics.  The Society worked in all branches of knowledge: scientific 
establishments, educational institutions and business enterprises.  It organized public lectures, scientific 
addresses and conferences, seminars, topical evenings, oral journals, popular readings, reports of the 
creative activity of scholars in production groups, discussions and scientific consultations.  Znanie also 




soon welcomed Kabakov into the most intellectual formation of unofficial art in 
Moscow—the so-called Znanie circle—which, in addition to both of them, also included 
the artists Popov and Lavrov.
150
  According to his autobiography, Kabakov‟s friendship 
with other prominent representatives of Moscow‟s underground—Neizvestni, 
Yankilevsky, Grobman and the Lianozovo group—also dates to the same period.
151
  As a 
result, in the words of the artist, the winter of 1962 opened the beginning of “new artistic 
life” for him.
152
   
 In his essay Apologiya personalizma v iskustve 60-kh godov (Apologia of 
Personalization in the Art of the 1960s) Kabakov assesses the role of these artists in his 
life and in the underground scene of the 1960s.
153
  According to Apologia, the two most 
significant (and, in many ways, mutually contradicting) developments in the unofficial art 
of the 1960s were the Lianozovo group and Sobolev‟s circle.  Led by the powerful 
charisma of Oskar Ryabin, the Lianozovo group seemingly dominated the artistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Znanie Publishing House was an important component of the Society as printed propaganda played a 
key role in its activities.  Znanie published popular science literature in various fields, including the 
subscription series: New Developments in Life, Science, and Technology (24 series) and the People’s 
University (seven departments), the series of instructions and guides for lectures Help for Lecturers, the 
mass series Read This, Comrade and the international popular science annuals Science and Mankind (since 
1962) and The Future of Science (since 1967).  In Moscow, the Society published the magazines: 
International Life (In Russian, French and English editions), Science and Life, Knowledge-Power, Science 
and Religion and so on.  See Great Soviet Encyclopedia.  (Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969-1978), 3rd 
Edition (1970-1979), V 9, 555: 1652-53. 
150
 Both Popov and Lavrov worked at illustrators at Zanie-Sila which regularly published their illustrations 
in the 1960s.  Lavrov also served as technical director of many of the magazine‟s editions while Sobolev 
became Znanie’s lead artistic director (leading artist) in 1967. 
151
 Subsequently, Yankilevsky and Neizvestny also joined the Znanie circle.   
152
 Zapiski, 16. 
153
 Recorded on a dictaphone on June 23, 1986, this essay, subtitled “passionate monologue” (“strastny 
monolog”), comprises the last section of the Russian Zapiski.  In it, the Lianozovo group and the other new 
acquaintances are discussed as part of, what Kabakov defines as, the “corner” mentality of the 1960s—i.e., 
people who inhabited, physically, artistically and psychologically, the invisible margins of Moscow culture.  




landscape of Moscow‟s underground.
154
  Ryabin who embraced all artistic novelties with 
a kind of generous “paternal” acceptance, was, as Kabakov puts it, indifferent to any 
“formalist” concerns and “aesthetic trends.”
155
  According to Apologia, the attention of 
this “father” of Moscow underground was centered, instead, on the “general strategy of 
artistic life as a type of activity” and on the “functioning of the artistic sphere itself.”
156
  
Thus, Ryabin impacted Kabakov not so much with his dark depictions of austere life and 
somber poverty on thickly painted canvases but rather with his predisposition to 
conceptual inquiries that probed the function and meaning, not the formal qualities of art.  
At the same time, Ryabin and the Lianozovo group, as a whole, rejected “any 
intellectualization or reflection in their works” (“otvergali vsyakuyu intellektualizatsiyu i 
refleksiyu v svoey rabote”) and based their art on the principles of the “natural, 
unpremeditated and instinctive” (“estestvennost‟, neproizvol‟nost‟ i instinktivnost”).
157
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 The name of the group took after the name of the poor worker‟s district in which Ryabin‟s apartment 
and studio were located—Lianozovo.  According to Kabakov, Ryabin‟s stoicism and determination were 
instrumental in establishing the idea of “our world”—the self-sufficient and developed underground world 
which later, in the 1970s, came to be known as “unofficial” and “nonconformist” culture.  Ibid., 154.  
Centered in Ryabin‟s studio, from which all contacts with the authorities, with alternative artists in other 
cities or buyers of unofficial art were methodically coordinated, the underground world did not lack any of 
the “attributes and characteristics” of the “other, external, „overground world.‟”  Pronounced ironically as 
the “ideal minister of culture,” Ryabin was the main “strategist” of the group which included Sapgir, 
Kholin, Masterkova, Nemukhin, Tsyferov and Kropivnitski‟s son and daughter.  Ibid., 153 
155
 “On ne byl „formalistom,‟ ego interes k spetsial‟nym esteticheskimi kontseptsiam i khudozhestvennym 
„priemam‟, ya by skazal, byl minimal‟nym.  On prikhodil ko mne v masterskuyu, i ya porazhalsya ego 
glubokomu ravnodushiyu k samomu khudozhestvennomu izdeliyu… on ne interesovalsya esteticheskimi 
tendentsiyami...” (“He was not a formalist, and I would say that his interest in specific aesthetic concepts 
and artistic „devices‟ was minimal.  Each time he came to my studio, I was struck by his deep indifference 
to the artwork itself… he was not interested in any aesthetic trends…”)  Ibid., 155. 
156
 “Ya by skazal, chto on interesovalsya obshchey strategiey khydozhestvennoy zhizni kak deyatel‟nosti... 
vse vnimanie obrashchal na funktsionirovanie samoy khudozhestvennoy sredy.”  Ibid. 
157
 The Apologia discusses in greater detail the art of the other members of the Lyanozovo group.  Related 
to Russian Expressionism or Tachism, their work, in contrast to Ryabin‟s paintings, is much more clearly 
devoted to resolving aesthetic problems, such as combining “factura” and “textura” with painterly 
techniques and attention to the surface of the canvas (Masterkova, Nemukhin and Plavinski), developing a 




Any rational and analytical approach to the work of art seemed to them inappropriate and 
inartistic: 
Obsuzhdat‟, raskladyvat‟, analizirovat‟ khudozhestvenny protsess, kholodnym 
skal‟pelem vskryvat‟ khudozhestvennoe proizvedenie predstavlyalos‟ chem-to 
prestupnym i privodyashchim k omertvleniyu samogo zanyatiya.
158
 
To discuss, deconstruct, analyze the artistic process, to dissect the work of art 
with a cold scalpel appeared as something criminal, leading to the death of the 
artistic activity itself. 
 
The ideational glue that bounded the Lianozovo artists together was the ideal of 
the “natural” and “instinctive” qualities of the artistic process on the basis of which they 
firmly rejected the “cold” (i.e., analytical) “dissection” of the work of art.
159
 
In the early 1960s, however, Moscow‟s underground witnessed the rise of other 
artistic predilections, among them, a trend that offered a diametrical opposite to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zapiski, 156-7.  Kabakov‟s Apologia sees another underground artistic alliance, the “Black Bohemians,” as 
closely connected to the Lyanozovo group.  The Bohemians produced art of the so-called “home-made” 
type that depicted objects and people as a direct will or expression of the artist “without any restraint or 
reflection upon the result.”  Ibid.  Known for its affinity for uncompromising, suicidal and dramatic 
gestures, this group included Voroshilov, Pyatnitskiy, Kurochkin, Stesin, Grobman and, to some extent, 
Zverev and Yakovlev.  Among the “Black Bohemians,” Kabakov especially liked the art of Voroshilov 
who was “extremely talented, subtle, smart person, but in everyday circumstances and interaction, he was a 
creature from hell.”  Ibid., 158.  In his personal encounters with the oil painting, gouaches and aquarelles of 
Voroshilov, Kabakov thought they could be assembled in an “exhibit of an artist of a very high rank.”  
Ibid., 159. 
158
 Zapiski, 160. 
159
 The scientific language and surgical metaphors employed by Kabakov to describe the artistic mentality 
of the Lianozovo group quotes, in fact, some of the arguments and accusations used by the opponents in a 
contemporaneous culture-wide debate.  Affecting the fields of literature, science, cultural studies and visual 
art, the debate was concerned, most broadly, with the nature of the aesthetic process, the appropriate form 
of approach to the literary work or the work of art and with the methods of their investigation.  Official 
Soviet culture was dominated by the view that the work of art and the literary text can only be seen “as a 
whole”; i.e., their meaning can only be admired aesthetically or comprehended with the tools of socialist 
realism, Marxism and Leninism.  Any other approach studying the “formal properties of the aesthetic 
object” received the dangerous label of “formalism” and its proponents were accused of “dissecting,” 




Lianozovo‟s anti-intellectual fervor.  That was the Znanie (Sobolev‟s) circle which, 
according to Kabakov, fostered a different “understanding of art,” different “worldview,” 
“different “movement” and even “a different type of person.”
160
  Kabakov had already 
experienced the debacle of his “expressionist” period, the “works from nature” and the 
failed “masterpiece” that left him searching for an outlet for his “reflective” 
consciousness when, in 1962, he encountered the physical embodiment of this new “type 
of person”—the lead artist of Znanie Yuri Sobolev.
161
  In the light of Kabakov‟s own 
artistic transgressions and “coming of age,” it is hardly surprising that Sobolev had an 
immediate impact upon his imagination.  In fact, the “complex and multifaceted” 
charisma of Sobolev, in the way in which it is described in Kabakov‟s Apologia, 
epitomizes the contention between the two “I”s of the artist pictured in the essay 
Concealment.
162
  In Kabakov‟s words, the defining characteristic of Sobolev and his 
associates was the “special relationship between the artist and the person, namely the 
distance between them”: 
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 Zapiski, 160.  In the “cultural arsenal” of the group Kabakov includes “Neizvestny, to a certain extent 
Yankilevsky, Sooster, Kolya Popov and, to a certain extent, me (Kabakov).”  The three artists, 
Yankilevsky, Sooster and Popov, according to Kabakov, “formed a distinct circle that was immensely 
active and had strong influence.”  Ibid., 161   
161
 “I vot‟ ves‟ obraz iskusstva i napravleniya, mirochuvstviya, kotoroe svyazano s imenem Soboleva i 
blizkikh k nemu khudozhnikov, kak raz opiraetsya na sovershenno drugie opory i neset v sebe drugie 
cherty.  I prezhde vsego eto drugoy chelovecheskiy tip.”  (“And this whole understanding of art, 
movement, worldview, which was connected with Sobolev and the artists close to him, was based on a 
different foundation and had different characteristics.  Most importantly, that was a different type of 
person.”  Zapiski, 160.  Kabakov was introduced to both the Sobolev circle and the Lianozovo group in 
1962 by Ülo Sooster.   
162
 See Chapter 1.  In 1970s, this compound relationship would evolve into ever more complex system of 
personages and mechanisms that would distance the author from his artistic creation and lead to Kabakov‟s 




Slozhnye i ochen‟ napryazhennye otnosheniya mezhdu chelovekom-ne-
khudozhnikom i chelovekom-khudozhnikom (ve nem samom) rassmatrivayutsya i 
otchetlivo reflektiruyutsya. 
 
What was examined and carefully reflected upon [in Sobolev‟s circle] was the 
complex and very intense relationship between the person-not-artist and the 




Occupying a paramount place in the art scene of the 1960s, Sobolev receives the 
greatest amount of attention in Kabakov‟s Apologia.
164
  According to its retrospective 
narrative, Sobolev‟s approach reflects not only the intellectual distance of the person 
from his artistic self and his own artistic creation.  It also involves an intense dialogic 
relation between the two sides of the artist‟s personality.  In the words of Kabakov, 
Sobolev not only embodies the “complex” divide between creator and intellectual; he 
also personifies the ironic dialogue and incessant “state of disagreement” between them: 
 
Odna iz chert, kotoraya lezhit v osnove obraza Soboleva, eto razdelenie 
kholodnogo, spokoynogo, postoyanno reflektiruyushchego soznaniya intellektuala 
or proizvodyashchego postoyanno, tvorcheskogo cheloveka, kotory izgotovlyaet 
kartiny.  Eto kak by dva raznykh personazha: odin deystvuet, drugoy otsenivaet.  
Odin dolzhen vse sdelat‟ iz podsoznaniya, drugoy—otsenit‟ iz soznaniya, odin 
dolzhen sozdavat‟ bessmertnye proizvedeniya, drugoy somnevaetsya i v 
bessmertii, i v tom, nuzhno li chto-libo sozdavat‟ voobshche.  Eto, vprochem, dve 
raznye storony lyubogo cheloveka, no v rassmatrivaemom sluchae dovedennye do 
chrezvychaynoy otchetlivosti, do podlinnogo napryazheniya i konflikta.  Nichego 
udivitel‟nogo, dve storony etogo soznaniya nakhodyatsya postoyanno v 
dialogicheskikh otnosheniyakh… Oni nakhodyatsya v sostoyanii spora i v 
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 Zapiski, 160. 
164
 Kabakov devotes roughly nine pages to the analysis of “the artistic” and “the philosophical” aspects of 
Sobolev‟s thinking.  Ibid., 160-9. 
165




One of the primary features characterizing the image of Sobolev is the distinction 
between the cold, composed consciousness of the intellectual who constantly 
reflects on things and the creative person who constantly makes art and paints 
pictures.  It appears as if those are two separate characters: the first one acts, the 
second one evaluates.  The first one has to create out of his subconscious; the 
second one—to judge with his consciousness.  The first one has to create 
immortal artworks; the second one—to question both immortality and the need to 
create anything at all.  In general, any person has such opposite sides, but in this 
particular case, those sides acquire unusual distinction, deep intensity and 
conflict.  There is nothing extraordinary; the two aspects of our consciousness are 
in a constant dialogic relation… They are in a state of disagreement and constant 
unbalance: if one of them speaks, the other one looks at the first one with irony. 
 
 
The inner dialogism of Sobolev embodies the psychological rupture described in 
the essay Concealment.  Kabakov himself would soon encounter a cogent theoretical 
writing on the theme and would develop the notion of dialogism into a palpable signature 
art form.
166
  In the early 60s, however, the behavioral example of Sobolev must have 
engaged the young Kabakov with the sudden intensity of its import and the exactitude of 
its timing.
167
  In 1962, harboring the energy coming “from deep inside” of the artist, the 
Shower had just presented to its creator the right form of visual expression.  Now, the 
intellectual Kabakov sought ways to engage it and understand it, so the “chorus of the 
witnesses-commentators” in Sobolev‟s approach must have offered a suitable 
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 This notion is exemplified by Kabakov‟s conversational paintings, e.g., Chiya eta mukha? (Whose Fly is 
This?), and his fictional albums (Ten Characters).  
167
 According to Kabakov, Sobolev was not only dialogical in himself, but he also had a dialogic impact on 
his surroundings.  That was facilitated by the fact that he was “‟open,‟ not self-contained, and he drew into 
participation a certain number of participants” who not only witnessed the “gladiator fight” between the 
“artist” and the “intellectual” in Sobolev but also took part in it.  Thus, the dialogue of Sobolev was not 
limited to the “fight between the two; it also included a chorus of commentators.”  It was even “very 
difficult to hear Yuri, because one always felt the presence of this conglomerate, the chorus of the 
witnesses-commentators.”  Zapiski, 161.  Recorded in Kabakov‟s painting Whose Fly is This? which, 
incidently, also mentions a Yuri, this “chorus” would also become a major device in Kabakov‟s albums in 




psychological matrix.  The role of the Znanie artist was further enhanced by the fact that 
outside of Sobolev‟s oasis there was a sea of apathy and “ignorance:” 
 
Bo-pervykh, nado srazu skazat‟ o meste Soboleva v situatsii 60-kh godov.  60-e 
gody—eto gody nevezhestva v samom tochnom smysle etogo slova, gody 
tyazhelogo, tomitel‟nogo sna v strane, otrezannoy ot vsyakoy kul‟turnoy traditsii.  
I kak neizbezhnoe sledstvie atmosfera tikhogo, pochti idioticheskogo nevedeniya 




First of all, in regard to Sobolev‟s place in the situation of the 1960s, one needs to 
point out that the 1960s were a time of ignorance in the most exact sense of the 
word, time of heavy, painful sleep in country that was cut off from any cultural 
tradition.  And, inevitably, the atmosphere of a quiet, almost idiotic lack of 
knowledge rose, in the 1960s, to the level of a virtue.   
 
 
The best antidote to the “heavy, painful” sleep—a condition that is certainly 
endowed with negative connotations in Kabakov‟s autobiographical writing—is provided 
by language, dialogue and knowledge, all of them inherent traits of Sobolev: 
 
Sobolev rezko vypadaet iz etoy situatsii.  Eto chelovek, znania kotorogo osnovany 
na glubokom khudozhestvennom obrazovanii, i ne tol‟ko v mertvom, shkol‟nom, 





Sobolev clearly differentiated himself from that situation.  He was a person whose 
knowledge was based on art education that was deep not only in the dead, 
schooled, academic sense, but also in a particularly expansive, alive, 
contemporary sense.   
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 As a result, a majority of artists who did not “know, read or see” anything came to the fore of the artistic 
scene.  This “lack of knowledge of anything” became a “condition for their creativity,” while the stance of 
“non-engagement” turned into the main principle of their art.  The most evocative example of such an 
artist, according to Kabakov, is Oleg Tselkov who “is a cosmos in himself, and everything that is outside of 
him, does not exist.”  Zapiski, 162. 
169




 Sobolev extensive knowledge of traditional and contemporary art history was 
complemented by a strong belief that every artwork was part of the larger “cultural 
situation” (“obshchekulturnoy situatsiey”) and the general “field of art” (“izobrazitel‟noy 
oblasti”).
170
  This contextual view affected not only the way in which Sobolev interpreted 
visual phenomena as an art historian.
171
  It also impacted his own artistic production, 
resulting in, what by all author‟s accounts appears to be, the most compelling quality that 
drew Kabakov to the aesthetic philosophy of the Znanie circle.  That was Sobolev‟s 
unique ability to create (and “manipulate”) images as signs which, in his hands, became 
“images-signs” (“obrazami-znakami”).
172
  This semiotic process started with a clear, 
compact and well-defined visual form: 
 
Kogda ya v pervy raz stolknulsya s mneniem Yury i s ego iskusstvom, eto bylo 
pryamo protivopolozhno vsemu, chto delaetsya v moskovskom 
khudozhestvennom, etakom spontannom, polnom ognya, dyma, neyasnykh 
vykrikov, mire.  U nego vse chrezvychayno chetko, zhestko i imelo khorosho 
proverennye, kak by obvedennye kraya.  Nachinaya s izobrazheniya, kotoroe ne 
razmyvalos‟ i ne plavalo, rastvoryayas‟ v fone, a vsegda bylo kak by tverdo 
zakrepleno: esli eto zhenshchina, to ona imela prezhde vsego kontur, a potom vse 





When I encountered for a first time the opinion of Sobolev and his art, they 
appeared diametrically opposite to everything that was typical of the art scene of 
Moscow which was then full of fire, smoke and confusing screams.  In the art of 
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 Zapiski.  It was Sobolev‟s conviction that every artwork creates a ripple in the “giant network of the 
massive cultural panorama.”  Ibid.  Kabakov attributed such beliefs to Sobolev‟s knowledge of art history 
and the wider cultural processes as well as to his unique ability to communicate with the “cultural 
noosphere (Vernadsky)”; that is, the vast deposits of cultural information around us.  As it will be 
established later, the examination of the text/artwork as part of the larger system of culture is also 
characteristic of Russian structuralism. 
171
 According to Kabakov, Sobolev saw each work of art as a vector and, thus, he was able to trace its 
development from the initial creative impulse to its final “program.”  Zapiski, 163 
172
 Ibid. 165. 
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Sobolev, everything was precise, firm, and it had well validated and outlined 
edges.  Beginning with the representation, it was never washed out and never 
floated dissolving in the background; it always seemed firmly affixed.  If there 
was a woman, she had, most importantly, a contour, and then everything else.  If 
there was a tree, it had a beginning, a middle part and an end, similarly, the egg, 
the cubes and so on.   
 
 
 A comparable visual clarity defines the loose contour in Kabakov‟s Shower 
which, even when it outlines the flow of the water, never seems “washed out,” diluted or 
“dissolved in the background.”  In that sense, even the murky liquid seems to lose its 
deliquescent and aqueous properties.  As a result, instead of the “fire, smoke and 
confusing screams” which, in Kabakov‟s words, characterized Moscow‟s art scene in the 
1960s, the Shower chooses to follow Znanie’s approach and to depict, figuratively and 
literally, a cool, silent and detached everyday subject.  Echoing Sobolev‟s firm outlines, 
Kabakov‟s image, however, also seems odd, incomplete and disproportionally interrupted 
by the frame of the drawing. 
 The visual completeness and clarity of Sobolev‟s “signs” is a prerequisite for their 
broad semantics.  Using linguistic analogies, Kabakov explains that Sobolev‟s images do 
not signify singular entities or objects but rather denote groups (or “concepts”) of objects.  
In this referential capacity, they have a “signature” (“name”) and resemble nouns which, 
with the exception of proper nouns, all refer to classes of objects by way of tradition and 
linguistic convention: 
 
To est‟ vse eti obrazy imeli sovershenno opredelennuyu “podpis‟”, imya.  To est, 
prezhde, chem guby byly ch‟i-to, oni uzhe byli guby kak ponyatie, eto bylo 
kakoe-to osoboe vzaimodeystvie s izoponyatiem.  U Soboleva, mne kazhetsya, 




sgushchennykh press-sharov, chto-li, takikh ponyatiy, vse bylo zapolneno takimi 
vot “predstavitelyami.”  Seksual‟ny mir obladal svoimi predstavitelyami, mir 




I.e., all of those images had a completely defined “signature,” name.  In other 
words, before the lips were somebody‟s [lips], they were already lips as a 
concept; there was some kind of strange relation to the iso-concept.
175
  It seems to 
me that, in Sobolev‟s art, all objects, the whole gigantic arsenal was reduced to 
some kind of condensed images of these concepts; everything was filled with such 
“representatives.”  The sexual sphere had its own representatives, the cosmic 





In terms of semantics and referentiality, Sobolev‟s “images-signs” possess a 
generic disposition, linguistic definitiveness and high conventionality.  They refer to the 
general notion of each object—as a linguistic and mental “concept”—not to the particular 
“thing” and, therefore, they convey semantic density (they are “condensed images of… 
concepts”) and generative function (“some kind of strange relation to the iso-concept”).  
In addition, Sobolev‟s “images-signs” are so recognizable and conventional (i.e., rely on 
linguistic and visual conventions) that each one of them has a “defined name” and 
signifies (serves as a “representative”) of a particular sphere—cosmic, sexual and so on.  
It is exactly those semantic and referential qualities of the “condensed images” of 
“iso-concepts” that the Shower series appears to problematize.  Similarly to Sobolev‟s 
images-signs, Kabakov‟s drawings have “a completely defined „signature,‟ name”—
Dush.  As mundane and descriptive as its English equivalent “shower,” the Russian word 




 With its prefix derived from the Greek word “isos” (“equal”), the iso-concept here signifies the relation 
of the painted image to its equivalent proto-concept—be it linguistic, visual or mental. 
176
 Zapiski, 164.  The actual word that Kabakov uses in the second case is “representant.”  Since its 
meaning in this context corresponds to the meaning of “sign,” I have used Pierce‟s early term for sign 





“dush” signifies exactly what says—the overhead implement, the place and the activity of 
“taking a shower.”
177
  The problem with Kabakov‟s title, however, arises when one 
fathoms that, as name-signature, it is far from being “completely defined.”  On a phonetic 
level, it evokes a number of homophonic and etymologically related, yet, contradictory 
words: from dyshat’ (to breathe, exude, radiate), dushit’ (to strangle, suppress) and dukh 
(spirit, mood) to dumat’ (to think) and duma (thought, meditation).  On a semantic level, 
the signification of Kabakov‟s title becomes even more problematic because most of the 
inflected forms of the Russian noun dush (shower) coincide with the declension of its 
homophone and, in some grammatical cases, homonym dusha (soul).
178
 
Such a semantic ambivalence is bound to bring complications in, what Kabakov 
alludes to as, the plane of the sign‟s reference.  If Sobolev reduces the “gigantic arsenal” 
of objects to a number of “condensed images of… concepts” in which every sphere has 
its own “representatives,” then Kabakov‟s undefined title and image fail to be clear 
“representamena.”  As the great variety of interpretations of the drawings has 
demonstrated, the series simultaneously evokes, among other things, domestic, literary, 
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 As a noun, “dush” refers to (1) the overhead perforated nozzle (showerhead) from which water is 
sprayed on the body (“prisposoblenie dlya obmivaniya tela vodoi”), (2) the stream of water sprayed from 
the nozzle (“tonkie struyki vody, kotorye l‟yutsya iz otverstviy takogo prisposobleniya”) and (3) a kind of 
bath in which a person stands upright and is sprayed with water from a nozzle (“pomeshchenie gde 
nakhoditsya odno ili neskol‟ko prisposobleniy dlya myt‟ya”).  As verbs, both shower and dush mean to 
take a shower bath (“prinimat‟ dush”).  See Tolkovy slovar’ ruskogo yazyka.  Ed. D. Dmitrieva.  (Moscow: 
Astrel‟, Act, 2003), 310. 
178
 Noting that the plural forms of both nouns are identical—dushi—which means simultaneously 
“showers” as well as “souls” or “serfs,” Matthew Jackson convincingly relates Kabakov‟s drawings to 
Gogol‟s Dead Souls (Mertvye Dushi which also means Dead Serfs) and the Gogolian “laughing-through-
tears” aesthetics.  See Matthew Jesse Jackson, Ibid., 38 and 43-44.  In fact, most of the inflected plural 
forms, all but Genitive, and two of the inflected singular forms of the two nouns are identical, although the 
accents may vary.  Thus, often when the author refers to a particular feature or characteristic of his series he 




historical, linguistic, structuralist and philosophical ideas.  Thus, the two-partite 
composition appears, as a structuralist would say, at once divided in its unity and united 
in its division.  Recalling the duality between matter/being (bitie) and consciousness 
(soznanie) in the philosophy of dialectical materialism, it juxtaposes the two ultimate 
spheres of human existence: animate and inorganic, matter and soul, automatism and 
mental cognition.  The stream of water in the drawings cascades as unfathomable as 
complex is the composition‟s binary dialectic.  So, in the context of the Shower‟s two-
way dynamic, it seems only ironic that the inanimate liquid descends far more alive than 
the passive, indifferent human.
179
 
The last feature that characterizes Sobolev‟s “manipulation of famous images” 
(“manipulatsia izvestnymi obrazami”) and transforms them into “images-signs,” in the 
eyes of Kabakov, involves the plane of their pragmatic content, i.e., the associations they 
evoke in the mind of the viewer.  The ideas of Sobolev‟s common images appeared so 
grand in their simple disguise that, to his contemporaries in the 1960s, the Znanie artist 
seemed as “a representative of mannerist tendencies, an enthusiast in pursuit of 
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 As a philosophical approach, dialectical materialism was developed in the writings of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels.  Expanded later by Georgy Plekhanov, Vladimir Ilich Lenin and Joseph Stalin, it became 
the official philosophy of communism.  Its central tenet, borrowed from Hegelianism, states that all 
historical growth, change and development results from the struggle of opposites.  (In philosophical terms, 
a thesis is opposed by its antithesis which leads to a synthesis.)  Thus, the Marxian interpretation of reality 
proposed that matter was the sole subject of change, and all change was the product of a constant conflict 
between opposites arising from the internal contradictions inherent in all events, ideas and movements.  
The Shower in this sense makes an ironic comment on the main “premise of dialectical materialism” which 
was articulated by Marx, paraphrased by Lukács and well known to every socialist citizen.  In Marx‟ 
words, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness.”  According to Lukács‟ version, “It is not men‟s consciousness 
that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their 
consciousness.”  See György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 18; and Karl Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. R. C. Tucker. 2d ed. 




mannerism” (“byl takim „predstavitelem‟ man‟eristskikh ustremleniy, entuziastom 
issledovaniy man‟erizma”): 
 
Man‟erism v etom kontekste vystupal prezhde vsego kak manipulyatsiya 
izvestnymi obrazami, dazhe emblemami.  Eto ne kakaya-to opredelennaya 
zhenshchina, a prosto Zhenshchina, eto ne voobshche kolesa, a Koleso.  To est 
mir napolnen slozhnym, no vpolne opredelennym naborom elementov.  
Upotreblyaya eti elementy-znaki, eti emblemy, mozhno bylo nazvat opredelennoe 
kolichestvo kakikh-to predstavleniy, assotsiatsiy, sil‟nodeystvuyushchikh ukolov.  
Fakticheski to iskusstvo, kotoroe ya togda videl u Soboleva, eto bylo operirovanie 
na belom pole lista sil‟nodeystvuyushchimi sgushchennymi obrazami-znakami, 




In this context, mannerism appeared mostly as manipulation of well known 
images, even emblems.  That is not some particular woman, but simply Woman; 
that is not wheels in general, but Wheel.  In other words, the world is full of 
complex, but completely defined number of elements.  By using these elements-
signs, these emblems, one could evoke a certain number of representations, 
associations, powerful injections.  In fact, the art of Sobolev, as I saw it back then, 
operated with powerful condensed images-signs, which collided and interacted on 
the white plane of the paper. 
 
To leave aside all mannerist associations, the semantic grandness was an 
important component of Sobolev‟s semiotic procedure.  Combining plastic reductionism 
and conceptual grandeur, Sobolev‟s “elements-signs” appear simultaneously shocking (as 
“powerful injections”) and familiar (“well known,” “famous”), “complex” and 
“completely defined,” “firmly affixed” yet constantly colliding and interacting.  Kabakov 
explains that Sobolev‟s manipulation begins with a common (conventional) image—
“emblem.”  As a rhetorical figure, the emblem carries a relatively open plane of content 
but it is also limited in its signification because it always refers to the same meaning/idea 
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by way of convention, tradition or habit.  Next, Sobolev expands the reference/meaning 
of the emblem to reach beyond the particular object (referent) to a more general or 
fundamental iso-concept—Idea (e.g., “Woman,” “Wheel”).  As the contextual overview 
in the subsequent chapters demonstrates, such semiotic manipulation remained, by no 
means, an isolated or unique phenomenon.  However, Kabakov‟s artistic insight captures 
the strong visual impact, complex appeal and artistic significance of Sobolev‟s 
manipulative images-signs-emblems.
181
  Similarly to symbols, they are semantically 
dense (“condensed”) and thus evoke a number of “representations, associations.”  At the 
same time, in their capacity of “emblems,” they remain relatively “defined” (and 
confined), and each one of them refers to a single grand Idea or “iso-concept.”
182
  
Invested with unity and contradictions, Sobolev‟s images collide on the sheet to conjure 
up compressed compositions of cosmic magnitude:  
 
Sobolev sdelal ochen‟ interesnuyu veshch‟—blagodarya ego daru, chto li,--
kakim-to obrazom on smog svesti k neskol‟kim (ya mog by perechislit‟, ikh vsego 





Thanks to either his talent or something else, Sobolev created a very interesting 
thing—in some way he managed to reduce the whole huge repertoire, the whole 
cosmos of most contradictory terms to several (I counted up to 15-20) emblems-
symbols. 
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 To convey the strong physical effect of Sobolev‟s emblems, Kabakov refers to them as “painful centers” 
and “chakras” in which the “chief rays, impulses of the whole cultural world” converge.  The white sheet of 
Sobolev‟s works is also compared with an “enormous dance floor” on which Mrs. Beauty, Mr. Terror and 
Mrs. Sex dance.  Zapiski, 164.   
182
 Kabakov addresses these contradictions while asking rhetorical questions about the best way to 
approach and understand Sobolev‟s images: “But what is this? How are we to perceive this particular tree, 
this woman…?  Perhaps, one has to realize that—as in knots, in painful points of a body, in chakras—these 
personages concentrate the most important beams and impulses that are projected by the whole cultural 








Kabakov alludes to the structural side of Sobolev‟s semiotic procedure that 
pertains not to how the artistic image represents (and refers to) the external reality, but 
how it composes a model of that reality, i.e., serves as a cognitive modeling structure.  
Though it can be understood here literally as “order” and “range,” the word “cosmos” is 
not accidental.  Thanks to the grandness of dense emblems (“emblems-symbols”), 
Sobolev‟s signs, even though they are limited to 15-20, are capable of conjuring up a 
whole universe (cosmos) of contradictory terms and binary oppositions.  Furthermore, 
evoking fundamental Ideas and “iso-concepts,” these “emblems-symbols” are able to 
create a model of the world that is “total” and “complete” (the Russian word 
“zavershenny” also means “self-contained” and “self-sufficient,” though not yet “self-
referential”): 
 
…Krome togo, Yure prinadlezhit mysl‟, chto na liste dolzhen byt‟ ves‟ kosmos.  
On predstavlyaet soboy kosmologicheskoe nachalo v nashem risovanii.  To est‟ 
ne fragment mira, a ves‟ mir.  Opyat‟ my poluchaem srednevekovuyu strukturu: 




…Besides that, Yuri maintained that the whole cosmos had to be on the sheet.  He 
embodied the cosmological trend in our art.  In other words, not the fragment, but 
the whole world.  Again, the result is a medieval structure: all relations, all 
movements, the whole self-contained world is on one sheet of paper.   
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 Zapiski, 165.  “Again” refers to Kabakov‟s earlier discussion of the “emblematic quality” 
(emblematichnost‟”) of the “heavenly” personages of Bosch such as his “semi-human—semi-egg which 
enters himself.”  “Many of these objects are impossible to decode, because we do not know whether Bosch 
invented them himself—in such a condensed form—or whether they were well-known in the medieval 
hierarchy of images-signs.  But this is all unimportant, because it is impossible to solve this rebus…”  Ibid., 
164.  Kabakov‟s semiotic take on Bosch reflects the cultural semiotics of the Russian structuralist school as 
well as the interests of the Znanie circle.  In fact, reproductions of Bosch‟ paintings and an essay on their 
enigmatic semantics were published in Znanie-Sila during the 1960s when Sobolev was the magazine‟s 






Reflecting larger tendencies in Russian culture, the aesthetic credo of 
universalism (“the cosmological trend”) has a special import in the art and legacy of 
Sobolev.  It allows him to build a picture of the “whole world” which, by means of 
semiotic manipulation, refers to both, to the external non-artistic reality, on the one hand, 
and the “self-contained” realm of iso-concepts/Ideas and their inner structure of 
“relations” and “movements,” on the other.  As a versatile system of names (signatures) 
and ideas, Sobolev‟s art offers new, coded ways of connecting the plane of content with 
the plane of artistic expression.  The complex structure of Sobolev‟s language of sign, as 
it will be demonstrated later, is related to novel currents in Russian (and international) 
science and theory.  As a multi-faceted phenomenon, however, the artistic “emblems-
symbols” also have the potential to show the limitations of scientific thinking and its full 
reliance on causality, logic and reason.   
Sobolev‟s attitude toward science reflects his views on the unity between artistic 
and non-artistic elements in the artwork.
185
  According to Kabakov, the Znanie artist 
eliminated the conventional distinction between “art” and “non-art,” proposing that the 
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 In this regard, another important contribution of the Znanie artist to Moscow underground was 
Sobolev‟s vast knowledge of contemporary art in the West.  According to Kabakov, he always judged the 
local phenomena in the context of global artistic trends and brought world “energies” to the “kettle” of 
Moscow‟s artistic scene.  Sobolev was familiar with ancient and modern art not only in the West, but also 
in the East.  His knowledge was facilitated by his good command of two foreign languages—German and 
English—something rare in Soviet Russia.  Zapiski, 166.  As a chief artist of the magazine Znanie-Sila 
(Knowledge—Power), Sobolev was responsible for reproducing a lot of masterpieces of contemporary 
Western art under the guise of technical illustrations.  Ibid., 166.  Kabakov also suggests that, in his 




work of art does not need any specially selected “artistic material.”
186
  For Sobolev every 
object could become part of the “aesthetic system,” provided that the artist could find the 
“right” place for such an object.
187
  Supporting the inclusion of “non-artistic” components 
in the work of art, Sobolev encouraged the close interaction of art and science.
188
  In the 
early 1960s, this also meant taking an active stand on the role of these two human 
activities and their respective places in the larger context of Soviet society.  In respect to 
scientific knowledge in art, however, Sobolev took a “professional” position, insisting 
that science could be present in artworks only as “intuition, joke and play”: 
 
…Okazyvaetsya, mozhno vse proschitat‟, to est‟ vozmozhna naukoobraznost‟ v 
iskusstve—vot chto on pokazal, khotya ponyatno, chto tut bol‟she intuitsii, shutki 
i igry i chto nikakoy nauki v iskusstve net, est‟ igra, i Yura ponimal eto luchshe 
drugikh.  I vse zhe on, Ernst i Sooster veli razgovory o tom, kak by nayti, 
dopustim, “obraz mira” ili kak na odnom risunke “prosverlit‟” chetvertoe 
prostranstvo i t.d.  Nadvigayushchayasya komp‟yuterizatsiya mira kak by eshche 
bol‟she stimulirovala ili simulirovala naukoobrazie, podschet, vychislenie.  Eto 





…It became apparent that everything could be calculated and that scientism was 
possible in art—this was what he [Sobolev] demonstrated, although of course, it 
was rather intuition, joke and play; there was no science in art, only play, and 
Yura understood that better than anybody else.  Despite all of that, he, Ernst 
[Neizvestny] and Sooster had conversations about how to find, to say, an “image 
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 Kabakov also attests that Sobolev was interested in psychology and, specifically, the psychology of art 
and therefore examined works of art as product of the psychological motifs (the sublimation and 
subconscious complexes) of their authors.  Sobolev was also involved in phenomenology, Freudism and 
psychoanalysis.  He was trained as a therapist and had students and patients.  Zapiski, 167. 
187
 Ibid., 167.  Kabakov adds that, while Sobolev was very critical about the relationship of the elements 
constituting the artwork, he was indifferent to the choice of these elements.  Defining such an approach as 
“anti-aesthetic”, Kabakov describes it as, rather, conceptual: the “artistic impulse” (idea) was more 
important for Sobolev than the “product itself.”  Ibid. 
188
 As a chief artist of Znanie, Sobolev had the freedom to hire artists and to allow them to choose their own 
subjects.  Thus, in Kabakov‟s words, he initiated a “new movement in Soviet illustration.”  Ibid. 
189




of the world” or how to “probe into” the fourth dimension on the sheet of paper, 
and so on.  The increasing computerization of the world seemed to further 
stimulate and simulate scientism, calculation and computing.  This resembled 
alchemic calculation: what to combine with what in order to achieve something 
new, nonexistent… 
 
According to Kabakov, Sobolev and his circle ardently appropriated scientific 
notions and ideas but rejected scientism with its absolute belief in calculation and 
computing.  As a result, science constitutes only one of the coded languages in their 
artworks—a language that is typically employed with a tone of irony within a playful 
context—in addition to contrasting references to what is unexplainable, mythological or 
beyond the logic of reason.  Kabakov observes that Sobolev‟s followers also appropriated 
science and “cosmological structures” in their works: Neizvestny—in the literal sense, 
Sooster—“through ambivalent forces.”
190
  However, semiotic games—as play with the 
meaning and form of signs and their conventional modes of reference—characterized 
mostly the art of Sobolev and Sooster: 
 
Nado skazat‟, chto sistema Yury vklyuchaet v sebya nekuyu ambivalentsnost‟, i 
my vidim na mnogikh ego risunkakh “obmanku”, kogda zhenshchina stanovitsya 
derevom, a derevo—zhenshchinoy.  Eto vpolne simvolicheskaya igra, na 
literaturnom urovne.  Soosterom eta igra byla ponyata v plasticheskom smysle, i 
my vidim u nego “shar”, a na samom dele dyra.  Glavnye ego tri simvola: 
kustarnik, yaytso i ryba—oni dayutsya ambivalentno, i nikogda nel‟zya skazat‟ 
tochno, yaytso li eto ili ogromnoe okno v mikromir, kuda my provalivaemsya.  
Faktura kartiny, po vidimosti stol‟ blizkaya i oshchutimaya, chto mozhno rukoy 
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 “Following Yuri, Ernst Neizvestny also made an attempt to understand his drawing as a cosmologic 
structure in the literal sense of the word, for instance, he created a tree that included in itself the whole 
history of humanity.  He seemed to be developing the thinking of Sobolev further, moving in that same 
direction in his drawing and in his sculpture.  Similarly, Sooster also attempted to create a cosmic structure 









It has to be said that the system of Yuri included some ambivalence, so we see a 
“deception” in many of his drawings—when a woman becomes a tree and the 
tree—a woman.  That is an entirely symbolic game, on a literary level.  This game 
was understood by Sooster in plastic terms and when we see a “sphere” in his art, 
it is, in fact, a hole.  His three main symbols—bush, egg and fish—are presented 
ambivalently, and one can never say with accuracy whether this is an egg or an 
enormous window into the micro-world in which we fall.  The facture of the 
picture—which seems so close and tangible that one can touch it with hand—in 
his case becomes an enormous space depending on the accommodation of our 
eyes.   
 
In regard to semiotic procedures, Kabakov gauges two types of play in the art of 
his two closest associates.  In Sobolev‟s “system,” the game is “entirely symbolic” and 
unfolds on a “literary level” because it involves the abstract (symbolic) side of the 
emblem-sign—its plane of content and meaning.
192
  In comparison, Sooster‟s semiosis is 
more playful “in plastic terms” because it incorporates the visual aspect of the sign—the 
plane of artistic expression.  Sooster renders his dense images (“symbols”) 
“ambivalently;” i.e., they work in a multi-referential way so that they simultaneously 
engage different realms of meaning and denotation (the “sphere” is also “a hole,” and the 
“egg” is a “window” into “the micro-world”).
193
  The two types of playful semiosis 
require two different types of response (“accommodation”) from the viewer: 
 




 For instance, in an illustration published in Znanie-Sila Sobolev‟s follower and friend Lavrov drew a 
lonely image of a woman depicted among the trees of a wood as a visual echo of their slim vertical figures.  
Such implicit visual comparisons correspond to the literary devices of syntactical or psychological 
parallelism.   
193
 Many of these “ambivalent” symbols will become Kabakov‟s playful point of reference in his later 




To, chto u Soboleva est‟ intellektual‟naya akkomodatsiya (to est‟ my “dumaem” 
chto eto zhenshchina, a mozhem “dumat‟” chto eto derevo), to est‟ eto vsegda 
umozrenie, u Soostera stanovitsya model‟yu na urovne opticheskom (my mozhem 
videt‟ poverkhnost‟ rel‟efnogo shara, no, nastroiv glaz, my vidim, kak skvoz‟ 
okulyar mikroskopa, gigantskoe kolichestvo mel‟chayshikh sushchestv za nim).  
Eto takaya modelirovka mira, kogda odno i to zhe okazyvaetsya to v 
beskonechnoy dali, to vblizi.  My vidim ulitsu, no vdrug obnaruzhivaem, chto eto 
ugol kirpicha pod samym nashim nosom.  Eta obmanka, kazhimost‟ blizka 




There is intellectual accommodation in Sobolev‟s art (i.e., we “think” that this is a 
woman, but we could also “think” that it is a tree; it is always a matter of 
speculation).  The same model functions on an optical level in Sooster‟s art (we 
could see the surface, the relief of the sphere, but, when we adjust our eyes, we 
see, as if through the lenses of a microscope, a giant number of microscopic 
creatures behind it).  In this model of the world, the same object seems to be one 
thing in the infinite distance and another—up close.  We may see a street, but then 
we immediately discover that it is the corner of a brick right under our noses.  
This deception, duplicity is close to Sobolev and his belief that nothing is what it 
appears to be… 
  
 In the works created after the late 1960s, Kabakov would avidly play with both 
referential strategies—the “intellectual accommodation” of Sobolev and the “optical” 
models of Sooster.  As a “fanatic of the unofficial art of the 1960s” who felt indifferent 
toward some aspects of this art, Kabakov, in his words, always “enormously appreciated 
people such as Sobolev, Ryabin, Voroshilov.”
195
  However, although it evokes the dense, 
compact and ambivalent language of his Znanie friends, the Shower can also be seen as 
pointedly literal and “unpretentious.”
196
  Open to (and openly accommodating) any 
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number of interpretations, Kabakov‟s image remains plain in its banal theme, 
conventional in subject matter and standard in its pictorial depiction.  Thus, in order to 
understand its uncanny strategy and hidden reference, one needs to explore the wider 
frame of Kabakov‟s contemporaneous intellectual circumstance. 
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Cybernetics, the Structural-Semiotic Movement and the  
Man-Machine Analogy 
 
V. The Structural-Semiotic Movement: Progenitors and Forerunners 
 
The period in which the Shower manifested a sudden change in Kabakov‟s artistic 
thought and expression was, according to the period‟s own authors, a time of “an 
extraordinary ferment” in the intellectual and cultural life of the Soviet Union.
197
  In the 
field of the humanities, the “ferment” engendered an important intellectual movement—a 
culturally-entrenched and internationally recognized phenomenon that is known today as 
“the Soviet variant of the international structural-semiotic trend.”
198
  Some sources find 
the beginning of the Soviet structural-semiotic formation in the 1950s; others date its 
emergence to the early 1960s.  However, no matter what point of genesis they propose, 
most scholars agree that, soon after its appearance, the movement reached a “wide 
recognition as a powerful phenomenon at the very forefront of world thought.”
199
  It has 
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also been established that the new theoretical trend emerged and gained a momentum in 
result of a variety of factors, local as well as international.   
In terms of local sources, the movement was deeply rooted in the preceding 
national tradition of formal and structural studies.  Some of the earliest examples of such 
studies included the nineteenth-century writings of Potebnia examining the relationship 
between literature, myth and folklore; the study of textual reconstruction by Shakmatov 
written in the turn of the century as well as the interests in stylistics and poetics in the 
work of non-formalists, such as V. Vinogradov, V. Zhirmusky, L. Shcherba and S. 
Bernshtein.
200
  Other prominent scholars—M. Bakhtin, V. Propp and P. Bogatyrev 
among them—provided a “unique continuity” to the Soviet structural-semiotic movement 
through their writings and personal contacts with both the early Russian progenitors and 
their structuralist descendants.
201
   
The most influential antecedents that defined the premises and the direction of the 
Soviet movement, however, were Western structural linguistics in its various 
manifestations (from Saussure‟s Cours de linguistique générale to Zelling Harris‟ 
descriptive method) and Russian and Czech formalism and structuralism of the 1920s and 
the 1930s.
202
  Replacing the organic model of Romanticism and the ontology of 
nineteenth-century scientific thinking which relied on the concept of the organism as 
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prototype, structuralism offered a new foundational model—the model of Language.
203
  
This transition from ontological to epistemological schemes of inquiry led to a profound 
change in the way in which cultural phenomena were understood and perceived.  Cours 
de linguistique générale became emblematic for such types of study not so much because 
of Saussure‟s influence upon his contemporaries but largely due to the lasting impact of 
his theory long after his death.
204
   
In Russia, Saussure‟s structural linguistics was first appropriated and developed 
by Russian formalism—a movement that flourished between 1916 and 1928.  Having no 
unified doctrine, the movement was characterized by scrutinizing the formal aspects of 
the work through analytical methods propounded by noted scholars such as R. Jakobson 
and N. S. Trubetskoy.
205
  The latter two academics played a critical role in the 
establishment of the two distinct factions of the movement—Opojaz [Society for the 
Study of Poetic Language] founded in 1916 in Petrograd (subsequently Leningrad, 
currently St. Petersburg) and the Moscow Linguistic Circle founded in 1915 in Moscow.  
Those factions included the famous critics V. Shkolovsky, B. Eikhenbaum, J. Tynyanov 
and B. Tomashevsky, among others.  Opojaz and the Moscow Circle based their 
theoretical notions on Saussure‟s fundamental division of the linguistic sign into form 
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(signifier) and content (signified) and methodically applied the major dichotomies 
resulting from such a division—“synchrony-diachrony,” “syntagmatics-paradigmatics” 
and “langue-parole”—to the language of literature.
206
  The goal was to define literariness 
in terms of internal organization of the literary object and to build a specialized 
classification of literary devices.   
In their earlier studies, the Formalists pursued two main questions: how the author 
“made” the work and how literary devices affected the reader.
207
  The exploration of 
these problems defined each device and each work in relation to two frames—literary 
tradition and innovation—and ultimately led to a focus on literary evolution which 
became one of the main subjects of Russian formalism.
208
  As a result, the formalists 
examined how linguistic facts were transformed into literary facts through the application 
of specifically artistic strategies.
209
  The main contribution and limitation of Russian 
formalism, according to the historians and the critics of the movement, was the discovery 
of the “richness of the literary artifact as a self-referential object irreducible to external 
sociological and ideological impulses.”
210
  However, in the end of the 1920s, when the 
formalist school was terminated by the authorities due to the establishment of Marxism as 
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the official doctrine of the Soviet regime, many of the formalists were already seeking 
ways to broaden the scope of their critical inquiry.  For example, M. Bakhtin extended 
the structuralist approach to medieval literature, culture and folklore, while V. Propp 
widened his sphere of research to examine characters, plots and motifs as functions of the 
literary structure.
211
   
It was Czech structuralism of the 1930s that amplified and refined the methods of 
the Russian formalist school, becoming its direct chronological, biographical and 
methodological continuation.
212
  The Czech and Russian participants in the Prague 
Linguistic Circle, heralded by R. Jakobson, N. Trubetzkoy, P. Bogatyrev and J. 
Mukarovsky, elaborated on formalism‟s findings in poetics and folkloristics and “laid the 
groundwork” for the later Soviet structural-semiotic studies.
213
  Through his work, 
emigration and subsequent travels, R. Jakobson acted as “a universal translator” and 
critical player in all of these movements, connecting Russian formalism, first, with the 
Prague Linguistic Circle and, then, with the Czech, Russian and international structural-
semiotic trends of the 1960s.
214
  Assuming a key role in the tri-partite relationship of 
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continuity, the Prague Linguistic Circle developed a unified basis for all divergent 
theoretical approaches by proposing a new encompassing method of investigation—
semiotics.   
This foundational method was put forward in the writings of Jan Mukarovsky 
who explicitly stated that the study of signs (semiotics) was the preeminent mode of 
analysis of art and literature.
215
  Czech semiotic structuralism saw the work as a “sign 
made up of signs,” all of them performing an “aesthetic function.”
216
  In the light of this 
approach, literature was perceived as a verbal act that could create and communicate 
meaning only through literary and aesthetic codes that were shared by the social 
collective.
217
  The individual author could modify or reject these norms but she or he was, 
nonetheless, dependent on the aesthetic codes and on the social and cultural conditions 
that produced them.
218
  The two-way dynamic between work and society was, therefore, 
bound to affect both elements of the equation.  On the one hand, the author created the 
work‟s structure by organizing the elements of the work in accordance to their function 
and the social conditions that produced them.  On the other hand, reflecting the aesthetic 
coordination of its components, the structure changed the function that the elements 
performed in their non-aesthetic contexts and opened up the collective to pluralism and 
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  In the end, although Czech structuralism took on the study of structures, 
functions and devices initiated by Russian formalism earlier, it also broadened its inquiry 
to pursue the interaction of literature and society.  Thus, the Prague Linguistic Circle 
emphasized the human values of the aesthetic norms and dedicated a considerable 
amount of attention to the historical process encompassing the literary evolution and its 
change of codes.
220
  In doing so, the Czech movement became the first school to 
formulate a “comprehensive theory and methodology of literary perception based on a 
semiotic concept of literature” long before the reader-response criticism or the aesthetic 
of perception (Rezeptionsästhetik) of the Konstanz school.
221
 
The Soviet structural-semiotic movement that sprung in the late 1950s-early 
1960s was made possible, to a large extent, by the antecedent formalist and structuralist 
traditions as its research was bolstered by their theoretical legacy.  However, the new 
spur of semiotic and structuralist ideas did not resurface as simple revival of Formalism, 
in part, because it emerged in a different social and intellectual climate.  Most broadly, 
the new movement reflected the discoveries and methods associated with the age of 
automation, the arms race and the information explosion that began in the 1950s.  It 
further benefited from the rising stature and political capital of Soviet academics and the 
thaw after the death of Stalin which provided opportunities to investigate concepts and 
theories which had been previously considered ideologically unsuitable and left 












  The most immediate impact upon the new intermarriage of structuralism 
and semiotics, however, came from within, from a dramatic shift in the direction of 
Soviet linguistics and in the study of its main object of investigation—the study of 
language. 
During the 1950s, Soviet linguists made numerous efforts to free their discipline 
from the encumbering effects of Marrism (the ideas of the Academician Nikolai Marr) 
and to bring it up to the levels reached in the West.
223
  Ironically, it was Stalin himself 
who deposed the, what he deemed as, “formalism” of Marr‟s theory and put an end to its 
domination in Soviet linguistics through a series of three articles that culminated in his 
notorious 1950 essay “Marxism and the Question of Linguistics.”
224
  Due to Stalin‟s 
political essay which initiated a groundbreaking overhaul in the discipline, the study of 
language not only became a more modern, desirable and encouraged specialty, but the 
field itself opened for discussion.
225
  Soviet linguists reacted to Stalin‟s intervention with 
a special collection of articles and a series of events and publications that gave voice to 
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the open proponents of the regime as well as to scholars formerly associated with 
formalism.
226
   
Further impetus for change emerged in 1958, when the sociological perspectives 
of the Soviet literary scholarship encountered the more specialized methods of Western 
philologists at the International Congress of Slavists in Moscow, and the event 
unequivocally exposed the widening gap between the two approaches.
227
  In addition to 
this external impulse for improvement, the inner structure of the field had already been 
impacted by the gradual transformations that took place in the Soviet Academy of 
Science during the last decade of Stalin‟s regime.
228
  Due to the government‟s support 
and special interest in the role of Soviet education and Academy, the social distinction 
and prestige of Soviet academics was growing in proportion to their increasing irritation 
with the state‟s constant infringement upon the academy‟s autonomy.
229
  The academics 
responded to the pressure with constant vigilance, attempts to translate their scholarly 
agendas into the official lingo of the Party and efforts to enter patronage relationships 
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with the members of the Central Committee.
230
  In this process, the sciences enjoyed 
greater freedom, economic support and independence thanks to the more specialized 
nature of their research which remained less understandable to the political apparatchiks.  
The field also benefited from the world-wide recognition of Soviet scientists.  In the 
sphere of humanities, which appeared much more transparent to the authorities and, 
therefore, was prone to ideological muddling and manipulation, the Party had a greater 
influence and control.  This partly explains why the earliest internal attempts at academic 
reform began in the domain of Soviet sciences; yet, those attempts had a quick ripple 
effect in other fields.  As part of the same efforts, in the 1950s Soviet academics 
concentrated on reforming the language of science and focused their attention on the 
question “Who controls language?”
231
  Such inquiries greatly facilitated the emergence of 
linguistics and semiotics as major concerns in the following decade. 
 
 
VI. Cybernetics, Theories of Communication and “Self-Reproducing Automata” in 
the U.S. 
 
The most important factor that led to the overhaul of Soviet philology (linguistics 
and literary studies) and prompted the formation of a new structural-semiotic movement, 
originated outside of the field of linguistics and outside of the Soviet Union.  In the 
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broadest sense, it reflected the widespread fascination with science and technology 
brought about by the newly opened Space Age.  More particularly, it resulted from the 
far-reaching effect of a newly discovered theory that was quickly perceived as a 
revolutionary discipline—cybernetics.  The close dependence of the expanding Soviet 
structuralist thinking upon this new theoretical rubric was acknowledged by notable 
scholars as early at the 1970s: 
 
In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, it was the science of linguistics that served as 
the matrix for the development of the structuralist approach, and it was the 
conception of language as a system of signs that led to expanded semiotic 
dimension of study.  However, not linguistics in or of itself alone was responsible 
for this development but rather linguistic thought under the impact of powerful 
new scientific interests that took delayed, but decisive, effect in the Soviet Union 
in the late fifties and early sixties.  This was paramountly the impact of 
cybernetics…  Indeed such was its fascination for the Soviet scholars that the idea 
of cybernetics instantly brought forth virtually a whole new intellectual era 




As a term derived for the Greek word for “steering” and “government” 
(kybernetes means steersman), cybernetics is the interdisciplinary study of complex 
systems, especially communication processes, as well as the mechanisms of control and 
feedback.
233
  The idea was proposed in the late 1940s by the American prodigy and 
mathematician Norbert Wiener who formalized much of the thinking up to that point and 
suggested new areas for cybernetic implementation in his foundational book Cybernetics 
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or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine in 1948.
234
  The notion of 
cybernetics grew out of Wiener‟s earlier work on a theory of prediction that would lead 
to the construction of machines embodying such theory.
235
  The task of the study 
underlined the importance of feed-back in the work of control engineers.  The actual 
output of the system is compared to the desired input (the goal) so that information about 
the “mismatch” is fed back to the controller (command generator) in order to modify 
subsequent inputs.  If the feedback is negative, the command signals make adjustments 
and drive the input closer to the goal.  On the basis of such matrix, Wiener and his 
colleagues established that just as improper feedback could cause “hunting” or instability 
in automatic control systems, so human control mechanisms managing motor activities 
could be impeded by improper feedback.  A case in point was the pathological condition 
known as “purpose tremor” in which an injury to the cerebellum impacted the voluntary 
acts: 
 
We thus found a most significant confirmation of our hypothesis concerning the 
nature of at least some voluntary activity.  It will be noted that our point of view 
considerably transcended that current among neurophysiologists.  The central 
nervous system no longer appears as a self-contained organ, receiving input from 
the senses and discharging into the muscles.  On the contrary, some of its most 
characteristic activities are explicable only as circular processes, emerging from 
the nervous system into the muscles, and reentering the nervous system through 
the sense organs…  This seemed to us to mark a new step in the study of that part 
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of neurophysiology which concerns not solely the elementary processes of nerves 





 Wiener‟s retrospection demonstrates that, from the onset of its inception, 
cybernetics—initially conceived as mere reading of scientific data and technological 
processes—began exploring relations between fields by drawing analogies with 
physiology, the nervous system or the neurological processes in the human body.  
Leaving aside Wiener‟s claims of a new systematic approach to neurophysiology which 
“considerably transcended” the current state in that field, one has to admit that his early 
vision of unity between technological and physiological processes contributed to the 
interdisciplinary success of cybernetics.  The introduction of Wiener‟s book demonstrates 
that, from the beginning of his research, he was not only able to find proof, application 
and resonance of his theory outside of the scope of inorganic matter and mechanized 
technology.  He was also instrumental in drawing a direct correspondence between 
information and control processes in artificial systems and similar processes taking place 
in biological and human environments and, particularly, in the human body.  Thus, in 
addition to widening the interdisciplinary application of his invention, Wiener 
engendered, at least conceptually, the most powerful (and problematic) rhetorical device 
of his new science—the cybernetic analogy of man and machine.   
 The study of the processes in human and artificial systems led to the recognition 
that the analysis of control problems should involve analysis of the underlying 
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communication problems.  The latter, in turn, made more apparent the fundamental 
importance of the message—be it distributed mechanically or transferred electronically 
and electrically—in the workings of all biological and artificial systems.  The 
consideration of the message and, vice versa, of its disruption (noise) prompted a close 
look at the statistical profile of the transmitted information and ultimately contributed to a 
statistical theory of information—another branch that would greatly affect, among other 
fields, the development of linguistics, communication theory and structuralism: 
  
Just as the amount of information in a system is a measure of its degree of 





 Providing quantification of signal transmission and formalization of control 
system theory, Wiener‟s introduction acknowledges the wide gap left by all other, 
narrowly defined, disciplines dealing with issues of information, communication and 
control.  To fill this gap, he established a new, broadly applicable, study—an 
interdisciplinary theory of communication and control.  The novelty of Wiener‟s proposal 
was strategically heightened by an effective terminological coinage—a “neo-Greek 
expression”—that came to name the new theory and to bridge the gap between ancient 
and modern even on a lexical level—cybernetics: 
 
Thus as far as four years ago, the group of scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and 
myself had already become aware of the essential unity of the set of problems 
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centering about communication, control, and statistical mechanics, whether in the 
machine or in living tissue.  On the other hand, we were seriously hampered by 
the lack of unity of the literature concerning these problems, and by the absence 
of any common terminology, or even of a single name for the field.  After much 
consideration, we have come to the conclusion that all the existing terminology 
has too heavy of a bias… and as happens too often to scientists, we have been 
forced to coin at least one artificial neo-Greek expression to fill the gap.  We have 
decided to call the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in 




Wiener‟s introduction goes on to define the interdisciplinary character of 
cybernetics and its relation to other fields dealing with similar problems; e.g., 
neurophysiology and information processing in the cerebral cortex, mathematical logic 
and its application to the analysis of neural switching circuits or computers and their use 
in constructing models of brain mechanisms.
239
  Thanks to its broadly defined subject, 
Wiener‟s theory becomes “the groundwork and beginnings of a broad interdisciplinary 
study of all phases of information processing and control systems and of the implications 
and ramifications of this for such subjects as the psychology of perception, psychiatry 
and memory disorders, linguistics and sociology.”
240
  The reception of the new science, 
however, even among scholars, was as diverse as the variety of fields that it affected, 
ranging from an overly enthusiastic pronouncements predicting that cybernetics would 
change the world, to similarly fervent disapproval, scientific skepticism and open 
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  Wiener‟s supporters framed his ideas as “a second industrial revolution” 
which was at least as significant as, if not more powerful than, the first industrial 
revolution.
242
  During the first industrial revolution the “prime movers largely replaced 
human energy, while men performed a control function.”  In comparison, cybernetics was 
a new type of revolutionary process because “under automation, process and production 
control is relegated to servomechanisms while the human operator programs, monitors, 
and maintains the automated system.”
243
   
More measured but pragmatic responses to Wiener‟s theory put his ideas into 
practice by applying cybernetics to other complex systems of communication and control.  
The so-called theory of information, a widely appropriated term for what began as 
mathematical theory of communication, played a central role in those further 
developments.  The foundation for such theory appeared in 1948-49 in two articles 
published by one of Wiener‟s students—Claude Shannon—who brought together 
communication engineering (the accurate and efficient transmission of signals) and 
cryptology (the accurate and efficient encoding and decoding of information).
244
  
Shannon‟s papers gave, for a first time in the history of the field, a precise quantitative 
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explication for “one measure of the amount of information contained in a message.”
245
  
Such an explanation made it possible to compare the amount of information conveyed 
over different communication systems, to define the capacity of a “communication link” 
and a “communication store” and to determine the amount of information generated by 
an information source.  Shannon‟s theory also advanced the notion of the code as a 
sequence of symbols for presenting a message in a way that allowed one to talk about the 
efficiency of the coding system and to decide whether a particular coding system best 
represented a given information source.  Finally, Shannon clarified the key notions of 
noise, redundancy, channel capacity and error-free transmission of messages, showing 
how redundancy could be introduced in coding schemes in order to prevent the 
destructive effects of noise on information.
246
  Thus, an important aspect of Shannon‟s 
contribution involves the language in which scientific processes are described.  In other 
words, Wiener‟s student provided “a precise language and a set of concepts tailored for 
the analysis of information systems” that became essential in the engineering of 
communication systems.
247
  Shannon‟s second article translated the engendering scheme 
into cryptological language in which the transmitter became an encoder and the receiver 
became a decoder, and the author examined human communication as an exchange of 
encoded messages.  Approaching human beings as “information source,” Shannon took 
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on the man-machine analogy of his teacher and extended its application to the study of 
human language and communication.  The ramifications of Shannon‟s theory affected a 
range of fields—from psychology and neurophysiology to genetics and, especially, 
linguistics—all of which embarked on defining the various aspects, conditions and 
factors involved in the complex process of transmission and processing of information.  
Subsequent developments to the theory would offer more adequate measures for the 
properties of message such as “complexity, accuracy, precision and, most important of 
all, semantic-pragmatic information content.”
 248
  The latter property would become a 
prime concern for linguists, among which the most important contribution belongs to 
Roman Jakobson. 
As contemporaneous assessments of cybernetics attest, the two areas in which the 
“new science” and its companion, the theory of information, found immediate application 
were computer and digital technology as well as neuropsychology and artificial 
intelligence.  In particular, after their initial publication, the theories of Wiener and 
Shannon “started an almost explosive growth in the development of digital computer 
technology”—an outcome that seemed only natural since digital computers were the most 
powerful mechanisms for electronic and logical processing of information.
249
  In the 
West, the first digital computers were generated during WWII in secrecy, yet, as soon as 
the information about their application and capabilities became available, it led to a race 
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in developing new computer designs, theories and technologies.
250
  In the Soviet Union, 
the military-related development of computers was also kept a secret until the death of 
Stalin in 1953 when the discussion of the subject entered the public realm.  Produced in 
1953, probably as an improvement of the 1951 MESM, the BESM was followed by a 
number of models such as the TESM-1, M-2, M-3 and STRELA.  Boosting the support 
for a programming theory, the digital race greatly facilitated another aspect of the 
analysis of communication—the development of artificial (computer and encoded) 
languages and the study of algorithms.
251
   
The explosion of new artificial and computer technologies in the late 1950s-early 
1960s also rested on the ideas of John Von Neumann.  In the late 1940s, he began 
working on a general theory of “self-reproducing automata,” a term that he applied to 
both living organisms and complex logical-mathematical machines.  His work prescribed 
additional capacities to the proficient man-machine analogy.  Whether the brain 
functioned as a computer was not even a question for Neumann.  He insisted that both the 
human brain and the computer were logical-mathematical automata and, as such, they 
could be quantitatively compared and defined analogously.  To describe their operations 
he used the scientific language of “self-reproducing automata” that eliminated the 
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distinction between impulse and stimulus, neutron and relay organ and, ultimately, 
between the human brain and the thinking machine.
252
  Cyberneticists began referring to 
humans simply as “control devices,” while computers were seen in anthropomorphic 
terms as artificial brains.   
Another field that received a boost after Wiener‟s work on the similarity between 
the brain and the digital computer as comparable information processing systems was the 
renewed collaboration between neurophysiology and artificial intelligence.  The basis for 
such collaboration was Wiener‟s broad approach to the mechanisms of control, 
information and communication which made them applicable to a variety of areas—from 
engineering to human behavior.  The main terms of the process—message, memory and, 
what seemed to be a cybernetic nod to Ivan Pavlov, conditioned reflex—pertained to the 
technical lingo of digital computers as well as to the description of the nervous system.  
For instance, neurons feed messages into other neurons, while both the computer and the 
brain are designed for “storing information” and therefore they can “hold a message.”
253
  
The construction of artificial intelligent machines that stored information in the way in 
which the human brain retains it is not only possible, but it seems like the next logical 
step: 
 
… In the nervous computing machine it is highly probable that information is 
stored largely as changes in the permeability of the synapses, and it is perfectly 
possible to construct artificial machines where information is stored in that way… 
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In the 1960s, scientists moved beyond the analogies between natural devices (e.g., 
neurons) and digital phenomena (e.g., the switching devices of the computer) to a more 
complex understanding of the circuitry of the brain as a highly redundant information 
system which exhibits parallel information processing.  Demonstrating that the cybernetic 
principles of feedback and control were beneficial in analyzing purposeful motor activity 
on a physiological level, scientists went on to apply them to the study of “higher mental 
functions” (e.g., complex problem solving) and artificial intelligence.
255
  After the 1960s, 
the cybertalk in the West became more and more dominated by the subfields of artificial 
intelligence and machine-biological interfaces (cyborgs) which led to a less favorable 
attitude towards cybernetics as a whole once this kind of research became less popular.  




VII. Cybernetics as Soviet Panacea: Reception, Growth and Controversies 
 
If in the West Wiener‟s ideas saw initial enthusiasm that quickly mutated into a 
diverse range of mixed, often negative, responses, in the Soviet Union cybernetics and 
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the theory of information triggered a diametrically opposite course of events.  
Engendered by a non-Communist author in the heart of the capitalist enemy, cybernetics 
was bound to encounter initial ignorance and hostility among the loyalist circles in 
Stalinist Russia.  The literature on the subject disagrees on the length of the initial silence 
and the extent of the anti-cybernetic rhetoric among Soviet scholars and officials in the 
early 1950s.
256
  What Western authors agree on is that the first significant diatribe on 
cybernetics appeared in 1953 in the prestigious ideological journal Voprosy filosofii 
[Philosophical Inquiry] under the title “Whom Does Cybernetics Serve?” and published 
in the section devoted to critiques of bourgeois ideology.
257
  Writing under the 
pseudonym “Materialist,” the author defined cybernetics as a “misanthropic 
pseudotheory” and “one of those pseudosciences that are generated by contemporary 
imperialism and are doomed to failure even before the downfall of imperialism.”
258
  The 
anonymous author, of course, paid all due tribute to the clichéd lingo of the Party by 
reinforcing the “obvious” idea that cybernetics served “the war god” (i.e., the capitalist 
military and industrial interest) in developing weapons guiding systems and robotic labor 
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  Aside from the typical ideological jabber, however, the “Materialist” put a 
finger on a problem that would resurface again in subsequent disputes on the function of 
cybernetics, in particular, and on the overreaching role of science in society, in general.  
Thus, the primary flaw of cybernetics, according to the concerned “Materialist,” was its 
“untenable universalism” based on inadmissible analogies between living or social 
organisms, on the one hand, and technological creations, on the other: 
 
The theory of cybernetics, attempting to extend the principles of operation of the 
most recently constructed computers to quite distinct natural and social 






The “Materialist‟s” proposition contends that, while the advances in the study of 
computer and control systems are useful as long as their application remains within the 
realm of technology, any attempts to blur the differences between man and machine are 
“doomed to failure.”  Though relying on shortsighted ideological prognoses, the author‟s 
invective was effective in attacking the heart of Wiener‟s theory—its intention to 
combine human and technological subjects of inquiry into one interdisciplinary 
investigation.  Thus, the “Materialist” predicted the future rhetoric of anti-cybernetic 
diatribes by defining Wiener‟s theory as a “fallacious new science” that “ignores the 
quantitative differences between the live organism and machines” and “discards 
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consciousness” in its flawed attempt to prove that machines can replace human labor 
force.
261
  Discarding cybernetics as nothing more than a modern version of La Mettrie‟s 
eighteenth-century mechanicism, the “Materialist” found a superior Russian counterpoint 
to Wiener‟s “idealism,” “universalism” and inadequate use of neurophysiology—the 
work of Ivan Pavlov.
262
   
The “Materialist‟s” condemnation of cybernetics was followed by mixed results.  
In 1954, the prestigious Soviet Philosophical Dictionary repeated, almost verbatim, his 
judgment.
263
  The title of his article (“Whom Does Cybernetics Serve?”) became the 
emblematic “statement of the opposition” and common target after 1954 when the 
defenders of the new science began voicing their opinion.
264
  The first major public 
approval of cybernetics was delivered at the Academy of Social Sciences in 1954 by 
Ernst Kolman, a Czech-born mathematician, ideologist and philosopher of science who 
resided in Moscow.
265
  His argument was printed a year later in Voprosy filosofii, the 
same journal that published the diatribe of the “Materialist.”  Answering the 
“Materialist‟s” inquisitive title with a different, and more substantial, question, Kolman‟s 
text “What is Cybernetics?” was printed next to another favorable evaluation of Wiener‟s 
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theory titled “Basic Traits of Cybernetics”
266
  This favorable and insightful evaluation 
was written by three high-profile scientists and professors at Moscow University: the 
Academician S. L. Sobolev (a distinguished mathematician and engineer), the economist 
A. I. Kitov (a computer specialist) and the programming theorist A. A. Lyapunov who 
was soon to become a prominent specialist in machine translation.  As a “careful and 
conservative” assessment of its subject, the article avoided drawing any inferences about 
a cybernetic influence in other fields, such as psychology, sociology or economics.
267
  In 
contrast, Kolman, who was critical of the “one-sided approach” of Wiener‟s opponents, 
defended both the practical value of cybernetics in the fields of computer technology, 
information theory and symbolic logic as well as its broader application in other areas of 
knowledge.
268
  Making the ironic remark that “our enemies” would not spend so much 
time and energy “merely to discredit Pavlov and force idealism and metaphysics into 
psychology and sociology,” Kolman returned to the heart of the issue of 
interdisciplinarity and “firmly endorsed” the use of the analogy “brain : computer” as a 
valuable method of cognition that only a “neovitalist” would deny.
269
  
The high-profile scientific defense of cybernetics coincided with (and likely 
influenced) the new Party line promulgated for Soviet philosophy and science in 1954.
270
  
The shift was first announced in the Party publication Komunist [Communist], which 
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proclaimed that practice must serve as the highest criterion for evaluating the truth of 
scientific propositions and inquiries.  This new line guided the plenary sessions of 
February and March 1954 in which the Party Central Committee criticized the dogmatism 
of agricultural sciences.
271
  Thus, the old ideological policy associated with Zhdanov and 
the resulting dogmatism in the sciences began to fall out of favor.  At its 1955 plenary 
session, the Central Committee declared the necessity of utilizing automation and 
cybernetic technology, even though the immediate response of Soviet intellectuals to the 
tenets of Wiener‟s theory was far less than enthusiastic.
272
  The initial antagonism against 
cybernetics had subsided, but there was still reluctance among scientists to grant it the 
status of autonomous science, partly due to its overlap with automation and partly 
because of its profile of an interdisciplinary amalgamation of ideas.  The reluctance, 
however, soon dissipated, replaced by a wide-spread professional approval, as it could be 
seen in the evocative case of the Russian Academician Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, 
an internationally renowned mathematician and perennial recipient of state honors.  After 
his initial rejection of the new theory as “interdisciplinary hodgepodge,” he became its 
most important public face and Soviet supporter.
273
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Within the short course of four years—i.e., between the first public defense of 
cybernetics in 1954 and the official appearance of the technical journal Problemy 
kibernetiki [Problems of Cybernetics] under the editorship of Lyapunov in the beginning 
of 1958 or the establishment of the Scientific Council of Cybernetics by the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences the following year—cybernetics became fully accepted as a 
discipline of its own and an important area of scientific knowledge in USSR.
274
  The 
process was facilitated and celebrated by a number of events: in the academic 1955-56, 
Moscow University held its first annual seminar on cybernetics; in 1956 the Lenin 
Library (the Soviet equivalent to the American Library of Congress) published a 23-page 
survey of recommended literature on cybernetics and its implications; later the same year 
Soviet delegates attended the first UNESCO-sponsored conference on cybernetics in 
Namurg, Belgium; in 1957 the Laboratory of Electromodeling of the Academy of 
Science held a scientific-technical conference that was attended by 500 scientists from 90 
different countries and, finally, later that year, the first Sputnik was launched with the 
assistance of cybernetics and computers.
275
  In the course of this process, cybernetic 
research gradually extended beyond mathematical principles and formulas to include 
larger subjects, among them scientific aspects of language, communication and thinking, 
such as information storage or retrieval and machine translation.
276
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The symptomatic 1958 also witnessed an influx of serious Soviet literature on 
cybernetics in both domestic publications and translations of foreign authors.  In addition 
to the launching of the official Soviet cybernetic journal Problemy kibernetiki—a hard-
bound irregularly published collection of articles on all aspects of cybernetics and 
automation—the readers saw the Soviet publication of Wiener‟s two books, the first 
popular domestic study on the subject—the acclaimed Poletaev‟s book Signal—and 
Komolgorov‟s article for the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.
277
  This initial boom of Soviet 
writings on cybernetics unleashed a real “publication explosion” of numerous articles, 
papers, journals, books and conference proceedings in the following years.
278
  The 
victory of cybernetics, however, was not only academic.  Scientists, bureaucrats and 
politicians marched hand in hand under the cybernetic banner of a new technological, 
economic and intellectual progress.  The new science was granted the highest stamp of 
approval and a long-term plan for the future from the government in the twenty-year 
“Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” that was adopted by the 22
nd
 
Party Congress in 1961.
279
  In addition to its political sanctification, the program seemed 
to put an end to the polemic between pro-cybernetists and conservative scientists or 
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The introduction of highly perfected systems of automatic control will be 
accelerated.  It is imperative to organize wider application of cybernetics, 
electronic decision-making computer devices and control installations in 






Among other benefits, the new communist blueprint gave an official 
governmental endorsement to the long-condemned interdisciplinarity of Wiener‟s theory 
and prescribed as imperative (or, in Soviet terms, ordered as obligatory) its wide 
implementation in other relevant social spheres and areas of knowledge.  From that point 
on, Soviet scientific events and collective publications included a wide variety of scholars 
and fields—from electrical systems, biology and medicine, to dialectical materialism, 
law, linguistics and economy.  Cybernetics spread its web as a wide cross-disciplinary 
project that challenged, among other things, the rigid boundaries of the Stalinist academia 
which were designed to serve the political and ideological status quo.
282
  The complex 
double-sided symbiosis between cybernetics and the Marxist-Leninist propaganda also 
began taking a more pronounced shape to create a new type of political ideologeme—a 
kind of cybernetic ideology or cybernetics for ideological purposes. 
As demonstrated in the Twenty-Year Plan for the Transition to Communism and 
the contemporaneous publication of the Academic Council of Cybernetics, Cybernetics—
                                                 
281
 “Draft Program of the CPSU, 1961,” FBIS (August 11, 1961): 47, cited in J. Ford, “Soviet Cybernetics,” 
163-64.  The Communist Blueprint gives a slightly different version: “The production of highly efficient 
automatic control systems must be introduced on a large scale in industry, research, designing, planning, 
accounting, statistics, and management.”  The Communist Blueprint for the Future: Communist 
Manifestoes, 1848-1961, introd. and comp. Thomas Whitney (New York: Dutton, 1962), 167; Seyffert, 
Ibid., 122. 
282




to the Service of Communism, the new science was assigned a highest ideological 
mission.  It was supposed to improve the Soviet society and economy in a rational way 
and, thereby, to achieve the communist ideal—a centralized “rational control” of the 
economy.  Rationality and centralized control were the leading ideological concepts that 
contributed to the political sanctification of cybernetics in the Soviet Union.  First, as an 
heir of the “optimism of the French Enlightenment and the Scientism of the nineteenth 
century,” the intellectual scheme of Marxism-Leninism believed that the “problems of 
society could be solved by man.”
283
  Second, the ideal of centralized planning of the 
economy was, of course, at the very heart of the Soviet system and its ideology.  Based 
on the notions of “control,” “system” and “feedback,” cybernetics and automation, at 
least in the eyes of Party officials and the head of the Academic Council of Cybernetics 
Aksel‟ Berg, offered a scientific matrix for achieving the goal of a massive planned and 
controlled economy: 
 
…As distinct from the capitalist countries, where the various firms create, each 
for itself, separate automated systems of control, under socialism it is perfectly 
possible to organize a single complex, automated system of control of the 
country‟s national economy.  Obviously, the effect of such automation will be 





Lastly, in the late 1950s the need to find a way to consolidate a massive structure 
that was disintegrating and growing out of hand loomed more imperative than ever 
                                                 
283
 Graham, Ibid., 325. 
284
 Komunist, Vol. 37, No. 9 (June 1960): 23, cited in C. Olgin, “Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics,” Bulletin 




before.  Soviet authorities faced the necessity to stabilize an economy that was becoming 
more complex and difficult to control, while the Party apparatchiks were seeking means 
to rationalize the huge managerial bureaucracy necessary to direct a large planned 
economy.
285
  Cybernetics emerged at the right place and the right moment as a panacea 
that offered a multifaceted solution to a circular problem.  Jumping on the loaded 
ideological wagon, the new science revived the old ideals of centralization, provided 
tools for macromanagement and, most importantly, restored faith in the failing system.  
The vision of an all-purpose remedy led to an “explosion” of cybernetic references, 
utopias, images and ideas which has been poeticized as “promise of modernity” and 
“triumph of rationality” and seen as “intoxication”: 
 
Cybernetics revitalized, at least temporarily, the Soviet leaders‟ confidence that 
the Soviet system could control the economy rationally.  This renewal came 
exactly at the moment when the possibility seemed to be irretrievably vanishing.  
The rebirth of hope was the explanation of the intoxication with cybernetics in the 
Soviet Union in the late fifties; in the period after 1958 thousands of articles, 
pamphlets, and books on cybernetics appeared… One can find no other moment 
in Soviet history when a particular development caught the imagination of Soviet 





Not only did cybernetics promise modernity and a better future, it also held out 
the prospect of the triumph of rationality in the man-made brain, and, with it, 
proof of the omnipotence of human reason; there was talk of poetry by computer, 
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of the “formalization of human intuition”… It seems that all fields of human 






 Not surprisingly and according to all accounts, cybernetics reached its “widest 
possible scope” and universality as a discipline in the Soviet Union where it enjoyed 
more prestige than anywhere else in the world.
288
  Whether the new science in fact 
delivered on any of its promises for a better future, “advent of communism” or 
“fulfillment of the Revolution” is a question that will remain outside of the scope of this 
dissertation.
289
  Already in the 1960s, critics acknowledged that cybernetics presented to 
the Soviet regime as many ideological problems as the numerous solutions it promised to 
provide.
290
  Even though Soviet cybernetics never rose to the level of a “rival 
philosophy” capable of endangering the status quo of dialectical and historical 
materialism (partly, because it was gradually integrated in the status quo and, partly, 
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governing the evolution of the material world and human society.”  Levien based his prognosis on the 
prediction of C. Olgin, “a recent émigré student of the Soviet Union,” who envisaged in 1962: “cybernetics 
… might easily result in the rise of a rival philosophy and, at the very least, encourage the devotees of 
cybernetics to query, first the of laws of Dialectical, then those of Historical Materialism, and finally the 
omniscience of the Central Committee, not in the natural sciences, which Krushchev‟s administration had 
already virtually liberated from Party tutelage, but in economics, sociology and possibly even politics, 





because its own promises were as utopian as the “omniscience” of the regime), it 
nonetheless played an integral role in the reform movement of the 1960s.  In fact, 
cybernetics became a critical player in that movement because it provided, if not an 




 Sociological studies have shown that the reform attempts began in the Soviet 
Academia in the early 1950s when, as mentioned earlier, the question “Who controls 
language?” came to the forefront of major intellectual inquiries.  After the death of Stalin, 
scientists, especially mathematicians and physicists, accumulated social status, academic 
prestige and political capital that was sufficient to push for a change in the management 
of science.
292
  The reform was partly successful, at least in the domain of the natural 
sciences, where the interventions of the Party nomenklatura became more limited, and 
new terms for the translation of science into practice were established.
293
  However, the 
real gain for the reformers came with the arrival of a new set of expressions in the field of 
scientific and intellectual inquiry—a new type of speech that employed objective notions 
and precise terminology which were capable of replacing the empty words or “floating 
signifiers” (newspeak) of the political apparatchiks.
294
  This new universal grammar and 
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vocabulary belonged to cybernetics.  It offered a new language—effectively studied and 
defined by Slava Gerovitch as cyberspeak—which unified “diverse mathematical models, 
explanatory frameworks, and appealing metaphors from various disciplines:”  
 
 
Cyberneticians combined concepts from physiology (homeostasis and reflex), 
psychology (behavior and goal), control engineering (control and feedback), 
thermodynamics (entropy and order), and communication engineering 
(information, signal, and noise) and generalized each one of them to be equally 
applicable to living organisms, self-regulating machines (such as 
servomechanisms and computers), and human society.  In their view, humans and 
machines were two kinds of control systems, which operating in certain 
environment, pursued their goals (hitting a target, increasing order, achieving 
better organization, or reaching the same state of equilibrium) by communicating 
with the environment, that is, sending and receiving information about the result 





Contrasting with the vague and manipulative newspeak of the Stalinist ideological 
discourse, the cyberspeak became the main vehicle of de-Stalinization of Soviet science, 
culture and language in the late 1950s-early 1960s.  The battle of languages took place on 
both fronts: in the social arena, as competition between the scientific community and the 
nomenklatura and, within the scientific communities themselves, as a dispute between 
traditionalists and the proponents of new cyberideas.  Cybernetics quickly left the 
technical field to become the universal language of a new relation between men, 
machines and society, and that novel language soon acquired the aura of rationality, 
progress and social change.
296
  Cyberspeak appealed to the supporters of the reform in 
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science with both of its aspects—its universality and its “exact” terminology—which, at 
least in the 1960s, made evident the vagueness of the newspeak and, at the same time, 
managed to translate abstract or allusive references into the precise terms of control, 
information and entropy.
297
  As a result, cybernetics became an “institutional umbrella” 
for the most progressive, controversial and underground branches of Soviet knowledge 
which gained outlets thanks to their ability to translate unacceptable terms and 
methodologies into the versatile cyberspeak of the new science.   Such controversial 
branches that modified even their names to fit into the new ideologeme were: non-
Pavlovian psychology (“psychological cybernetics”), structural linguistics (“cybernetic 
linguistics”), genetics (“cybernetic biology”), new approaches in experiment planning 
(“chemical cybernetics”) and legal studies (“legal cybernetics”).
298
  In psychology, the 
cybernetics‟ supporters were able to move beyond the dogmatic interpretation of the 
Pavlovian theory and to explore aspects of the human nervous system that were 
previously left outside of psychology.  Such a shift was enabled largely by Wiener‟s 
pervasive analogy of man and machine.  Some of the new psychological aspects that 
drew cybernetic attention, for instance, were purposeful behavior and human thinking 
both of which became described in machine terms as information, programming, 
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feedback, calculating and computing.  Being of little importance to the followers of 
Pavlov, the concept of “purposeful behavior” became central for the Soviet physiologist 
Nikolai Berhnstein who proposed a new branch of physiology—“psychology of 
activity”—which acquired progressive scientific as well as political implications.  
According to his cybernetic approach, the human organism is a “self-regulating machine” 
which first receives information from the external world, then encodes and stores that 
information in a model and finally, on the basis of the same model, programs its actions 
and behavior.
299
  Bernshtein‟s theory, however, went on further.  The purposeful activity 
of the organism, according to the Soviet physiologist, was not simple adaptation, as 
Wiener would have it, but constructive movement or even change of the environment.  
Although Bernshtein insisted that his goal was plain liberation of the organism from the 
Pavlovian dogmatic notion of a passive entity (“reactive automaton”), his discreet 
allusion to the adaptive behavior of Soviet conformists, likely intended, prompted his 
critics to accuse him in alleged “mechanicism” and “teleologism.”
300
 
Bernshtein‟s ideas created a new movement in Soviet cybernetic research that 
quickly overthrew the dominant psychological paradigms which ignored the mechanisms 
of physiology.  The engineers Artobolevskii and Kobrinskii insisted on overcoming the 
limited theories of human thinking; the mathematician Mikhail Bongard (a leading 
specialist in pattern recognition) rejected the Pavlovian reflex theory as incapable of 
addressing more complex nervous activity; Liapunov created a stochastic algorithm that 
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modeled the acquisition of a conditional reflex and the control engineer Gal‟perin 
proclaimed that the automatic control devices of the latest machines function as nervous 
systems because they were capable of unconditional reflexes.
301
  Gal‟perin then focused 
on another project the goal of which was to prove that modern control devices could, in 
principle, demonstrate conditional reflexes—a development which called for 
“reevaluation of physiological values” and moved a step closer to approaching the control 
device as a human brain.  In 1963, Komolgorov was heard reinforcing the same line of 
thought: “Artificial thinking beings are possible.  It is not worth arguing whether it is 
possible to create them in principle.”
302
 
Buttressed by Bernshtein‟s ideas, Soviet “physiological cybernetics” made 
significant contributions to the fields of artificial intelligence and the man-machine 
analogy.  In contrast to Western cyberneticians, who, according to Bernshtein, 
concentrated on devices that simulated individual physiological acts, Soviet research 
pursued a comprehensive cybernetic model of all human physiological mechanisms—i.e., 
nothing short of an artificial human organism.  Wiener‟s analogy extended both ways.  
Cyberneticians aimed at a complete makeover of physiological methods and terminology 
until control systems simulated the complexity of the most compound living organism—
the human organism—while human beings became equated with the most perfect 
cybernetic machines.  One of the earliest proponents of the new science in USSR 
summed the process most effectively: 
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In cybernetics, a machine is defined as a system capable of accomplishing actions 
that lead to a certain goal.  Therefore, all living organisms, and human beings in 






 Even the last argument of the Pavlovian opponents of such analogies—the 
argument that thinking is reserved for humans who are the only ones who can make sense 
of their environment—seemed to be easily overtaken by cybernetic terminology and 
technical concepts such as “feedback.”
304
  Cyberneticians then took on another activity 
typically connected with specifically human behavior: game.   
 Soviet cybernetic research on games was rooted in Bernshtein‟s study of adaptive 
physiological activities which occur in “dynamically variable” situations.  In order to 
survive or succeed in such situations the organism has to exhibit something more than 
simple receiving of feedback or decoding of information.  It has to perform something 
closer to cognitive function or as Bernshtein puts it—to make a “probabilistic forecast”: 
  
To use a metaphor, we might say that the organism is constantly playing a game 
with its environment, a game where the rules are not defined and the moves 
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 There was only a short distance from the idea of “probabilistic forecast” to a 
cybernetic game theory, and Bernshtein‟s friend, the mathematician Mikhail Tsetlin, 
masterfully bridged that gap by applying the new mathematical study of finite automata 
to neurophysiology.  Tsetlin tested Berneshtein‟s idea in his analysis of a particular type 
of game in which stochastic automata had no information about the outcome of the game 
and had to develop their tactics in the course of the game.
306
  The Soviet mathematician 
explicitly compared the strategies of the simple automaton dealing with a complex 
environment with the situation of “a little animal in the big world” but the implicit 
references to human behavior were hard to ignore.
307
  Building on Von Neumann‟s 
research on automata and Bernshtein‟s complex approach, Tsetlin then turned to the 
“collective behavior” of mathematical objects.  In such a way, he expanded his game 
model to include the behavior of the whole system the actions of which resulted from the 
combined actions of the primitive automata.  Moreover, Tsetlin argued that he found the 
key principle of coordination between the elements of the system—the “principle of least 
interaction”—i.e., all parts in the system “strove” to minimize their interaction with the 
rest of the components in the system and with the system as a whole.
308
  This conclusion 
simplified the mechanisms of control in the system in which the elements were less 
dependent on a direct connection to the center and, if provided feedback information, the 
simple automata can develop their own strategies of coordination with the system.  Such 
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a model was much more suitable to study complex system processes such as the 





VIII. Cybernetics and the New Science of Language: Structural Linguistics 
 
The “objective” terminology and “exact” methods of cybernetics had a radical 
impact on the development of Soviet linguistics in which, as stated earlier, the question 
“Who controls language?” came to the forefront of academic thought after the death of 
Stalin.  In the 1950s, Soviet linguists, such as Viacheslav Ivanov and Isaak Revzin, 
became increasingly resentful of the shifting political phraseology of the newspeak and 
sought more objective language and exact methods of scientific investigation.
310
  One of 
the earliest signs of the need of new methodology was the renewed interest in Saussure‟s 
ideas.  In the summer of 1952, the young linguist Sebast‟ian Shaumian gave the first 
indication that Saussure‟s structural linguistics had planted a fruitful seed in the new 
generation of Soviet academics.
311
  Shaumian‟s article “The Study of the Phoneme” 
published by the official organ of the Soviet Academy (Izvestiya Akademii nauk) draws 
its subject, as Seyffert rightly points out, from the very source of structural linguistics—
                                                 
309
 Ibid., 226. 
310
 Ibid., 227. 
311
 Shaumian‟s piece could have been provoked by the first of two articles by Aksmanova who, although 
acknowledging the importance of Saussure, reaffirmed the older stronghold of Soviet “antiformalism.”  See 






  By arguing that phonology is superior to “traditional historical phonetics,” 
Shaumian indirectly defended the synchronic study of the formal characteristics of 
language and introduced a whole arsenal of structuralist notions and devices without 
mentioning the dangerous name “structuralism.”  The official outcry following his “The 
Study of the Phoneme” was a testimony to the rising impact of structuralist thinking.  
Thus, although Shaumian played the traditional game, i.e., he used the appropriate 
political jargon, supplied novel ideas with ample quotations by Stalin, Zhdanov, Lenin 
and Engels and phrased the argument as a “vital part of the official campaign against 
„bourgeois idealism,‟” the traditionalists responded with a “somewhat incompetent” 




Shaumian‟s case further demonstrated that the desire to combat the control and 
ideologization of communication was connected to the need to achieve a precise and 
“ideologically neutral” way of expression.  This belief was shared by both linguists and 
cyberneticians who discovered its foundation in the language philosophy of the logical 
positivist Rudolf Carnap and the linguist Louis Hjelmslev.  As Carnap and Hjelmslev 
suggest in their writings, one can decide whether a certain problem can be resolved 
scientifically only after trying to “formulate this problem clearly in some strict terms, for 
example, to pose it as a mathematical problem.”
314
  If the problem cannot survive such 
translation, it ought to be considered unscientific.  The language of cybernetics, 
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Shannon‟s mathematical model of “a general communication system” and Komolgorov‟s 
contributions to the “theory of information” made such a process of reformulating the 
scientific language of linguistic inquiry possible.  The opportunity was promptly seized 
by the proponents of a new branch that came to transform the former Marrian linguistics 
into new, more scientific, study of language.  That was structural linguistics (or 
“cybernetic linguistics”) which emerged as a combination of American descriptive 
linguistics, transformational-generative grammar, Saussure‟s ideas and Jakobson‟s key 
contributions to phonology, communication and poetics. 
 In the 1940s, Roman Jakobson, who had already acted as a founder of the 
Linguistic Circles in Moscow and in Prague and had briefly become associated with the 
Copenhagen Linguistic Circle and Hjelmslev, immigrated to the U.S. and moved to 
Harvard.  There, he joined the cybernetic proponents and quickly established contacts 
with Wiener and Shannon.  In his letter to Wiener written in 1949, he pointed out the 
ground-breaking potential of cybernetics and insisted on close “parallelism” between 
modern linguistics and the new science.
315
  Drawn to the unambiguous terminology of 
cybernetics and information theory, Jakobson used both Wiener‟s man/machine analogy 
and Shannon‟s mathematical model to construct a generalized scheme of linguistic 
communication.
316
  In his scheme, he blended new terms coined by himself with the 
terminology of Wiener and Shannon in order to replace Saussure‟s traditional 
dichotomies, such as langue and parole, with Shannon‟s scientific approach, now 
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supplemented with a new “psychological” dimension of communication (contact).
317
  
The result was a new model of linguistic communication that changed the old perception 
of language as the mere expression of one‟s thoughts.  In Jakobson‟s terms, language 
became rather a circular relation between acts of encoding, transmitting and decoding of 
information.  His model incorporated the main components of Shannon‟s diagram, such 
as message, signal, source, channel and receiver; however, it also changed certain 
aspects in order to convey the specificity of the linguistic process.  Thus, the new scheme 
included six constituent notions: addresser (that is a speaker or encoder), addressee 
(listener or decoder), context (e.g., “referent” or an area in which we understand what the 
message is about), message (information sent by addresser to the addressee), code (way 
of formulation that is “fully, or at least partially, common” to them) and contact 
(“physical or psychological connection between them”).
318
  Jakobson also proposed that 
each one of the factors in his scheme corresponded to one of the six functions of language 
(shown below in parentheses):
319
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As a whole, Jakobson‟s model suggests that, a successful act of communication, 
i.e., an act that does not fail due to noise or entropy, involves at least two stages: (1) the 
transmission of a message from an addresser to an addressee through a contact (physical 
or psychological) and (2) the reception (decoding or understanding) of this message 
which needs to be framed in a code and to refer to a familiar context.  Though the 
cybernetic idea of a circuit and the notion of feedback are not explicitly stated, they exist 
implicitly in the second phase of reception (understanding) which is necessary in order to 
make linguistic communication possible.  Resting on his formalist work in Moscow and 
on the semiotic ideas of the Prague circle, Jakobson‟s model proposes a structuralist-
cybernetic approach to language as communication that is very different from the 
Saussure‟s division of langue and parole.  The new approach accounts for the various 
factors involved into the process of linguistic transmission of messages, each one of 
which could determine, change, obstruct or facilitate the amount of information delivered 




communication in human and in engineering circuits, proving thus the applicability of 
Wiener‟s ideas in the field of modern linguistics and paving the way to new 
developments in machine translation and the creation of artificial languages.
320
 
 Jakobson‟s model was instrumental in the development of Soviet structural 
linguistics, and it was namely Roman Jakobson who brought the cybernetic innovations 
in the study of communication to USSR.  In 1956, Jakobson visited Moscow for a first 
time after his emigration more than a decade before, and during that visit he met with a 
group of progressive Soviet scholars.  Soon thereafter, one of those scholars—Viacheslav 
Ivanov—and his friend the mathematician Vladimir Uspenskii (a student of Komolgorov) 
organized a seminar on mathematical linguistics.  The projected topics included 
mathematical logic, machine translation, information theory, the mathematical definition 
of grammatical categories and the “mathematization of language.”
321
  The course of a 
new development in the study of language was set and its trajectory became firmly and 
tightly aligned with the exact sciences, preeminently mathematics.  Groups and seminars 
in machine translation emerged at the Applied Mathematics Division, at the Institute of 
Precise Mechanics and Computer Technology as well as at the Institute of Foreign 
Languages.
322
  With its interdisciplinarity, systematic approach and precise terminology, 
cybernetics presented the next logical step of linguistic inquiry in the 1950s.  This step 
was also motivated by political reasons because as soon as the Academy‟s Council of 
Cybernetics was established in 1959 it set up a linguistic section that provided “safe 
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haven for innovative research” by marginalized Soviet linguists.
323
  As a result, structural 
linguistics sprung and grew in the second half of the 1950s in the field of machine 
translation under the institutional protection of cybernetics.
324
  This political refuge led 
not only to close cooperation between linguistics, cybernetics and computing, but also 
resulted in further innovative developments and theoretical models in the field of 
language. 
One of the first official indications of a cybernetic turn in the field of linguistics 
emerged in 1961 when V. Ivanov and, not surprisingly, S. Shaumian published a co-
authored article on the “linguistic problems of cybernetics.”  The article reinforced 
Wiener‟s analogy because it compared the way in which the human brain performed 
linguistic activities with the ways in which specialized computing machines conducted 
linguistic analyses.
325
  Expanding on the cybernetic idea of machine translation, the two 
authors called for “a new discipline of structural linguistics” that would study the 
“construction of formal models of language” and would become an “exact science”: 
 
In the transmission of information, it is often necessary to convert information 
from one sign system into another, that is, from one code into another.  This type 
of conversion is called coding.  Any code is a language, and coding is nothing 
else but translation from one language into another.  Therefore, studying codes 
and coding is a linguistic problem, and the theory of codes and coding is a 
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linguistic theory… It is precisely the concept of code and coding that serve as a 




 As Gerovitch rightly points out, this approach clearly separates the ideas of 
Ivanov and Shaumian from the source of their initial inspiration—Roman Jakobson.  If 
Jakobson treated natural language as one of various possible codes and classified 
linguistics as one of the disciplines under the umbrella of information theory, Ivanov and 
Shaumian did the opposite.  They regarded every code as language and considered 
information theory as part of linguistics.
327
  Under the powerful agenesis of cybernetics, 
the new science of language was ready to claim its leading and overarching place among 
all disciplines dealing with signs and codes and thus to become the foundational model 
and basis of the new structural-semiotic movement.   
Not all parts of the Soviet academic and non-academic community, however, 
embraced the new “scientific-technological revolution” and its brainchild—cybernetics—
as enthusiastically or, at least, uncritically.  A wide group of artists, writers and 
intellectuals openly voiced their opposition to the overemphasis on science and 
technology and expressed concerns that rationality would gradually replace artistic 
imagination, non-utilitarian creative thinking and aesthetic ideals.  The debate, which in 
1962 would ultimately fuel the dispute on the issue of “man versus machine,” broke out 
in the fall of 1959 and became known as “the quarrel of the physicists and the 
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  In addition to articles by leading literary specialists such as Zelinskij and 
Ermilov, the controversy involved a large number of letters sent by ordinary, often 
anonymous, readers of Komsomol’skaya Pravda, the Communist Youth League organ on 
the pages of which the quarrel began.   
 The debate started with an article by Ilya Erenburg who, as the article‟s 
introduction explained, was responding to an alleged letter from “Nina,” a student in the 
humanities.
329
  In her letter, Nina complained of having arguments with Yuri, a young 
engineer and sports fan, who ruined their relationships with his lack of appreciation for 
art.  In the end of her complaint, Nina raised the question whether art still had any role or 
meaning in the Soviet society.  Erenburg responded with a long tirade of thoughts and 
observations on the importance of art for maintaining one‟s spiritual values “in the age of 
narrow specialization and monotonous labor.”
330
  The public reacted to his article with an 
avalanche of written reader‟s responses, and the paper published many of them.  The 
majority of readers supported Erenburg‟s notion of the importance of artistic imagination 
and the complementary roles of art and science in society.  However, a small group of 
scientists took the position of Yuri, defending the vast superiority of technology and the 
rising dominance of science.  One of the most evocative laudations on the power of 
science was presented in the letter of Igor Poletaev—the young engineer who had 
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published the first Soviet book on cybernetics just a year earlier.
331
  In his response to 
Erenburg, Poletaev stated: 
 
Science and technology determine the face of this epoch, influence ever more the 
taste, the mores, the conduct of man.  We live by the creative work of the mind, 
not of feeling, by the poetry of ideas, theories, experiments, construction.   
… 
Whether we like it or not, the poets rule our souls and teach us ever less.  Today 





With its binary oppositions, Poletaev‟s diatribe reveals the vast territory that, once 
chartered by the powerful man-machine analogy, was now used as a rhetorical battle 
ground.  Thus, the young cybernetician divides and juxtaposes two different worlds: mind 
versus feeling, poetry versus “poetry of ideas, theories, experiments, construction,” the 
poets that “rule our souls” versus the “absorbing stories” of “precise, bold, merciless 
reason.”  Voicing an extreme part of the spectrum, Poletaev triggered numerous 
responses among which nearly fifty objected to his opinion and only six supported his 
view.  One of his most passionate opponents, a certain Minaev, pointed out the narrow 
ways of “philistinism” and evoked the harmonious ideal of “Soviet man:” 
 
The people of the communist society, Comrade Poletaev, will never be walking 
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By the end of the year, Komsomol’skaya Pravda received thousands of responses 
which broadened the scope of the discussion to include the general state of education in 
schools, the role of artists in society, the difference between socialism and communism 
and the lack of meaningful integration between science and art.
334
  Reverberating in the 
Soviet press for years, this heated, though “utterly unsophisticated” (Seyffert), debate 
articulated the conflicting public reaction to the rapidly spreading new science and 
“cybertalk.”  In fact, although it took a different shape in the academic circles, the 
problem of how to integrate art and literature with science and technology as well as the 
question of whether such integration would ever be possible had already began to 
preoccupy leading scholars and would soon become an impetus for new developments in 
the Soviet humanities.  As to the opponents of “walking computers,” they found 
themselves pushed to a corner when most innate human characteristics, such as thinking 
and play, were successfully claimed by the spreading man-machine analogy, smart 
automatons and cybernetic euphoria.  Yet, although they seemed defeated to the young 
engineer Poletaev, the “poets” still had one last “safe haven,” one last human quality that 
no computer or automaton could gain.  Frequently employed by a range of discourses—
from classical Russian literature to pompous Soviet newspeak—the most elusive and 
powerful Russian signifier for that quality appears, though ironically, even in the heart of 
Poletaev‟s diatribe.  There it stands alone next to “the poets” who, in Poletaev‟s view, are 
losing the battle against the “precise, bold, merciless reason” of science and technology.  
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 According to Seyffert‟s summary, some letters complained of the “uninspiring” teaching of art in 
school, the lack of “good new literature” and the remoteness of artists from modern life and from the “spirit 
of the space age.”  See Komsomol’skaya Pravda (25 October 1959): 3 and (22 November 1959): 3, cited in 




That untouchable, vague, evasive yet powerful signifier of the last human quality to 






The Birth of the Conceptual Image: Kabakov’s Works in the 
Early 1960s 
 
VII. Soul or Shower 
 
When Kabakov began his Shower drawings in 1962, cybernetics had already been 
established and institutionalized as a field in USSR, and the debates between poets and 
scientists fueled various journals and publications.  Some of those debates resonated on 
the pages of Znanie (Knowledge) and Znanie-Sila (Knowledge-Power), the two journals 
that brought together progressive underground artists in the 1960s.  As Kabakov 
mentions in his memoir, Sobolev held the position of artistic director at the publishing 
house Znanie and as such he oversaw the graphic and artistic design of, first, the journal 
Knowledge and, then, the journal Knowledge-Power.
335
  As an artistic director, Sobolev 
had the freedom to hire artists of his own choosing to illustrate both magazines, and he 
determined the aesthetic outlook of particular issues.  He also allowed artists to select 
their own subjects and thus, according to Kabakov, created a “new movement in Soviet 
illustration.”
336
  For that reason, the issues published under Sobolev‟s “supervision” show 
both Sobolev‟s vision as well as the stylistic individuality and creative approach of the 
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artists that illustrated them; e.g., Sooster, Popov, Lavrov, Neizvestnii, Yankilevsky and 
Grobman.  As a whole, those issues also exhibit a much more pronounced affinity 
towards using emblems, signs and symbols, such as human heads to allude to intellectual 
activity or cybernetic control mechanisms (Fig. 21), balls to connote physical activities 
and intellectual games (Fig. 24), realistic depictions (e.g., a picture of a fly) or pictograms 
(chromosome of drosophila) to signify scientific discoveries (Figs. 22, 25 and 26) as well 
as construction elements (e.g., pipelines/pipes) to suggest technological advancements 
and scientific progress (Fig. 23).  Shown next to articles discussing cybernetics, genetics 
or recent developments in machine translation and linguistics, those emblem-symbols 
actively participated in the larger cultural dialogue.  In tune with Kabakov‟s 
psychological profile of Sobolev, the visual aesthetic of Znanie’s symbolic language 
demonstrates a dual attitude towards the new scientific developments and their impact on 
all aspects of Soviet life and society.  The “new aesthetic movement” generally supported 
the prevailing cyberspeak, treated the anti-cybernetic sentiments and the man-machine 
analogy with a dose of irony and showed professional appreciation for the high 
accomplishments in the arts and the humanities. 
As Kabakov‟s memoir confirms, he was certainly closely associated with the 
Znanie circle and its visual aesthetics; however, at the same time, he was not officially 
participating in it.  The name “Kabakov” appears only once among the names of the 
artists illustrating one of the issues of Znanie, however, the initial next to it—“A.”—
made the connection with the author of the Shower uncertain.  In 1967, a miniscule 




association with Znanie, while a color reproduction of one of his paintings—Ride on a 
Bicycle—published in January‟s issue of Znanie-Sila the same year suggests that his dual 
stance of “participating while not openly participating” was most probably intentional.  
With its semantic openness and visual simplicity, the paired-down style of 
Kabakov‟s early Shower drawings (Figs. 12 and 13) plays upon the signature vocabulary 
of the Znanie journals—vocabulary consisting of crudely drawn “emblems-symbols” 
such as human head, human profile, pointing hand, sphere or globe.  The juxtaposition of 
inanimate technology (shower) and living being (the bather) also evokes the new 
scientific developments and the heated controversy that they caused in the Soviet society 
in the beginning of the 1960s.  By 1962, the debate has already reached its final stage and 
battleground—the battle over the human soul, that last evanescent, yet, innately human 
facet which, in the words of Poletaev, had long been ruled “by poets” but “today” is 
absorbed by the stories of the “precise, bold, merciless reason” of science and 
technology.
337
  In Kabakov‟s pictorial treatment, however, the visual story is far from 
being so clear-cut and decisive as Poletaev would have it.  It is true that the vertical 
dualism of the drawings conveys the separation between animate and inanimate, human 
and technology, person and shower, as well as it is evident that the frivolous stream of 
water seems to flee away from this charged environment as if refusing to connect the 
circle of communication, connection or feedback between the polar opposites.  What is 
much less obvious in Kabakov‟s drawings is where the soul actually resides or, to put it 
in the language of semiotics, what its signifier actually refers to.  All of the elements in 
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this disconnected circle can make a claim for it—the shower linguistically (as mentioned 
previously the Russian dush/a can refer to both shower and soul depending on the 
context), the water stylistically (as it is the only dynamic element that seems alive in the 
drawing) and, lastly, the bather (by way of habit and convention since his passivity and 
detachment recall an automaton rather than a person).  In the end, with its linguistic and 
visual ambiguity Kabakov‟s symbol-emblem pokes fun at both sides involved in the 
public dispute and at their respective officialized discourses.  The fashionable signifiers 
of the pervasive cyberspeak, e.g., automaton, information, circuit, feedback, etc., lack a 
true meaning and seem incapable to deliver on their promises to change and improve the 
world.  Similarly, one of the most evasive and vague symbols of the newspeak and 
Russian culture in general—the soul—unfolds as a constantly shifting, elusive and empty 
signifier that is devoid of any content and meaning.  As Kabakov‟s discussion on the 
novelty and personal value of the Shower in his memoir suggests, he has indeed found his 
artistic voice and image.  That is the voice of the probing, polysemantic and ironically 
charged conceptual expression and the ambiguity of the image-symbol. 
 
 





Kabakov divides the works he created after the first Shower pieces into two 
separate “groups: drawings and paintings.”
338
  The two genre categories, in fact, often 
overlapped as they used similar images and motifs and, being more versatile, informal 
and intimate in scale, the drawings often served as a testing ground for new painting 
strategies and ideas.
339
  Most of the drawings that the artist made in the first studio he 
shared with Sooster have been given away and destroyed.
340
  However, Kabakov‟s 
memoir contains a short authorial assessment of the subject, style and composition of 
those early drawings coming into his head “one after the other” while he was sitting at the 
drawing table: 
 
Eto varianty “Dusha”, no glavnym obrazom kompozitsii, svyazannye s 
simmetrichnoy geometriey i figurkami lyudey, kak-to uvyazannymi s etoy 
geometriey, podklyuchennymi k ney.   
Nekotorye risunki obrazovyvali nebol‟shie serii.  Po nekotorym ya sdelal 





Those [drawings] were variants of the Shower, but in terms of their general 
composition, they had a symmetrical geometry and figures of people which were, 
in a way, coordinated with this geometry, integrated in it.   
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 Zapiski, 16.  This “new life” began in the fall of 1962 when Kabakov moved into the first one of the 
three studios he shared with Ülo Sooster.  Noting the “huge amount of works” (“ogromnoe kolichestvo 
rabot”) and “thousands of drawings” that Sooster had already produced and stored in a pile of boxes and 
folders, Kabakov admonishes, in contrast, that he spent most of his time in “sitting at the table and making 
small drawings that, one after the other, came into my head.”  For instance, in 1962-63, he produced “a 
great number” of drawings showing “spheres on a grid,” only few of which have survived.  Ibid., 17.  For 
images of two of those drawings see Wallach, Ilya Kabakov, 98 and Jackson, The Experimental Group, 61, 
Fig. 27.   
339
 Kabakov admits that he produced series of drawings which he subsequently turned into paintings.  
Speaking about the way he arranged his studio, the artist also reveals that the drawings and the paintings 








Some of the drawings formed series.  Some of them I turned into middle-sized 
paintings (50/60) using the plywood of boxes that I found near the studio.   
 
 Despite that the majority of the early drawings are lost and the authorial passage 
on them consists of only few sentences, a couple of key ideas emerge.  Most importantly, 
Kabakov continued experimenting with the image that would turn into one of his 
signature idioms—the generic and depersonalized human form—after it transpired in the 
first Shower drawings and came to signify artistic originality, personal style and open 
symbolic potential.  Second, the idiom is now seen as an element of a larger system of 
representation and organization, or more precisely as a component that is locked in the 
system‟s spatial (symmetry, composition) and formal (geometry) relations.
342
  The 
propensity to systematization can be seen in the internal progression of the Shower series: 
the pattern of the water, for instance, becomes less spontaneous, more regularly shaped 
and rather stylized.  In the first drawing, the erratic flow of the murky substance is cut off 
by the frame but, but by the same token, it continues to gush forth in the perpetual and 
unlimited time/space outside.  In the second drawing, the stream is suspended in midair 
and ends inside but its symmetrical curvaceous body flows freely in and out of the 
picture.  In the latest Shower drawing, however, the erratic stream and free flow are 
substituted with numerical values, mathematical calculations and multiple frames within 
the frames (Fig. 14).  “Water” is still present in the drawing, yet its presence is 
ambiguous and codified.  Enclosed within the smallest frame of the piece, it looks like a 
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 Derived from the word for key (klyuch), the Russian equivalent of “plugged in,” “integrated,” or 




sample of a liquid substance that is disconnected from the shower nozzle.  This iconic 
and indexical reading of the substance‟s figural sign, however, is further complicated by 
the molecular formula of oxygen O2 written to the right of the sample‟s middle section.  
Retroactively, this molecular formula suggests that the figural metonymy sketched on the 
left can be seen as a stand-in for the molecular formula of water (H2O).
343
  The dangers 
of the scientific approach become apparent when the viewer decodes the chemical 
brainchild of this mathematical solution and discovers that the molecular sequence of 
water and oxygen composes the formula of hydrogen peroxide (2 H2O2)—a pale blue 
liquid, slightly more viscous than water, characterized by bleaching and oxidizing 
capacity.
344
  To increase the ominous (and playful) associations, hydrogen peroxide, 
which has already been produced instead of being in the process of making, hovers 
framed right next to the head of the bather which appears slightly darker than his body.
345
  
In comparison with the earlier Shower drawings dated to 1962, the image of the bather 
also undergoes transformations.  Surrounded by various measuring and framing devices, 
the man‟s figure is fully integrated (or locked) into the drawing‟s composition while his 
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 Representing the ironic and “reflective” I of the artist, the plumbing calculations surrounding the image 
were a response to the increasing obsession with science and mathematical approaches to cultural 
phenomena that peaked in Russian society in the early 1960s.  
344
 Having strong oxidizing properties, hydrogen peroxide is used as a disinfectant, antiseptic, oxidizer and 
a powerful bleaching agent.  With its qualities of a bleaching substance and a weak acid, it supports the 
drawings‟ references to the Jewish “enduring anxieties over bodily cleanliness” or Stalin‟s political 
retributions Chistki (See M. Jackson, Ibid., 41-42).  Used as a propellant in rocketry, the Shower‟s 
hydrogen peroxide could also be an ironic play on Yuri Gagarin‟s 1961 flight into space—the first human 
flight to orbit the earth—and, in this capacity, Kabakov‟s drawing foreshadows his numerous future 
characters flying into outer space or into the space of the picture.   
345
 Exothermically, hydrogen peroxide decomposes, disproportionately and spontaneously, into water and 
oxygen gas [2 H2O2 → 2 H2O + O2].  However, the reverse formula does not represent the way in which 
hydrogen peroxide is made as it is produced through the Riedl-Pfleiderer process.  See W. T. Hess, 
Hydrogen Peroxide, in Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, 4th edition (New York: Wiley, 
1995), Vol.13, 961-995.  A literal reading of the scene, would suggest that escaping the chistka or ominous 




presence more purposefully coincides with the composition‟s vertical axis.  The use of 
linocut technique comes to further underline the increased stylization, impersonal 
character and rounded quality of his body and facial features.  Reduced to basic 
depersonalized lines, the linocut bather will remain a consistent motif in all future 
additions to the Shower series.  Severing most links with the earlier works “from nature,” 




IX. Boy and Head with a Sphere 
 
 Next to the drawing table, between 1962 and 1965 Kabakov began creating three 
“large paintings:” Hand with a Broken Mirror, Head with a Sphere (Fig. 15) and Boy 
(Fig. 16).
347
  Conceived in chorus with the drawings that Kabakov saw as “variants of the 
Shower,” they express similar concerns related to “symmetrical geometry” and the 
compositional ways in which “figures of people” are “coordinated with” or “integrated 
in” this geometry.  In addition, the large paintings have a direct iconographic link with 
the Shower series, reducing further the depersonalized male body to its basic outlines, 
geometric shapes and metonymic components—head, shoulders and hand.  Characterized 
as a “monstrous” painting, Boy brings the relation between figure and frame, body and 
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 Kabakov paints his last work “from nature,” a self-portrait with a ski hat, and completely loses interest 
in that activity in 1966.  Zapiski, 15. 
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 Zapiski, 16.  Today, the two latter paintings are dated to 1965.  See Kabakov: Paintings/Gemälde 1957-
2008. Catalogue raisonné, ed. Renate Petzinger and Emilia Kabakov (Bielefeld, Germany: Museum 
Wiesbaden/Kerber Verlag, 2008; Wallach, Ilya Kabakov, 149 and Jackson, The Experimental Group, 81.  
In Zapiski, Kabakov states that he began making them in 1962, but recently Ilya and Emilia Kabakov have 




composition or integration and disintegration to an ironic extreme.  The body is 
condensed down to its most general parts and shapes, and yet, despite the clearly marked 
diagonals and measurements, it seems too large to fit into the center of the painting.
348
  
Recalling the graphic signs of the third Shower drawing, the charts act not only as a meta-
comment on the irregularities and the aspirations of the painting, but further reduce its 
actual size through an echo of minimizing frames within the frames.  The impact of 
overwhelming centrality (which appears even more overwhelming due the fact that it is 
off-center and too large to contain) evokes two cultural models—Orthodox icons, a 
connection further supported by the encaustic medium, and the official portraits of Soviet 
party leaders.
349
  Boy can also be read as an autobiographical mockery of Leonardo‟s 
diagram of ideal human proportions and the artistic tradition of representing the perfect 
body.
350
  A more immediate contextual reference even leads to the relationship between 
the universal macrocosm and the human microcosm in the art of Sooster, Sobolev and 
Neizvestny.
351
  However, Boy‟s individual microcosm, as center of all things, is blown 
out of proportion to such an extent that it threatens to consume the macrocosm of the 
artwork.  The most explicit linguistic sign—the title of the painting—heightens this ironic 
subtext as the Russian equivalent of boy (mal’chik) originates in the word small (maly) 
and phonetically evokes this meaning.   
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 In fact, the head is positioned slightly off-center, moving an inch to the right and breaking the lower 
rectangular border. 
349
 Both of these models are mocked by the pink color that alludes to the Shower‟s beige countenance and 
its autobiographic idiom.   
350
 See Wallach, Ilya Kabakov, 43-45.   
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 Head with a Sphere is similarly concerned with the interplay of figure, geometry, 
composition and language.  Yet, it devotes a lesser importance to the autobiographical 
references and physiognomy of Boy and the Shower.  Instead, Head with a Sphere makes 
a more tangible pun on the emblem-symbols and cosmic metaphors of Kabakov‟s 
friends-nonconformists and art‟s old conventions.  The increased comprehension of art as 
a system of signs; i.e., as a visual language, gains impetus, hand in hand, with a growing 
proficiency in the use of linguistic means to express the reflexive “I” of the author.  
Minimizing the self-referential quality of the familiar autobiographic idiom, Head with a 
Sphere substitutes the frontal exposure, cramped space and centralized compositions of 
Boy and the Shower with a profile view, a classical sculpted head and a bipartite 
composition.  This shift from looking at oneself to looking at the artistic other (a fellow-
artist, a new artistic trend or the classical tradition), forges an array of oppositional 
binaries between left and right, high and low, animate and inanimate, male and female or 
foreground and background.
352
  The dualistic structure combines, among other 
references, the coded “emblem-symbols” of Sobolev, the microcosm/macrocosm 
mythology of Sooster and the female/male cosmogony of Yankilevsky and, through 
them, visual allusions to surrealism, Magritte, classical art and even the heroic 
hyperbolae of monumental Soviet sculpture.  Characteristic of Sooster and Sobolev, the 
ambivalence of the spatial relations makes it unclear whether the head appears enormous 
because it has been pushed to the extreme foreground or whether it is, indeed, of 
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 The empty center of the painting is filled with the tension of a curious drama of “not being looked at” 
and yet “being seen” since the eye level of the head does not meet the blue trajectory of the sphere, while 




magnanimous proportions and size and thus presents a hypertrophic microcosm.
353
  
Similarly dualistic in its syntactic composition, the title comes to heighten the semantic 
tensions and to underline the ironic component.  Thus, the Russian word for “head” 
(golova) signifies, as does its English equivalent, the most intellectual part of the body 
associated with leading, brain activity, main center and bravery; yet, the Russian noun 
can also refer to absentmindedness, empty-headedness, mental conundrums and lack of 
reason or control.
354
  Used in its Instrumental form, the second noun in the title, “sphere” 
(shar), also has a dual meaning referring simultaneously to the “Earth” (zemnoy shar 
earthly sphere) and, in its diminutive version, to “balloon” (vozdushny sharik or, literally, 
small sphere of air) while evoking phonetically or homophonically the words “comedy” 
(sharada) and “caricature” (sharzh).
355
  As a result, the ambivalent title not only echoes 
the painting‟s two-partite composition, but also heightens its cosmological ambiguity and 
ironic play on the idea of universal balance.
356
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 This instability recalls the ambiguity that Kabakov saw in Sooster‟s work depending on whether the 
eyes concentrated on the foreground or the background.   
354
 In Russian, the words “main” (“golovnoy”) and “puzzle” (“golovka”) as well as the idioms for a “brave 
person,” e.g., a person with brains (“chelovek s golovoi”), “to answer for somebody with one's life” 
(“golovoy ruchat‟sya za kogo-libo”), “to remember something” (“derzhit v golove chto-libo”) or “bold 
spirit” (“smelaya golova”) are directly derived from and contain the root “head.”  At the same time, “head” 
is the main component in expressions such as “empty-headed” (“v golovy nichego ne pridet”), “to forget 
about something” (“chto-libo vyletelo iz golovy” literally “to slip out of somebody‟s mind”), “absent-
minded” (“sovsem bez golovy”), “self-sufficient” (“ya sam sebe golova”), to act “over somebody‟s head,” 
e.g., without somebody‟s knowledge (“deystvuvat‟ cherez golovu chego-libo”) and “to lose one's head” 
(poteryat‟ golovu”).   
355
 The sphere is a polyvalent symbol alluding to the macrocosm of the earth, the universe or the technical 
proficiency of the artist able to draw a perfect full sphere.  Kabakov‟s sphere/balloon also refers to 
Sooster‟s signature image—the egg—as a symbolic unity of micro and microcosm that contains individual 
life and recalls the eternal endless circle of the universe.  However, the instrumental case accentuates the 
Head as the main image and the sphere as an addition—a tool or an accompanying object.   
356
 Thus, the human microcosm could be blown out of proportion, lost its mind (or in Russian “lost its 
head”), puzzled or simply pushed close to the surface (the later effect is heightened by the plaster relief of 




In his diary, Kabakov‟s friend Mikhail Grobman recalls that on April 13, 1965 he, 
Kabakov, Sooster, Juri Rogov and Volodya Fedorov (i.e., the physician Vladimir 
Fedorov) had a long discussion about “the brain, memory, images, egg and circle, n-
metric dimension, etc., etc, etc.”
357
  The previous year, Sobolev had completed a drawing 
representing his contemplation on the ideas of memory, brain processes, scientific 
knowledge and visual imagination—Cybernetic Fantasy (Fig. 17).
358
  Combining the 
cubist technique of Picasso with the visual language of Miro and Klee, he addresses a 
question particularly pertinent to the cultural and scientific debates of Soviet society at 
the time of advent of cybernetics in the early 1960s.  In addition to promoting the 
advancement of science and technology, the chief artist of Knowledge and, later, 
Knowledge-Power, in the words of Kabakov, had an avid interest in phenomenology, 
Freudism and psychoanalysis.
359
  In its fantastic vision, Sobolev‟s drawing brings 
together, in one ideally balanced head-universe, the microcosm (human head-brain) and 
the macrocosm (the small sphere-globe in the jaw of the head), the conscious and the 
subconscious (or the collective subconscious indicated in the repetition of heads within 
                                                                                                                                                 
mathematical emblem (a full-sphere sharik), an airborne balloon or a large object diminished by the 
distance.  To reinforce the latter respect, the painting‟s composition is vaguely reminiscent of the official 
poster of Tarkovski‟s first masterpiece Ivan’s Childhood.  Released in 1962, it earned enthusiastic acclaim 
in Russia and abroad and won the Golden Lion award at the Venice Film Festival the same year.  Kabakov 
himself has shared on a few occasion his personal resentment to the symbolism and seriousness of 
Tarkovski‟s cinematographic mythology. 
357
 Mikhail Grobman, Leviathan.  Dnevniki 1963-1971 godov (Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 
2002), 64.  In the next sentence, Grobman adds that, on the way home, he and Kabakov ruminated about 
the “scientific and mystical approach to knowledge, about drinking and so on.”  Ibid. 
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 The drawing was published in Konečný‟s article that also discusses the art of Sooster and Kabakov.  See 
Dušan Konečný, “Problém Techniky A Mladé Moskevké Experimentující,” Praha-Moskva 2 (1966): 30 
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the heads), imagination and science, dream and technology, vision and inner vision.
360
  
Devoting a central attention to this “collage”-like drawing, Konečný sees in it “an 
imaginary work in which the overwhelming cybernetic realism dissipates in a brittle 
poetic dream.”
361
  The “cybernetic realism” would have not been regarded without a 
sense of irony on the part of the Znanie artist, for whom, as Kabakov‟s memoir attests, 
science can be present in art only in the guise of jokes or intuition.
362
  Similarly to 
Kabakov‟s Head with a Sphere, the key to the drawing‟s irony is encoded in its 
ambivalent title, glancing at which, one begins to wonder whether a human is envisioning 
a perfect balance of thinking and universe in the n-dimensional cognitive world of 
cyborgs or, vice versa, whether a cyborg is charting the complex connection between 
mental, visual, subconscious and psychological processes in the imperfect head of a 
human.
363
  While the cyborg in “cybernetic” is divided between subject or object, 
“dream” removes each one of those options from the world of reality.   
 Next to the cyborg head by Sobolev, Konečný places a representation of another 
object-symbol discussed, as Grobman‟s diary testifies, by Sooster, Kabakov and their 
friends on April 13, 1965 and another one of the images with which Kabakov was 
surrounded while working on Head with a Sphere.  That is Sooster‟s drawing Egg dated 
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 The heads within the head could refer to the symbols in Freud‟s interpretation of dreams, the darker 
profiles could signify vision versus cognition, while the repetition of images indicates memory. 
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 See D. Konečný, “Problém Techniky..”, 30 
362
 See Chapter 2. 
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 Similar ideas convey the massive cyborg-like heads painted in the same period by Yankilevski and 
Brusilovski as well as Bulatov‟s 1966 visual metaphor in which thinking and memory are envisioned as an 
echo of heads within the head of a nightly wonderer.  See J. Padrta, “Neue Kunst in Moskau”, 8, 9 and 13; 
Konečný, “Problém Techniky..”, 35; and E. Bulatov, Moscow (London: Parkett Publishers, 1989), 18.  
According to Konečný, Brusilovsky‟s work exposes the “psychological problems of an extreme form of 




to 1965 in the same article (Fig. 18).
364
  Konečný, who paid numerous visits to the 
Moscow artists and spent a fair amount of time talking to them, defines Sooster as “one 
of the most original and most mature representatives of the young structural and 
imaginative painting in Moscow.”
365
  Although, in Konečný‟s view, Sooster‟s works 
appear at first “decorative,” below their “ornaments, spheres, ellipses, ovoids, cylinders, 
pyramidal and amorphous formations one can discern the imaginary world of proto-forms 
[archetypes].”  Konečný continues: 
 
These proto-forms——always have the breath of live organisms although 
sometimes they evoke a rock formation or a cobblestone made by a human hand.  
Sooster‟s images require a contemplative attention, despite the fact that they 
appear at first clear, uncomplicated.  The participation of contemplative 
apperception is deeply embedded in the images, in them the symbolist shapes are 





 What Kabakov perceived as a “structural instability” or “optical accommodation” 
in Sooster similar to the “intellectual accommodation” in Sobolev, in Konečný‟s article 
becomes an image charged with hidden complexity.  What Kabakov defined as “emblem-
symbols,” Konečný sees as archaic prototype-forms connected into an imaginative 
narrative.  Both Kabakov and Konečný, however, interpret the structural symbolism (and 
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 Konečný, “Problém Techniky...,” 29.  In fact, Sooster painted various versions of the same symbol in 
1963, 1964 and later.  In Konečný‟s article, Sooster‟s egg appears at the end of the page that precedes the 
page that is headed by the work of Sobolev.  According to the Russian art historian Yuri Gerchuk, the egg 
is “the ideal form and favorite symbol of Sooster” and “a capsule of the life, proto-embryo of the Universe-
to-be (prazarodysh eshche ne voznikshey Vselennoy).”  The egg‟s “porous, rough surface resembles a 
weathered rock or a layered shell,” while its layered center, as a Russian matryoshka, contains a row of 
eggs “nested within each other.”  See Yuri Gerchuk, “Drugaya realnost Ülo Soostera” in Iskustvo 6 (2004) 
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 Konečný, “Problém Techniky...,” 29.  The structural quality, in Konečný‟s view, is enhanced by the 
complex texture of Sooster‟s painting, resulting by the fact that the artist was adding resin to oil paint.  On 
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229-32, 254, 277 and 389. 
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unstable structures) of the Estonian artist in a similar way—i.e., Sooster‟s archetypes 
simultaneously recall natural forms and man-made formations and, therefore, unite the 
human microcosm and the universal macrocosm.  Sooster‟s Egg, for instance, alludes to a 
variety of oval, feminine and symbolic proto-forms: from a rock, dune or hill to the naked 
belly of a pregnant woman.
367
  Kabakov‟s sphere combines Sooster‟s “structural 
instability” and “optical accommodation” with Sobolev‟s ironic take and “intellectual 
accommodation,” adding to them the artistic conventionality, tactile matter and 
heightened referential quality of the realistically depicted tridimensional object.  Thus, in 
the context of an ambivalent pictorial situation in which Kabakov‟s plastered sphere 
simultaneously hovers in the bright sky/ether/space and rests on a blue 
thread/line/horizon it recalls not only Sobolev‟s sphere and Sooster‟s egg but also the 
referential objects of Pop Art and Russian avant-garde‟s visual language.  Kabakov‟s 
familiarity with the latter two movements in the early 1960s is a contentious subject 
because, in the artist‟s eyes, it translates into interpreting his works as influenced by such 
movements.  Furthermore, Kabakov maintains that even when he became introduced to 
Malevich‟s work and the avant-garde of the 1920s, which according to his personal 
testimony happened in the 1970s, this art was already dead for him.  Historical accounts 
and recent research have suggested that he probably visited Costakis‟ collection, as early 
as, 1962 and perhaps saw some of the avant-garde exhibits at the Mayakovski museum in 
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  Mikhail Grobman also remembers in his diary entry for October 30, 
1964—the first time he mentions Kabakov in his book—that on the same day he and 
“Ilya [Kabakov]… talked about Pop Art and ostranenie” while Kabakov was pointing to 
his new works in the studio he had just rented with Ülo Sooster.
369
  Bringing a keen 
insight into the aesthetics of Pop Art, the Russian term coined by Victor Shkolovsky 
ostranenie (“defamiliarization”) provides another key into Kabakov‟s meta-
referentiality.
370
  Used by Russian formalism to distinguish “poetic language” from 
“practical language” or the “ordinary speech” of prose, ostranenie alludes to the ways in 
which art turns familiar objects into strange and unfamiliar entities.
371
  Thus, art enhances 
the perception of the familiar and makes its discernment less automatic.  The process was 
also interpreted in psychological terms, because, according to Shkolovsky, it prevented 
the “over-automatization” of individuals which causes them to function as though they 
“followed a formula.”  Similarly to Pop Art, Kabakov‟s sphere or balloon depicts a 
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 George Costakis was born in Russia of affluent Greek parents and worked at the Greek and the 
Canadian Embassies in Moscow.  In 1946, he discovered by chance a number of constructivist paintings 
left in a Moscow studio and began searching for and collecting other examples of Russian constructivist art.  
Thus, he was able to preserve many works that would have been otherwise lost for the world, and his 
collection served as a historical link between the first and the second Russian avant-gardes.   
369
 “Ilya pokazal novye raboty, my govorili s nim o Pop Arte i ostranenii.”  This happened in the studio 
located across the street from Mayakovski‟s museum.  Grobman, Leviathan, 34. 
370
 Shkolovsky coined the term in 1917 in his article Iskusstvo kak priem (Art as Device/Technique) 
published in Sborniki, II (1917) and translated in English as “Art as Technique.”  See Viktor Shklovsky, 
“Art as Technique” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, eds. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reiss. 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Publishing, 1965), 3-24.  In his essay, Shklovsky states that when "we see 
an object several times, we begin to recognize it.  The object is in front of us and we know about it, but we 
do not see it.”  Art “removes objects from the automatism of perception in several ways.”  Tolstoy, for 
example, “makes the familiar seem strange by not naming the familiar object” but by describing an “object 
as if he were seeing it for the first time, an event as if it were happening for the first time.  In describing 
something, he avoids the accepted names of its parts and instead names corresponding parts of other 
objects…”  Ibid., 13. 
371
 Initially, Shklovsky invented the term as a means to “distinguish poetic from practical language on the 
basis of the former‟s perceptibility.”  See Lawrence Crawford, “Victor Shklovskij: Différance in 




common object and makes it unfamiliar by placing it in a new artistic context.  The ironic 
wink to formalism, however, is hidden in the fact that the common object is 
defamiliarized twice—once by being used in the context of art, and a second time, quite 
literally, by entering a strange and semantically unstable environment.
372
  At the same 
time, Kabakov‟s “sphere” (shar) could be defamiliarizing any of the contructivist abstract 
spherical images in the avant-garde sculptures and paintings in Costakis‟ collection.  In 
this case, the process acquires an additional meta-layer since the constructivists had 
defamiliarized the prosaic sphere once to turn it into an abstract indication of flight into 
space or a symbol of technical prowess or freedom.  Kabakov‟s painting would 
defamiliarize (or rather refamiliarize) the symbol again bringing it back to the blue 
horizon of the earth, to the prosaic referentiality of the sign and the everyday, though 
ambivalent, language.  As if to make a visual pun on the psychological aspect of 
ostranenie, the sphere is physically distanced from the head which, depicted in profile, is 
distanced from both the viewer and the autobiographical idiom of Boy and the Shower.  
The artist has arrived at the picture that is simultaneously part of him and remains at a 
distance as a separate, independent entity.  As such, the image can now participate in the 
dialogue with its author, evoking various culturological and psychological associations.   
 
X. The Fragment, the Flight and the Body: Cybernetics or Fiction 
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 Suspended in mid-air and touching the blue line, the object seems simultaneously flying and grounded, 
connected to and disconnected from the head and equally tangible and illogical.  It may be or may not be a 
balloon or it may be or may not be an object at all, just a vision springing out of the imagination of the head 




 In parallel with its growing semantic ambivalence, the fragmented human idiom 
undergoes another important transition—it becomes liberated from the symmetrical 
compositional structure.  As mentioned previously Zapiski defined the “symmetrical 
composition” and the “figures of people… coordinated with this geometry, integrated in 
it” as a common characteristic of the early drawings.  In fact, if we look at the earliest 
surviving drawings and consider the language that Kabakov uses to describe them we 
would see that these figures—both spheres and body parts—are not only “coordinated 
with” but rather locked or trapped in the multiple grids and frames of the painted 
structure.  After the Shower and Spheres in a Grid (“sharikami na setke”)—the two 
earliest Kabakov‟s series that most fully demonstrated the interdependence of figure and 
composition—the artist began another set of drawings that Zapiski describes as “series 
with flying body parts” (“seriya s letayushchimi chastyami tela”).
373
  A good 
reproduction of one of these drawings—perhaps the only surviving example—can be 
seen in a 1969 article by Dušan Konečný (Fig. 19).
374
  A system of concentric, radiating 
and crossing lines marks and reinforces the structure of the composition.  However, 
despite that the complex network of lines ties each body part to the hills of the landscape 
and perhaps even ironically measures the figures‟ velocity and size, the idea of flying 
away or freeing oneself from the bounds of the earth (and from its measuring system) 
dominates the upper half of Kabakov‟s binary composition.  The tension between high 
and low, astral and terrestrial, dynamic and static is concentrated in this intermediary 
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 Zapiski, 17-18. 
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linear middle that seems simultaneously geometrically precise and pseudo-scientific.  
Like Boy and Head with a Sphere, the drawing of the flying body parts makes an ironic 
comment on the system of rationalism and Leonardo‟s man as a measure of all things.  
Similarly to the contemporaneous 1964 Shower, the flight drawing also alludes to 
Sobolev‟s idea that science can exist in art only as “intuition or joke” and refers to 
cybernetics.  In 1965, after the same conversation in which Kabakov, Rogov and 
Grobman discussed “the brain, memory, images, the egg and circle, n-metric dimension 
and so on, and so on” Kabakov would share with Grobman that he “felt intimidated by 
such sciences as cybernetics…”
375
  In fact, when examined in relation to the “circular 
casual” relationship of the closed circuit systems studied by cybernetics, the drawing‟s 
inner tension seems playful rather than timid.  In the closed signal loop of cybernetics, 
the relationship between the action in the system and the environment is reciprocal—the 
action leads to a change in the environment which manifests this change back to the 
system via information or feedback.  As a result, the system changes its behavior and 
adapts to the new conditions.  Although Kabakov‟s drawing plays on the idea of a closed 
circuit with its semicircular curves and concentric radii, the relationship between the 
flight of the fragmented body and the static environment is, in fact, an entwined one-way 
affair with two contradictory corollaries.
376
  Either the disembodied extremities are 
unable to break free and cause a sizable physical action, or the curvaceous horizon, upon 
receiving the chaotic signals of the limbs, converts their velocity into geometrical values, 
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 Literally, the artist “felt shyness in front of such sciences as cybernetics…” (“Ilya skazal, chto on 
ispytyvaet robost‟ pered takimi naukami, kak kibernetika…”  Grobman, Leviathan, 64. 
376
 The closed circuit is typically represented as a clockwise or counterclockwise transmission of energy or 




but does not change and does not transmit any informational feedback.  At any rate, the 
very idea of a free flight, mutual reciprocity, system change and universal balance 
becomes undermined by the illogical appearance of mathematical logic and the non-
scientific depiction of science, as they fill the open space between the absurdity of the 
human flight and the serenity of the bare macrocosm. 
 In 1964, in the same conversation in which Kabakov shared with Grobman his 
“shyness” when it came to “sciences such as cybernetics,” he added next to cybernetics 
its linguistic branch—“mathematical linguistics.”
377
  Using mathematical formulas, 
complex calculations and numerous references to Western publications, mathematical 
linguistics was indeed designed to instill “shyness” and intimidation in the mind of the 
uninitiated.  As in other contemporaneous scientific branches, the goal of mathematical 
linguistics was to prove that such complex societal phenomena as human language can be 
reduced to and studied as mathematical processes.  In contrast to “traditional descriptive 
grammars,” which “register the structure of the most standard and commonly used 
phrases of language” but are not capable of “generating” them, structural linguistics takes 
on the ultimate challenge—to automatically recreate or replicate the mystery of human 
language: 
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 “Ilya said that he felt shyness when it came to such sciences as cybernetics or mathematical linguistics” 
(“Ilya skazal, chto on ispytyvaet robost‟ pered takimi naukami, kak kibernetika ili matematicheskaya 
lingvistika.”)  Grobman, Leviathan, 64.  The interdependence of cybernetics and mathematical linguistics is 
well explained in the 1962 book of V. I. Sviderskii on the subject: “The research of structural linguistics—
an abstract theoretical discipline dedicated to constructing of formal models of language—is widely used in 
cybernetics.  As a matter of fact, without the formal modeling of the structure of language it would be 
impossible to convert automatically the language information and without such conversion the processes of 
management as the main subject of cybernetics would be also impossible… The main contribution of 
structural linguistic is the investigation of the general structure of language.”  Sviderskii, O dialectike 





Sami po sebe traditsionnye grammatiki ne pozvolyayut porozhdat‟ avtomaticheski 
frazy yazyka.  Formalizatsiya traditsionnykh grammatik privodit k razlichnym 
avtomaticheskym sposobam porozhdeniya i analiza predlozheniy i, v chasnosti, 





The traditional grammars in themselves are not capable of generating 
automatically phrases of language.  The formalization of traditional grammars 
will lead to various automatic means of generating and analyzing sentences and, 
in particular, it will lead to mathematical understanding of generative grammar as 
calculation.   
 
 
 In context of such scientific optimism which partially would reach its objective in 
the encoded languages of computer programs, Kabakov‟s drawing captures the general 
aspiration of mathematical linguistics, if not its complex diagrams and computations.  In 
the process, the image turns into visual puns some of the fundamental principles of 
structural linguistics employed in early, more computational and descriptive, writings on 
mathematical logic and in later, more abstract and theoretical, analyses of structural 
linguistics—the principles of “isomorphism of objective structures,” the notion of “class 
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 E. D. Stotskiy , “Obobshchennye grammatiki i ikh svoistva” (“Generalized Grammars and Their 
Characteristics”) in Bochvara and Shreider, eds., Isledovaniya no matematicheskoy lingvistike, 
matematicheskoy logike i informatsionnym yazykam (Investigations in Mathematical Linguistics, 
Mathematical Logic and Informational Languages) (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 7.  Although Stoitsii‟s article 
was written in 1969; i.e., after Kabakov‟s drawing, it summarizes the ambitions of the early proponents of 
mathematical linguistics and their conviction that science would lead to the invention of artificial languages 
generated by machines and automatic systems.  In this, mathematical linguistics aspired to replace or go 
beyond the generative grammar of Chomski which reached the Soviet scientific circles through Russian 
translations published in the cybernetic periodical Kiberneticheskii sbornik in 1962, 1965 and 1966.  
Describing language as “a great number of phrases,” Chomski‟s generative grammar, according to Stotskiy, 
allows the generation of grammatically correct phrases.  Yet, in Stotskiy‟s view, it is incapable of 
formalizing the process of speech and unable to understand or translate texts from one language to another 
since it is applicable only to the grammatically correct phrases that are produced in correlation with a 
“programmatic conclusion” located in the mind of the speaker or in the memory of the machine.  In other 
words, the “program” is not constant; it changes depending on the situation or the context of the speech act, 
and it is defined by the semantics of the phrases.  In contrast, mathematical linguistics concentrates on the 
grammatical structure of the phrases and considers their semantics only in so far as it is manifested in 




as a whole” and the opposition of “system versus text.”
379
  The rule of isomorphism of 
objective structures characterizes both structural linguistics and cybernetics, while the 
latter as a discipline was generated by this principle.
380
  Isomorphism ensured the 
compatibility between systems and made possible the essential processes of 
communication, feedback, change and control.
381
  A firm believer in isomorphism of 
objective structures, Wiener developed various methods of enhancing the informational 
feedback of systems, such as the Wiener filter produced in the 1940s and published in 
1949, in order to reduce the amount of noise present in a signal and thus to improve the 
communication.   
 The principle of “system versus text,” as defined by Evdoshenko, unites an even 
greater number of theories related to cybernetics, mathematical linguistics and 
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 Though their definitions and descriptions vary, these general rules were imbedded in any serious 
application of mathematical/structural linguistics even when they were not named explicitly. 
380
 See A. Evdoshenko, Problema structury yazyka (Problems of the Structure of Language) (Kishinev, 
1967), 7.  An earlier shorter version of Evdoshenko‟s text was published in Kurs de gramatike istorike a 
limbii moldovenesht’ in Kishinev in 1964.  Devoting attention to all three branches—mathematical 
logic/linguistics, cybernetics and structuralism—this study of language defines in lay terms the basic 
postulates of all these disciplines.  In regard to the isomorphic principle, Evdoshenko states “As N. Wiener 
had noted, the main thought that served as the beginning stage in the establishing the basis of cybernetics 
was the hypothesis of isomorphism of the calculative and problem-solving mechanisms, the processes of 
the neurological system, the sphere of social processes and so on.”  Ibid., 7-8.  Evdoshenko‟s passage is 
referring to Norbert Wiener and the Russian translation of his programmatic study Kibernetika ili 
upravlenie i svyaz v zhivotnom i mashine (Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and 
the Machine) published in 1948 and translated in Russian in 1958.  See Graham, Science, Philosophy, and 
Human Behavior, 280.  Wiener stirred additional interest in cybernetics during his visit to Russia in 1960.  
Evdoshenko traces the isomorphic principle back to Wiener‟s teacher Bertran Russell and his idea of 
identical structures (“tozhdestvenosti struktur”) which played “a huge role in resolving a great number of 
problems.”  Evdoshenko bases his assessment on a passage from Russell‟s book Chelovecheskoe poznanie.  
Ego sfera i granitsy (Human Consciousness.  Its Sphere and Boundaries) quoted in Sviderskii‟s O 
dialektike elementov i struktury (On the Dialectic of Elements and Structures) (Moscow, 1962), 119, 146-7, 
243-44.   
381
 Evdoshenko illustrates the importance of the principle through the mathematical theory of resonance 
(“teoriya kolebanii”): a general theory enabled by the isomorphism of mechanical, acoustic, 






  In his generalized overview of this postulate, the author traces it back to 
a number of key stages in the development of structural linguistics, all united under the 
umbrella of the principle of philosophical dialectics: 
 
The factors that facilitate the study of language, in the most general sense, have 
been discovered, consciously or subconsciously, in response to the main principle 
of dialectics, according to which, the whole is divided into parts for the purpose of 
studying its contradictory aspects.  The first most significant partition of the unity 
of language is—language (langue) and speech (parole), or, what is essentially the 
same—of form and substance.
383
 
Form, in itself, splits into signified (plane of meaning) and signifier (plane of 
expression).  Language also manifests itself as text (process), on the one hand, 
and system, on the other.  Text becomes a subject of syntagmatic analysis, while 
the system—[a subject] of paradigmatic [analysis].  In addition to that, language 
can be examined in synchronic and diachronic ways.  Indebted to F. de Saussure, 






In this general and synthesized overview of structural linguistics, Evdoshenko 
makes implicit and explicit references to a range of key philosophical and linguistic 
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 The importance of this principle is also rooted in the centrality of the system of language for the study of 
all other structures.  Characterized subsequently as linguistic fascism by post-structuralist scholar, the 
centrality of language, in Evdoshenko‟s view, is well argued by Karl Bühler, according to whom, simple 
systems can be developed on the basis of more complex ones, such as language, while the opposite process 
would be illogical.  See Bühler, Das Strukturmodel der Sprache translated in Russian as “Structurnaya 
model yazyka” in Zvegintsev, Istoriya yazykoznaniya XIX i XX veka v ocherkah I izvlecheniyakh, chast‟ II, 
(Moscow, 1960), 36.  Evdoshenko connects the idea of centrality of language with the general grammar of 
Hjelmslev, according to which, language holds a “key position in human knowledge.”  See Hjelmslev, 
Principles de grammaire générale (Copenhagen, 1928).  Russian translations of Hjemslev‟s writings on the 
method of structural analysis in linguistics and on the relationship of language and speech were published 
in the same volume of Zvegintsev‟s book, while Hjemslev‟s Prolegomena to the Theory of Language and 
the essay “Can We Say that the Semantics of Words Form a Structure?” appear in Russian in the periodical 
Novoe v lingvistike (New in Linguistics) in 1960 and 1962.  Admitting that Prolegomena presents the 
desirable as a reality, Evdoshenko devotes a special attention to the Hjemslev‟s idea of the key role of 
language in human knowledge: “The semiotic structure serves as a model with which all scientific subjects 
can be examined.”  Prolegomena quoted in Evdoshenko, Problema structury yazyka, 9.   
383
 My translation preserves the original syntax of Evdoshenko‟s sentence, but in the author‟s intention 






theories—from Hegel‟s dialectics and Marx‟ dialectical materialism, through the 
groundbreaking studies of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, to, what Soviet 
linguistics had disapprovingly deemed as, “American descriptivism.”
385
  Such an 
amalgamation of historical opinions was not uncommon in Soviet literature, and, as a 
result, even if the authors did not specify the original source of a postulate or the details 
of a theory, the general public was familiar with the theory‟s thrust and ideas.
386
  In a few 
sentences, the Russian author summarizes the key contributions of Ferdinand de Saussure 





  Evdoshenko begins with Saussure‟s main concept—the notion of 
language as a sign system or structure which ought to be studied by approaching the 
structure‟s individual components—however he appropriately translates the concept into 
the binary paradigm of dialectical materialism, stripping it of the most contentious 
standpoints.
388
  The passage continues with Saussure‟s distinction between langue—
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 Later in the book, he adds that American descriptivists, such as Chomsky or Trager, concentrate on the 
text, the syntagmatic axis and the plane of expression.  The author also quotes Revsin, according to whom, 
the American school “does not acknowledge at all the place of content.”  See I. Revsin, “Editorial” in 
Volotskaya, Moloshnaya and Nikolaeva, Opyt opisaniya ruskogo yazyka v ego pismennoy forme (Moscow, 
1964). 
386
 Besides reflecting real commonalities and trends and having a popular appeal, the Soviet theoretical 
amalgamation had ideological reasons.  The linking of an argument to the all-encompassing umbrella of 
dialectical materialism ensured its political correctness, while juxtaposing it to the “formalism” of the West 
made innovations appear less extreme and ideologically appropriate.  In other words, even if the separation 
of form and content or the attention to the formal characteristics of the text evoked the criticism of 
conservative circles, such criticism could have been easily redirected to the real problem—the extreme 
formalism of Western descriptive linguistics.  The same strategy allows even unfitting scholars such as 
Saussure to be seen as “subconsciously” applying Marxist dialectics.   
387
 The book was translated into Russian as Kurs obshchey lingvistiki in 1933 and became part of common 
knowledge with the rise of mathematical and structural linguistics.   
388
 Thus, Saussure‟s postulate that the individual components of the system can be differentiated only in 
relation to each other and understood in relation to the system as a whole becomes reduced to a dialectical 
procedure which divides the whole into parts “for the purpose of studying its contradictory aspects.”  The 




language as a system (e.g., Russian or English)—and the way in which it functions; i.e., 
parole referring to speech, utterance and the particular use of the individual units of 
language.  Evdoshenko then moves to the structure of Saussure‟s linguistic sign 
comprised of form (signifier) and meaning (signified).  Next, he evokes the 
differentiation between language as an abstract set of rules (system) and the language‟s 
realization (text).  Lastly, the passage describes the two aspects of language study—
diachronic denoting the development of language in “historical time” and synchronic 
examining language as a system at any given moment of its development; i.e., in “actual 
time.”
389
  In the course of his overview of Saussure, the author alludes to the structuralist 
theory of Roman Jakobson and the study of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.   
Originating in Hjelmslev‟s Prolegomena, the third structuralist principle evoked 
by Kabakov‟s drawing, “class as a whole,” belongs to the axis that Hjelmslev and 
Evdoshenko associate with the system, paradigmatics and content.
390
  “Class as a whole” 
denotes groups of linguistic objects united by a semantic characteristic or a grammatical 
category—e.g., gender or person (first, second, etc.).  In mathematical linguistics, the 
“tree” of this “class” appears as a pyramid composed of concentric lines radiating 
                                                                                                                                                 
only in relation to each other and the system as a whole not to the external reality is left out of 
Evdoshenko‟s passage as it puts into question the important Marxist-Leninist dogma of culture and 
language as reflections of reality.   
389
 Evdoshenko, Problema structury yazyka, 10.  Using Hjelmslev‟s definition of text as “syntagmatics the 
endless chain of which manifests itself in each material,” Evdoshenko elaborates on B. Uspenskiy‟s 
equation of the relation system-text with the relation langue-parole and adds to them the relation substance-
form, plane of content and plane of expression.  Ibid., 12.  See Boris Uspenski, Nekotorye voprosy 
strukturnoy tipologii (Moscow, 1963), expanded and published as B. Uspenski, Strukturnaya tipologiya 
yazykov (Moscow, 1965). 
390
 Evdoshenko sees those terms as synonymous in Hjelmslev.  Evdoshenko, Problema structury yazyka, 
11.  Hjelmslev divides the linguistic notion of “class” into “class as a whole,” allowing “virtual analysis;” 




downward from the pyramid‟s center.
391
  In the light of Russian mathematical and 
structural linguistics gaining a strong momentum in 1964, Kabakov‟s dualistic 
juxtaposition of high—low, sky—earth, fractured body—geometric composition acquires 
an additional semantic dimension.  Like structuralist writing, the drawing creates a binary 
opposition between the syntagmatic axis of text/process (form) taking a plunge above 
versus the paradigmatic axis of the system (content) below trying to replicate the plunge 
through geometric figures and abstract linear compositions.  Whether the spatial 
dichotomy would achieve the balanced synthesis of philosophical dialectics depends 
entirely on the sophistication of the system below and its ability to decipher, analyze and 
encode the illogical logic of the disembodied human action.  Absurd and unpredictable, 
the flight of the fractured extremities itself poses a number of challenges to the 
mathematics of the paradigmatic approaches.  First, it puts a hand next to a hand and a 
foot next to a foot, breaking thus the primary postulate of Jakobson‟s axis of 
syntagmatics.
392
  Then, as soon as the viewer discovers that the two hands and two feet 
stand for (or rather, fly for) a person as literal metonymies of a human body, the drawing 
depicts next to these two pairs an extra (third) right hand to cancel any easy readings and 
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 For example see Stotskiy‟s theorems 15 and 16: “There are non-contextual grammars with endless 
index.”  Lemma 5 provides a diagram of such a “class”—a tree “D” forming a pyramid the top of which is 
marked with the letter “O”—and an unlimited number of radii “branches” (1, 2…K) extending downwards 
from the top “O” to the bottom of the pyramid.  That tree is then replicated into an unlimited number of 
other “trees” (O1, O2, O3…OK-1) with their own unlimited number of “branches” (1, 2, 3… K-1, K).  See 
E. D. Stotskiy, “Obobshchennye grammatiki i ikh svoistva,” 21. 
392
 In order to compose a meaningful syntagma, the elements of the horizontal register have to be 
differentiated and differential; i.e., to signify through their difference—e.g., syllabi are composed of 
different sound or phonemes, sentences—of different words, texts—of different sentences.  Sequences of 
syntagmas made of the same elements would make communication impossible.  Kabakov‟s visual syntax 
not only features a hand next to a hand, but it also conveys the possibility that all three hands depicted on 




associations.  So, if the viewer is intentionally confused and left semantically disoriented, 
what is science to do with such an impossible riddle of most erratic human behavior?  
Judging by the compound construction of crossing lines, concentric radii, tilted pyramids 
and inverted cones/rhomboids/semi-curves, linguistic science takes on the challenge full 
force to create a masterful paradigm-metaphor of the body‟s irrational trajectory of air-
borne disarticulation.  Tilted in the opposite direction, the two “pyramids/tries” O1 and 
O2 can be read each as a “class as a whole” corresponding either to the hand flying 
forward or to the foot turned backward.  The jagged, entangled and somewhat chaotic 
lines seem to successfully decode the syntactic and semantic esotery of the human form 
before transliterating its dislocated flight into the pyramid that leans more forcefully 
forward.  In this mid-point (O1) of, what appears to be, the center of the dialectical 
composition, the philosophical balance of sky and earth, poetry and science or liriki and 
phisiki seems almost achieved or, at least, virtually attainable.
393
 
The conceptual instability of the drawing‟s spatial dialectics becomes apparent 
when one considers the metaphor of the metonymy or the content of the form; i.e., the 
semantic dimension of the disembodied figural sequence.  The illogical sentence of 
severed feet and hands carries a wide number of linguistic connotations: from 
loosing/gaining ground, associated with one‟s legs, through being/not being in control, 
connected with one‟s hands, to physical balance/imbalance depending on one‟s hand-leg 
coordination.  For instance, not to “stand on one‟s feet” (“na nogakh ne stoit,” “nogi ne 
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 When one looks carefully, it becomes clear that the apex of pyramid O1 falls below and to the right of 
the actual center of the drawing in a way that may also recall geometric renditions of depth and linear 




derzhat”) in Russian indicates to be weak, tired or drunk, while to tell someone “Legs in 
hands!” (“Nogi v ruki!”) means to cause them to run away.
394
  The idea of instability 
evoked by the severed legs is combined with a hint of a threatening cause of action.  
Thus, the imperative “No hands!” [“(Tol‟ko) Bez Ruk!”] denotes an appeal to avoid 
aggressive physical acts; “(not) to take something in one‟s hands” [“(ne) beret‟ chto-libo 
v svoi ruki”] connotes (not) being in control while to “remove yourself with hands and 
legs from something” [“rukami i nogami otbivat‟sya ot chego-libo”] signifies “to 
absolutely refuse to do something.”
395
  The vast range of potential scenarios suggested by 
the disjointed feet next to the severed hands; e.g., running away from a physical threat or 
not controlling oneself due to being drunk, becomes even more complicated when one 
considers the whole composition.
396
  Thus, to be “with your legs up” (“vverh nogami”) 
means to be, physically or conceptually, off beam; i.e., “upside down,” while “to tie your 
hands and feet” (“svyazat‟ sebya po rukam i nogam”) suggests to be unable to act or 
think.  In the end, the carnivalesque anecdote does not provide a visual key to the enigma 
of the mysterious human condition: does science “tie up one‟s hands and feet,” does 
knowledge (or drunkenness) set one‟s mind free or is mathematics unable to comprehend 
the illogical aspects of human nature?  After all, the almighty Soviet science and 
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 Similarly, to have “one leg here one leg there” (“odna noga zdes‟, drugaya tam”) means to make 
somebody escape.  
395
 Accordingly, to “give freedom to your hands” (“dat‟ volyu rukami”) means to start beating somebody; 
to “have one‟s hand in something” (“prilozhit‟ ruku v chemu-libo”) indicates to participate in some 
suspicious deal while “to tell something to somebody under one‟s hand” (“govorit‟ chto-libo komu-libo 
pod ruku”) signifies making obstructing remarks.  The Russian idiom “brat‟ sebya v ruki” (“to take yourself 
in your hands”) corresponds to the English “to pull oneself together.”   
396
 In the same conversation, right after discussing the “brain, memory, images, egg and circle, n-metric 
dimension, etc.” and right before Kabakov shared his “shyness” in regard to mathematical linguistics and 
cybernetics,” he and Grobman talked “about the scientific and mystical approach to knowledge, about 




Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, a major subject of official art, had just sent Yuri Gagarin—the 
first man into space—to orbit the earth two years prior to the date of Kabakov‟s drawing.  
Floating horizontally, Kabakov‟s sequence of conjoined and disjointed body parts, 
however, does not seem to glorify this unprecedented technical accomplishment. 
Another key to the drawing‟s non-dialectical dialectics could be found in the rise 
of a new and poignantly dynamic development on the artistic horizon of Moscow‟s 
underground in the early 1960s.  That was the kinetic group Dvizheniye (Movement) 
founded in 1962-1964 by Lev Nusberg and a few young artists, mostly students at the art 
school affiliated with the Surikov Institute in Moscow.
397
  The artists shared interest in 
geometric forms and employed kinetic constructions to represent motion and infinity 
which they saw as the essence of human experience.  The aesthetic credo of the group, 
described in a series of treatises and manifestos, rested on three main principles—
movement, synthesis and symmetry: 
 
Underlying the activities of the kinetists are three basic principles.  The first of 
these is movement…: the movement of constructions, the movement of human 
bodies and their shadows; written texts, music; the ideas of authors of grandiose 
spectacles, sending color music up into the clouds and seeking for a permanent 
equilibrium of all the constituent elements in a kinetic representation.  The second 
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 According to Vyacheslav Koleychuk—an architect, theoretician and artist who was part of the group—
the members of Dvizheniye “made their first attempts to unite on the basis of their common interests in art” 
in 1962.  The name of the group appeared in 1964.  Koleychuk connects the emergence of the alliance with 
the “thaw” of the 1960s which led to an “urgent creative atmosphere that encouraged the exchange of 
information among various spheres and led to the destruction of boundaries between traditional art forms.”  
As the author testifies, “It was a time in which such matters as physics, lyrical poetry, cybernetics and 
communities of the future influenced artists.”  Initially, the members of Dvizheniye were: L. Nusberg, F. 
Infante, A. Krivchikov, V. Akulinin, V. Shcherbakov, R. Zanevskaya, M. Dorokhov and G. Bitt.  In 1966, 
the group split, and the new Dvizheniye included: Nusberg, Infante, Kuznetsov, Buterlin, Koleychuk, 
Zanevskaya, Orlova, Glinchikov, Muraveva, Bitt, Dubovskaya and Stepanov.  The group disintegrated in 
1974 when its “ideologist” Nusberg moved to the US.  See Koleychuk, “The Dvizheniye Group: Toward a 




of these principles is synthesis, the synthesis of all materials, all aesthetic and 
technical means...  And lastly, [there] comes symmetry-balance, as a principle for 
the production of a work of art and its internal structure, with all the separate parts 
and elements creating the inner, organic, harmonious structure of what constitutes 





In their general philosophical sense, none of the three principle propositions 
featured new discoveries in the early 1960s.  Movement (typically seen as evolution), 
synthesis (as a resolution of the tension between thesis and antithesis) and balance (as a 
dialectical unity of opposites) was an essential part of dialectical materialism in its 
primary forte of a reworked Hegelian dialectics.  However, upon the foundation of old 
philosophical ideas, Dvizheniye developed a new approach to the aesthetic image and its 
composition.   
 
Amongst us are artists and engineers, musicians and psychologists, mimes and 
architects and technicians.  We seek new means of artistic expression (whilst at 
the same time, of course, preserving and using the old, so-called "classical" ones), 
new symbols capable of conveying a profounder reflection of the philosophy of 
modern man who has penetrated the mysteries of the micro- and the macro-
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 See “Russian 'Movement' Group,” CMeHa, no. 1 (January, 1968); reprinted in Leonardo 1, no. 3 (July, 
1968): 319.  Nusberg wrote a similar treatise that is quoted in Koleychuk‟s article and, according to the 
same article, remains “located in the author‟s personal archives.”  In this treatise, the “ideologist of the 
group” elaborated on the three principles: “Movement is the main principle for us! By this word I mean 
change, transference, mutual penetration, development, struggle, condition, etc.  In other words, it is the 
condition of all that lives, fights and moves (of course, not in a biological but in an aesthetic sense).”  In 
regard to symmetry, Nusberg adds: “By „symmetry,‟ I mean balance and the mutual dependence of the 
separate parts of a whole.  Everything that is material, internally correct and organic is symmetrical.  This is 
the idea of natural (cosmic) harmony; this is the world of necessity.”  See Koleychuk, “The Dvizheniye 
Group,” 433-34 and 436, n. 2. 
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 A “declaration” made in one of the group‟s earlier exhibitions.  Quoted in “Russian 'Movement' Group,” 




As a result, Dvizheniye‟s synthesis of “technical and aesthetic means”—brought 
the latest technological developments, such as cybernetics, to the field of art and sought 
to incorporate: 
 
…all known forms of art (including television and cinema techniques, optical 
effects, use of chemical and physical phenomena-changes of scent and 




The kinetic works that implemented Dvizheniye‟s program combined technical 
innovations with “the seemingly long-forgotten ideas” and geometric constructions of the 
“national avant-garde of the 1920s.”
401
  Yet, although Dvizheniye was the first Russian 
movement to openly revive the historical Soviet avant-garde and the first artistic alliance 
to readily incorporate cybernetics, Nusberg and his friends developed an ambivalent 
relationship with the aesthetics of the machines, the “one-sided” geometry of 
constructivism and the “individualism” of Western kinetic art.
402
  Dvizheniye emphasized 
the “elegant form” and “prophetic overtones” of the cyborg without glorifying its 




 V. Koleychuk with V. Polyakoff, “The Evolution of My Kinetic Work,” Leonardo 27, no. 5 (1994): 395.  
The authors continue, “It was not just the ideas themselves that were revived, but the spirit of a search that 
had been a natural expression of the first postrevolutionary years in the Soviet Union—an all-embracing 
urge to discover new ways in both art and life.”  Ibid.  According to Koleychuk and Polyakoff, the group 
Dvizheniye materialized, for a first time, the kinetic potential of the constructivist form manifested in such 
projects as the 1919-1920 Monument to the Third International (Tatlin's Tower) and the 1929 Monument to 
Christopher Columbus by K. Melnikov (both of which were never built).  Ibid. 
402
 For example, in his essay “Cybertheater” written in conjunction with the large-scale 
performance/installation conceived in 1966 and realized, under the same name, in 1967 in Leningrad 
Nusberg explains: “The 'Cybertheater' is intended to be yet another reminder to Man of the fantastic 
possibilities of technology and of the need for developing it further; but, at the same time, it is intended to 
serve as a warning of the dangers inherent in highly developed machines… Here Man clashes with 
Machine in the most non-utilitarian and aesthetic sense, with the Machine expressed in elegant form.  But 
even in this form, the Machine remains only a machine.  I do not believe that the Machine will ever (no 
matter how developed it becomes) be capable of becoming a Creator...”  Lev Nusberg, "Cybertheater," 




technological superiority.  The artists played with the sensual and sensational aspects of 
the geometric form by directing its appeal to all possible human senses, and, eventually, 
the group‟s spectacles turned the painted or sculpted kinetic construction into a theatric 
performance open for ecstatic viewing and public participation.
403
  Those were the 
group‟s principle goals, at least, according to its members, manifestos and organizers.  In 
reality, Dvizhenie remained as idealistic and utopian as the “dry” constructivist tradition 
it hoped to revive and the formidable cybernetic machine that it aspired to present as 
aesthetic and “elegant.”
404
  After all, neither had the modern man truly “penetrated the 
mysteries of the micro- and the macro-universe,” nor was “the permanent equilibrium of 
all the constituent elements in a kinetic representation” realistically achievable.
405
 
Kabakov had a firsthand experience of the early, so-called pre-kinetic, works of 
Dvizehniye—paintings, sculptures and drawings in which the artists began experimenting 
with geometric constructions, sense of motion and cybernetic ideas.
406
  Grobman‟s diary 
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 The activities of the group went through a couple of stages ranging from the early paintings and 
sculptures, in which they tested constructivist principles, sense of motion and vibration and optical effects, 
to later large-scale kinetic constructions, performances, installations and projects related to urban planning.  
According to Koleychuk, “The first, prekinetic period of the group's artistic activity was based on the 
assimilation of geometric and structural form.”  The first kinetic exhibit of Dvizheniye, as he attests, was 
held in 1965 in Leningrad, and it “showcased the group's experience in creating kinetic works, as it 
presented a wide spectrum of kinetic expression.”  The works of the group, however, were shown as early 
as in 1964, at the exhibit "Toward a Synthesis of the Arts," held at the Prospect Miza Club in Moscow.  See 
Koleychuk, “The Dvizheniye Group,” 433 and 434. 
404
 It was thanks to this optimistic utopianism, that the group was tolerated, if not encouraged, by the Soviet 
government.  In regard to the idealism of the artists in the early 1960s, Koleychuk avows: “One could call 
them Romantics, which of course they were, because only Romantics would recklessly rush into the 
unknown, burning bridges behind them without any thought of looking back.”  Ibid.   
405
 “Russian 'Movement' Group,” 319. 
406
 Koleychuk gives a detailed account of those early works: “Among the works characteristic of this [the 
prekinetic] period are Nusberg's Cross (1963) and Programmed Picture (1963), which are notable for their 
quasi-computerized symmetry, similar in style to „cold‟-or extremely regular-structuralism.  In the works of 
Zanevskaya, the geometric theme became a method for achieving optical effects.  Her compositions 




attests that in 1964 Grobman and Kabakov attended an exhibition presenting “Lev 
Nusberg‟s group—the Moscow constructivists” and that the exhibition was “a very 
important event in Moscow.”
407
  Grobman‟s diary refers to "Toward a Synthesis of the 
Arts," held at the Prospect Miza Club in Moscow, in which he and Kabakov saw the early 
geometric constructions of Nusberg‟s group.  According to Grobman, Kabakov would 
attend at least one more exhibit of Dvizheniye—a “very captivating spectacle” performed 
in 1966 in Moscow—and share his “fascination with Nusberg‟s ideas and kinetic 
performances” on at least one occasion.
408
  In 1964—the year in which Kabakov 
commenced his series of flying body fragments—he must have had a more complex 
response to what Koleychuk defines as a “pre-kinetic” mix of Nusberg‟s “quasi-
computerized symmetry” or “cold structuralism,” Zanevskaya‟s “optical effects” and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shcherbakov's linear graphics, which share characteristics with the spatial works of N. Gabo, are limpid, 
elegant compositions that appear to be woven from bunches of thick lines.  Infante at first developed a style 
of design that was notable for its multistep structure, involving the color nuancing of infinitely repeating 
ornamentation.  He then turned to methods of ornamental and compositional construction, which he used in 
a number of his spatial compositions in a manner similar to the fitting of matrsheka dolls one into another.”  
See Koleychuk, “The Dvizheniye Group,” 434. 
407
 “1 dekabrya 1964.  Segodnya otkrytie vustavki gruppy Lebki Nusberga—moskovskie konstruktivisty.  
Po puti ya zaekhal k Il‟e Kabakovu i vzyal ego s soboy…  Na Bol. Mariinskoy mnogo lyudey.  Razrezanie 
tselluidnoy lentochki.  Rebyata mnogo potrudilis‟ i vse ochen‟ zdorovo sdelali.  Levka khodit, ob‟yasnyaet 
chto k chemu.  Eta vystavka—ochen‟ vazhnoe sobytie v Moskve.”  (“Decenber 1, 1964.  Today is the 
opening of the exhibition of Lev Nusberg‟s group—the Moscow constructivists.  On my way, I stopped at 
Ilya Kabakov‟s and took him with me… There were a lot of people on Mariinska Avenue.  Cutting of the 
celluloid tape.  The guys have worked a lot, and everything is well done.  Lev walks around and explains 
something to somebody.  This exhibit is a very important event in Moscow.”)  Grobman, Leviathan, 39.  
Grobman (and Kabakov) had already met Nusberg earlier.  Grobman, for instance, mentions him in the 
beginning of his diary, describing a meeting between the two of them in which Grobman read to Nusberg a 
short story written by himself.  In response, Nusberg “made efficient observations.”  Ibid., 18. 
408
 See Ibid., 175.  Grobman refers here to the “Exhibition as Performance of Kinetic Art” held at the House 
of Culture at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in 1966.  Among the work of two other artists, the 
exhibit included six kinetic performances—part of Nusber‟s Metamorphoses—by the Dvizheniye group.  In 
conjunction with that event, the group wrote and distributed “The Manifesto of the Russian Kineticists.”  
See Koleychuk, “The Dvizheniye Group,” 435.  After seeing these “fragments of… kinetic performance,” 
Kabakov shared with Grobman his “admiration for Nusberg‟s ideas and kinetic performances” (“Kabakov 




“illusive sense of movement,” Shcherbakov‟s “linear graphics” and Infante‟s “ornamental 
and compositional construction.”
409
  He must have sensed the tension between the 
compound “structuralist” geometry and the free poetic imagination, or he might have 
seen a gap between the complex scientific computations and the metaphysics of the 
flying human spirit.  Depending on the ways in which Nusberg explained Dvizheniye‟s 
motto in 1964, Kabakov‟s drawing may also reflect the scientific/artistic attempt to 
capture the “movement of human bodies and their shadows,” “the movement of wind” or 
“the ideas of authors of grandiose spectacles, sending color music up into the clouds and 
seeking for a permanent equilibrium of all the constituent elements in a kinetic 
representation.”  The drawing could also be presenting “the philosophy of modern man” 
who, allegedly, “has penetrated the mysteries of the micro- and the macro-universe” or it 
could be reflecting on Dvizheniye‟s synthesis of art and science, on its “idea of natural 
(cosmic) harmony,” or its perfect “symmetry-balance” of separate constituting 
components.  Whatever ideological apparatus Nusberg used to explain his “pre-kinetic” 
utopia in 1964, it engendered ironic overtones in Kabakov‟s de-centered, imbalanced, 
esoterically scientific and, at the same time, overtly absurd interpretation.   
 
XI. The Flight and the Fractured Body: OBERIU 
 
If the artistic idioms of “flight” and “motion” pointed to Dvizhenye and 
Suprematism and if “system,” “feedback” and “information” reflected the scientific 
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models of cybernetics, the notion of absurdity evoked by Kabakov‟s drawing was no less 
referential and significant.  The artist uses the key term (“absurdny,” i.e., absurd) himself 
in the same paragraph in which he describes his “series with flying body parts” (“seriya 
letyaushchimi chastyami tela”) in Zapiski.  Linking those works with another series of 
drawings that was chronologically and thematically related to it—the “drawings with a 
pipe and a stick, with sticks, lines and spheres flying above the hills”—he concludes: 
 
V izvetsnom smysle ikh mozhno bylo by opredelit‟ kak “metafiziku” predmetov v 




In some sense, their meaning can be defined as “metaphysics” of objects in absurd 
relations [literally, connections]—in this was their whole metaphysics.   
 
In 1964, Kabakov‟s take on “metaphysics” had a coded dual significance.  On the 
one hand, it referred to the religious, mystical and metaphysical aspects which, ever 
present in Russian literary and philosophical thought, became particularly fervent in 
Moscow‟s artistic underground in the 1960s.  On the other hand, the artist‟s interpretation 
of the metaphysical “Al-Unity” as fragmented corporeality that consists of a limited and 
irregular number of body parts rendered in a place typically associated with the heavens 
and the divine (the sky) is already an ironic wink to the very idea of meta-physics.
411
  
Combined with a reference to “objects in absurd relations,” however, Kabakov‟s 
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 Ilya Kabakov, 60-e—70-e, 18.  In this memoir, Kabakov examines the two series as contemporaneous.  
However, the dates of the few survived drawings “with a pipe, stick, lines and spheres flying above the 
hills” (“pisunki s truboy i palkoi, palki, linii I shariki, letyashchie nad kholmami”) suggest that this series is 
later.   
411
 The idea of going “beyond” the “physical,” as defined by Aristotle, i.e., beyond body, form and 
substance, is imbedded in the etymology of the term combining μετά ("beyond" or "after") and υυσικά 




metaphysical image engenders an additional dimension that points to an important 
literary development, or rather, a revival of a long-forgotten avant-garde movement 
which had just begun reemerging on the horizon of Soviet underground in the early 
1960s.  That was the literature of the “absurd” associated with OBERIU (abbreviated for 
Ob”edinenie real‟nogo iskusstva, i.e., An Association of Real Art)—a short-lived avant-
garde grouping of Russian poets founded by Daniil Kharms and Alexander Vvedensky in 
1927 in Leningrad.
412
  Uniting Futurist aesthetics and Formalist approaches, the Oberiuty 
(the members of OBERIU) considered themselves a “left flank” of the literary avant-
garde.
413
  The so-called “OBERIU manifesto” announced the group‟s involvement in 
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 Along with other pseudonyms, such as “Daniil Dandan” and “Kharms-Shardam,” Daniil Kharms was 
the main, and eventually the sole, pen-name of Daniil Ivanovich Yuvachov.  It is generally thought to 
derive from the tension between the English words for “charms” and “harms” (also the German Charme) 
although it may have also alluded to the name of Sherlock Holmes, one of Kharms‟ fascinations.  See Neil 
Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarists” in Incidences: Daniil Kharms, ed. and transl. 
Neil Cornwell (New York: Serpent‟s Tail, 1993), 2.  Kharms began appearing at avant-garde activities in 
1925, and in 1927 he joined forces with like-minded writers, mainly Aleksandr Vvedensky, Igor Bakhterev 
and Nikolay Zabolotsky to form OBERIU.  Other writers, such as Nikolay Zabolotsky, were at first “loose 
associates.”  See N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist” in Daniil Kharms and the 
Poetics of the Absurd, ed. by Cornwell (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1991), 3-22.  The group was a 
continuation of the earlier grouping “School of Chinari” (“Shkola chinarei”) created by Kharms and 
Vvedensky in 1926.  Due to the loose character and short-lived life of OBERIU, the name chinari (coined 
by Vvedensky from the word chin “rank”) is often used in reference to all OBERIU activities.  The group 
was disbanded by 1930, following hostile publicity backed by the rising Stalinist terror, and the OBERIU 
poetics was denounced as reactionary.  Kharms and Vvedensky were arrested and then released, but 
subsequently, were able to find work only occasionally as writers of children‟s literature.  In the 1930s, 
Kharms and Vvedensky became more closely involved with a group of friends that met for, what they 
called, "conversations.”  They included the writer-mathematician Leonid Lipavsky and the Christian 
philosopher Yakov Druskin.  Lipavsky wrote down a number of the "conversations."  The outbreak of the 
war brought new purges, and Kharms and Vvedensky were arrested again.  Vvedensky died in 1941, while 
Khrams, who was deemed psychiatrically unfit, died during the occupation of Leningrad in 1942, allegedly, 
from starvation or enforced psychiatric treatment in a prison hospital.  Ibid., 9; Anatoliy Aleksandrov, “A 
Kharms Chronology” in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd, 46. 
413
 For instance, they had direct relations with Malevich, Shkolovsky and his student Khardziev as well as 
with the Zaum poet Khlebnikov.  See Aleksandrov, Ibid., 46.  On the connection between Khlebnikov and 
Kharms and their mutual fascination with Egypt see Biacheslav Ivanov, “Egipet armanskogo perioda u 
Kharmsa i Khlebnikova: “Lapa” i “Ka” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, ed. Alexandr Kubrinskiy (St. 
Petersburg: CPGUTD, 2005), 80-91.  Kharms attended meetings of the Bakhtin circle as well as lectures of 




literature, fine art, theatre and cinema, promising to broaden the meaning of the poetic 
word (without destroying it in the way in which zaum poets did) as well as to abandon the 
plot in theatre and cinema.
414
  The OBERIU approach was seen as both “revolutionary 
and universal”—it “invigorated” objects, words and acts through “collisions of verbal 
meanings” and challenged common logic and appearance by proposing a new 
relationship between art and life.
415
  The aesthetic program translated into a new type of 
literature that destroyed all protocols of formal organization, semantic coherence and 
linguistic realism.
416
  Traditional figurative devices, such as metaphor and simile, were 
often literalized, denounced and destroyed causing what Vvedensky defined as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Selected Writings of Daniil Kharms, ed. and trans. M. Yankelevich (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 
2007), 23.  Both Malevich and Schkolovski made remarks to Kharms and his peers which have become 
anecdotal aphorism.  See Eugene Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” in OBERIU: An Apologia of 
Russian Absurdism, ed. E. Ostashevsky (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006), xvi-xvii.  On 
Malevich and Kharms see Jean-Philippe Jaccard, “Polet bez poleta,” in Ruskaya mysl’ 3781 (23 June, 1989; 
Literary Supplement 8): xi.  Kharms read and took notes on Scholovsky‟s articles.  See Yulia Vasileva, 
“Daniil Kharms: voprosy pragmatiki” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 24. 
414
 Written mostly, as it is generally accepted, by Zabolotsky, the Manifesto was published simply as 
“OBERIU” in the second number of the Leningrad “Posters of the House of Print” (“Afishi doma pechati) 
in January 1928.  See N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 6; and Anatoliy 
Aleksandrov, “A Kharms Chronology,” 37. 
415
 N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 6.  The literary and artistic provocations 
of the group translated into a close, almost “one-to-one” relationship between art and life, and the “semi-
scandalous public performances became, for a brief period, a highlight of Leningrad artistic life.”  Ibid.  For 
instance, Kharms became a literal incorporation of his catch-phrase “art is like a cupboard” as he often 
kneeled in or stood on the top of a black, varnished cupboard while reading “phonetic verses” for his 
bemused audience.  See Ibid., 7; Igor Bekhterev, “Kogda my byli molodymi (Nevydumannyi rasskaz)” in 
Vospominaniya o N. Zabolotskom, ed. A. V. Zabolotskaya et al. (Moscow, 1984), 57-91; and Oleg Ris 
(Olegri), “Literaturnye penalty na fontanke,” in Neva 3 (Moscow, 1982), 199-200. 
416
 See Eugene Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xv.  The author suggests that the chinars’ breaking of 
the narrative and the group‟s plans to collaborate with Russian formalist critics point to an artistic 
realization of formalist analysis.  For such collaboration plans see Kharms, Zapisnye knizhki. Ed. V.N. 
Sazhin and J.-Ph. Jaccard. (St. Petersburg: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2002), vol. 1, 287.  Some of the devices 
that Kharms and Vvedensky used were: changing the names of the characters in the course of the story, 
treating parts of the narrative as independent and unrelated to whole, interrupting the story unexpectedly 
without indicating its ending and so on.  Yulia Vasileva relates Kharms narrative techniques to the folktale 
model constructed by Vladimir Propp in his fundamental Morphology of the Folktale published in 1928.  
Since Kharms breaks all of Propp‟s functions and their sequence, she proposes that Kharms creates an anti-
genre (“anti-folktale”) and combines it with other forms of folk theatre or clown reprise.  Yulia Vasileva, 




“nonsense” (bessmyslitsa) and Zabolotsky deemed as “alogical” joining of words.
417
  As 
a result of such techniques, the OBERIU activities and body of literature has traditionally 




OBERIU‟s use of “alogism” and absurd grew out of previous trends in Russian 
literature and echoed the social turmoil of the 1920s-1930s.
419
  It also reflected the 
concern for the (in)adequacy of language as a means of communication characteristic for 
the Druskin “school of philosophy” in which Kharms participated.
420
  Expressing doubt 
that language can represent a reality external to itself and thus to transmit knowledge, this 
concern runs from Plato, through the romantics, to the “extreme language relativism” of 
twentieth-century exponents of “linguistic nihilism” such as Nietzsche and Mauthner.
421
  
According to Donald Crosby, “linguistic nihilism” asserts that different cultures, times 
periods, groups and individuals are locked into different conceptual schemes the 
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 Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xvi.  The author connects Zabolotsky‟s alogism with the use of 
“unexpected metaphors,” while Vvedensky‟s “materialization” of such metaphors is seen as the end of 
poetic utterance, not as means to convey content more effectively.   
418
 Such a term emphasizes OBERIU‟s similarity to Western trends; e.g. the literature of the absurd in 
postwar Europe, at the expense of its direct relation to previous developments in Russian avant-garde 
literature.  See Ibid., xiii. 
419
 For instance, according to Neil Cornwell, Kharms belongs to the Russian tradition of double-edged 
humor which extends from Gogol and Dostoevsky to Siniavsky and Voinovich.  See N. Cornwell, 
“Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 11-12.  According to Matvei Yankelevich, Kharms 
embraced Futurism and its outgrowth as laid out by his “idols:” Malevich, Khlebnikov and Terentiev, 
among others.  Matvei Yankelevich, “Introduction: the Real Kharms,” 10. 
420
 A key member of the group and friend of Kharms, Yakov Druskin was a Christian philosopher and 
music-theorist who wrote on Bach, Schoenberg and Webern.  Cornwell relates his views to the linguistic 







meanings of which are fundamentally different.
422
  Due to the incommensurability of 
concepts, the claims of different schemes cannot be understood comparatively or assessed 
for their comparative truth value.
423
  In the end, what we have left is the chaos of our 
accidental senses which seem ordered by arbitrary linguistic concepts, and there is no 
way of knowing the world or of knowing whether such a world exists in and of itself.
424
 
OBERIU‟s interpretation of the relationship between world, language and logic 
also plays upon a second thread of philosophical ideas running from Plato‟s Cratylus and 
Aristotle‟s Categories or Metaphysics, through Humboldt‟s ideas of the “internal form of 
the word,” to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis known as the “theory of linguistic relativity.”
425
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In the early 20
th
 century, the equivalence between language and reality became a central 
issue in the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and preoccupied one of its most 
famous proponents—Ludwig Wittgenstein and his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
426
  
According to Ichin, Wittgenstein‟s ideas impacted the philosophy of Druskin and, 
through him, the logical-philosophical exercises of Kharms.
427
  The main point of 
convergence became the importance of language in relation to thinking.  Language, in 
Wittgenstein‟s view, is not simply “a vehicle of thought” in the traditional linguistic 
sense (“Die Sprache ist das Medium des Denkens”), but it is thought itself since thoughts 
are linguistic propositions.
428
  Based on such understanding, Wittgenstein defines “all 
philosophy” as a “Critique of language” not as a sequence of logical processes and 
operations.
429
   
                                                                                                                                                 
“analogical „dialogues‟” to present his ideas on being, which is defined by the spoken, the unspoken and the 
boundary between them.  For instance, his treatise Eto i to (This and That) takes as its point of departure 
Aristotle‟s Physics.  Similarly, Kharms‟ treatise O sushchestvovanii, o vremeni, o prostranstve (On Being, 
on Time, on Space) uses syllogisms that play on the idea of the importance of the present moment as a 
condensation of the process of time in Aristotle‟s Metphysics (VI 3, 30, 1027b)  Korneliya Ichin, “‟Logico-
filosofskiy traktat,” 92.  Analogous views on time emerge in Wittgenstein‟s treatise discussed below.   
426
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ist der Gedanke.”  (“The applied thought, propositional sign is the thought”); 4. “Der Gedanke ist der 
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translation which takes into account the semantic variations of the German original.  This translation is also 
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 Ibid., 4.0031.  Accordingly, all previous “questions and propositions that have been written about 
philosophical matters,” according to Wittgenstein, “are not false, but senseless,” because they “do not 




Another aspect in which the Austrian philosopher and the Russian Oberiuty unite 
and diverge is the relation between language and logic (or language and reality).
430
  For 
Wittgenstein, the boundary is clearly defined, and it marks the distinction between “what 
can be said” (6.53), i.e., what represents knowledge of the world in a clear form, on the 
one hand, and that of which “we cannot speak” (6.423), e.g., the “ethical” (6.423), 
“inexpressible” (6.522) or “mystical” (6.522), on the other.
431
  Language as knowledge 
and the methods of philosophy reach their limits as soon as the possibility of clear 
articulation disappears:  
 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.  (Wovon man nicht 
sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen).
432
   
 
What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof 
one must be silent.  (Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und 





Positioning itself in the relative space between Mauthner‟s “linguistic nihilism” 
and Wittgenstein‟s language-based philosophy, Druskin‟s treatise Razgovory vestnikov 
opens with a related question: 
 
Neskazannoe i skazannoe odno i to zhe ili ne odno i to zhe?
434
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 Ichin sees that as a common concern uniting Wittgenstein, Druskin and Kharms.  K. Ichin, “‟Logico-
filosofskiy traktat,‟” 93-94. 
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 Quoted in K. Ichin, “‟Logico-filosofskiy traktat,‟” 93.  The Russian words for “uttered” and “unuttered” 
(“skazannoe” and “neskazannoe”) correspond to Wittgenstein‟s “what is said” and “what is not said.”  In 




Nazyvaem li neskazannoe i kak otnositsya k nemu nazvanie, ch‟e ono, togo li, 
kotoroe nazvano, ili drugogo?  Chto nazyvaem i skol‟ko nazvaniy? Gde nazvanie? 




Are the uttered [what is said] and the unuttered [what is not said] different things 
or the same thing? 
Do we name what is unuttered and how does the name relate to it, whom does it 
belong to, to that which is named or to something else?  What is named and how 
many names are there?  Where is the name: in the unuttered or in the uttered? 
  
 By articulating the problems of naming, Druskin puts into question one of the 
most stable notions in Wittgenstein—the boundary between “what can be said” and the 
“inexpressible” (what is beyond thought, logic and language).  By the same token, 
Druskin opens the possibility that there might be no boundary at all and that the logical 
and the illogical might be the “same thing.” 
 On such grounds, Druskin raises a second set of problems connected with 
naming: does the name belong to the designated (k skazannomu, i.e., “to what is said”) or 
to the designator (k nazyvayushchemu); where is the name (in the designated object or in 
the designator); how to designate the unsaid (“what is not said” or “that”) in the process 
of investigating the possibilities of its naming.  He then continues with a paradox that 
destabilizes another long-established philosophical correlation—the relation between part 
and whole: 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
terminology of Western philosophy, he utilizes common everyday language to create his “unsystematic 
system” (Meilakh).  The series “Vestniki” consists of “Razgovory vestnikov” (divided into three parts: "O 
nekotorom volnenii i nekotorom spokoystvii," "Priznaki," "O derevyah") and the 1933 treatise "Vestniki i 
ikh razgovory.”   
435
 Sazhin, V., L. Druskina and A. Mashevskii, eds.  “Sborishche druzei, ostavlennykh sud’boiu.” A. 
Vvedensky, L. Lipavskii, Ia. Druskin, D. Kharms, N. Oleinikov: Cinari v tekstakh, dokumentakh i 




Chto chast‟ i chto tseloe, i est‟ li chto ni chast‟ i ni tseloe? Chast‟—eto ili to, 
tseloe—tol‟ko eto ili tol‟ko to.  No vsyakoe eto ili to est‟ tol‟ko eto ili tol‟ko to—i 




What is part and what is whole and is there something that is neither a part nor a 
whole?  Part—is it this or that, whole—only this or only that.  However, every 
this or that is only this and only that—both part and whole.  Everything is a 
limitation in its way of existence.   
 
 Clearly differentiated in the beginning of the passage, part and whole (or this and 
that) gradually collapse into an interchangeable pair (“both part and whole”), just as 
limitation, stretched to the ubiquitous parameters of “everything… in its way of 
existence,” either ceases to exist or becomes equal to all “existence” (those are 
categorically one and the same).
437
  Beyond the limitations of our world (i.e., beyond our 
level of comprehension which, for Wittgenstein, is also the limitation of our logic, 
philosophy and language) lies another realm defined by Druskin as “what is not for us.”  
That is the world of vestniki—an ambiguously appropriated polysemantic Russian term 
“the first meaning” of which, according to the author‟s supplementary commentaries, 
refers to “newspaper” and the “last meaning” of which corresponds to the English noun 
“angel” (or messenger).
438
  Druskin‟s series of treatises on the subject of vestniki 
                                                 
436
 Ibid., I: 761; Ichin, Ibid., 93-94. 
437
 If everything is a limitation, then the very notion of limiting as a category becomes pointless.  Bypassing 
Druskin‟s strategies of paradoxical destabilization, Ichin rightly notes that even this “everything” that he 
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 The root of the noun vestniki is derived from the Russian word vest’ (message, news and information) 
which is phonetically and etymologically related to the verb vesti—to lead, manage or conduct.  According 
to Druskin‟s explanation of the term recorded by Meilakh, the author uses the word to designate a “parallel 
world,” “parallel existence,” and vesntiki “are part of the word of creation, but they belong to a state that is 
„beyond sin,‟ to the „holiness to which the humans are called.”  (“Zdes' eto slovo upotreblyaetsya v 
znachenii: „sosedniy mir,‟ „sosednee sushchestvovanie‟. Vestniki prinadlezhat k sotvorennomu miru, no 




composes a lengthy and complex refutation of Wittgenstein‟s firm postulate that one 
ought to remain silent on subjects, such as “the ethical” or the “mystical,” because they 
fall outside of the boundaries of knowledge, language and philosophy.  Discussing the 
life, conversations and timelessness of vestniki, Druskin not only speaks at length on such 
subjects, especially on topics particularly designated by Wittgenstein as 
“inexpressible”—“the problems of life,” “death” or the supernatural.
439
  Furthermore, 
Druskin appropriates the same logical operations used by Wittgenstein to prove that those 
subjects are irreducible to the terms of language and philosophy in the first place.
440
  The 
OBERIU philosopher, however, employs the same philosophical strategies in order to 
demonstrate the “logic” of vestniki‟s illogical existence and, in the course of such absurd 
                                                                                                                                                 
supplemented by the author in the mid-1960s when he was writing mostly on philosophical-theological 
subjects and when Mikhail Meilakh visited his home to work on the archives of Vvedensky and Kharms.  
In the process, Meilakh became interested in Druskin‟s early philosophical writings which the author read 
to him in person.  Providing extensive personal commentaries, Druskin suggested that the treatises were a 
lot more complex than they seem to be at first and added that his comments were only a supplement and 
not part of the text.  In the original text and in the OBERIU context of the 1920s-1930s, Druskin, in fact, 
never canceled the first meaning of the word (newspaper), and the text plays on its parallel existence and 
interpretation.  Such a double reading and affinity to ambiguity would not be unusual for the Oberiuty in 
the 1930s, when led by a fascination with orders and societies, Kharms created the “Order of Relative 
Mistakeability” (a rough translation of the playful Russian "Orden nebol'shoy pogreshnosti") toying with 
one of Druskin‟s ambivalent philosophical phrases “equilibrium with some (relative or, literally, not large) 
mistakability” (“nekotoroe ravnovesie s nebol'shoy pogreshnost'yu”).  According to Meilakh, the oberiuty 
sung this “formula” translated into Latin (“quaedam equilibritas cum peccato parvo”) in an upbeat polka 
rhythm.  Druskin also reports that, after reading his treatises, Kharms stated “Ya vestnik” (“I am a 
vestnik”).  M. Meilakh, “Yakov Druskin: „Vestniki i ikh razgovory‟” (“Yakov Druski: Vestniki and their 
Conversations‟”).  Unpublished manuscript. 
439
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sobytiya? Kak oni provodyat den'?” (“What do vestniki talk about?  Are there any events in their life?  How 
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procedures.  See Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xxi.  In fact, Druskin wrote extensively on Pavel 
Florensky—a famous Russian philosopher, theologian, mathematician and inventor, who employed such 
strategies in his approach to Kant.  See Pamyati Pavla Florenskogo: filosofiya, muzyka: sbornik statey k 
120-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya o. Pavla (1882-2002).  Ed. S.M. Sigitov (St. Peterburg: DB), 2002; and P. 
Florensky, “Kosmologicheskie antinomii Immanuila Kanta” in P. Floresky, Sochineniia, 4 vols. (Moscow: 




demonstration, to de-automatize the common terms of our logic (and our terminological 
and logical language).
441
  The end of Vestniki and their Conversations reverses the order 
established in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  The world of the mystical is not only 
“expressible.”  It has an internal logic to it; while the apparent logic of our language and 
knowledge, when applied to the mystical, becomes, in itself, illogical.  It is again the 
world of vestniki that offers an alternative to our limited means of expression: 
 
Vestnikam izvestno obratnoe napravlenie.  Oni znayut to, chto nakhoditsya za 
veshchami. 
 Vestniki nablyudayut, kak pochki raskryvayutsya na derev‟yah 
 ……………….. 
Vestniki znayut yazyk kamney. Oni dostigli ravnovesiya s nebol'shoy 




Vestniki know the opposite direction.  They know what exists beyond the objects. 
Vestniki observe how the buds of the trees are opening.  
…………………. 
Vestniki know the language of stones.  They have reached equilibrium with some 
mistakability.  They speak of this and that. 
 
According to Druskin‟s commentary on the passage, the “opposite direction” 
known to vestniki replaces our “direct way” which is the way of “automatism.”  In the 
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 For instance, Druskin uses familiar notions of time and eternity to demonstrate that vestniki have “time” 
(though not in the traditional sense of the word) and “life” that is different from our understanding of life as 
existence.  Their life evolves in stillness (“nepodvizhnosti”) that begins with one event, but then nothing 
else happens (“nichego ne proiskhodit‟”) since “what happens” (the Russian word for the latter, 
“proiskhozhdenie,” also means genesis) belongs to time, and time is the section “between two moments” 
(“mezhdu dvumya mgnoveniyami”).  For us, this means “void and absence” since we forget the end of the 
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anticipation of the second moment and no “emptiness and boredom” since the latter “result from time.”  
The “life” of vestniki described in such a way plays on the notions of time and death in Wittgenstein‟s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.431), 106-107.   
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context of Druskin‟s philosophy and in the milieu of Russian OPOYAZ, automatism 
refers to traditionalized (“normative”) means of cognition, representation and 
communication, which, due to their repetitive use, have lost connection with the essence 
of things.
443
  In contrast to the automatized human language and knowledge, vestniki 
know the essence of things (“what exists beyond the objects”) because they perceive the 
things-in-themselves.
444
  Such a Kantinian reference is not accidental, and in fact it 
indicates one of the trademarks of OBERIU and Russian modernist trends, in general.
445
  
Commenting on the ability of vestniki to see “how the buds of the trees are opening,” 
Druskin explains: 
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 In this sense, the Oberiuty employed various strategies of de-atomatization.  For instance, the group‟s 
manifesto propounds the de-automatized object and ostranenie as the goal of art: “The concrete object, 
cleaned from all literary and everyday layers—that‟s the property of art.”  See M. Yankelevich, “Daniil 
Kharms i Marcel Duchamp” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 244.  Especially notable in terms of de-
automatization was the writing and behavior of Kharm who, according to Vvedenski, created not just art, 
but life itself because he did not separate his life from his art.  In Druskin‟s view, Kharms “rebelled against 
the automatism of existence” by living as an embodiment of the device of “opposite direction.”  For 
instance, the unusual clothes of Kharms were neither fashionable, nor out of fashion (either case would 
have been an example of automatism); they were always strange, new and belonging to the “opposite way.”  
Arguing that miracles presented another manifestation of the “opposite direction,” Druskin recalls a story 
written by Kharms in which a man decided to stand in front of a closet every day for two hours until he saw 
a miracle.  At the end, he did not notice that he was able to see a picture that was hidden behind the closet, 
and he would have been able to see only if he levitated two inches above the ground.  On the basis of this, 
Druskin concludes “we live in miracles but do not notice them.”  Kharms signature image of the closet and 
the motif of flying would resonate in various ways in Kabakov‟s albums and installations, most notably in 
the album “Sitting-in-the-closet Primakov.” 
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 In his notes, Druskin reveals that such knowledge presents a transition from “existence” to the “way of 
existence,” and Vestniki have an insight into “the way of existence.”   
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 According to Ostashevsky, “in turn-of-the-century Russia, even academic neo-Kantians resented Kant‟s 
claim that the thing-in-itself cannot be known.”  The philosophers found an alternative in the Bergsonian 
intuition brothering on the sixth sense that is different from the Kantinian intuition of time and space.  A 
product of “perception above the senses” and “reason above reason,” art served as a primary field for such 
intuition, while the artwork became a “window into the true structure of the world” for all Russian 
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… yavlenie, vydelennoe iz obshchey svyazi, stanovitsya "veshch'yu v sebe", 
potomu chto poryadok sozdaetsya razumom.  Zdes'—primer estestvennogo fakta, 
za kotorym stoit sverkh”estestvennoe, cely mir (konechno, esli k etomu faktu ne 
podkhodit' tol'ko nauchno). Lopaetsya pochka—eto "nachalo mgnoveniya", 




… a phenomenon that is isolated from the general sequence becomes “a thing in 
itself,” because the order is created by reason (thinking).  Here, this is an example 
of a natural event behind which stands the transcendental, the whole world (of 
course, if one does not approach the event only scientifically.)  The bud opens—
this is “the beginning of a moment,” creation of the world.  Again, “we live in a 
miracle, but do not notice it.”   
 
 
On the basis of Kant‟s own procedure of using “reason to reign in reason,” 
Druskin demonstrates that the “thing-in-itself” is not part of the order created by our 
logical thinking.  It belongs to the world of the supernatural which, for Druskin and the 
long tradition of Russian theological philosophy, has Christian form and connotations.  
As such, the “thing-in-itself” cannot be approached and understood with the limited tools 
of our “normative” logic and language.
447
  In contrast, vestniki know the true language of 
things and relations (described here as the language of the most silent inanimate 
objects—“the language of stones”) and, according to Druskin‟s notes, this is the “silent, 
pre-reflective language that is different from our reflective language.”
448
  The knowledge 
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 As Ostashevsky notes, OBERIU‟s “concept of normative language was far broader than Kant‟s concept 
of reason which includes logic and a priory categories such as causality, quantity, succession, and so forth.”  
In the context of Russian formalism and its interest into the structure of linguistic expression, “normative 
language” refers also to established grammatical and metaphoric constructions as well as to standard rules 
for classification of concepts.  All of these elements constituted a single system of cognition and 
representation by which we “(mis)cognize the world” because we mistake cognitive relations for real 
relations among objects and take the properties of language for properties of the world.  See Ostashevsky, 
“Editor‟s Introduction,” xxi-xxii. 
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 This comment is supplied by Druskin as an equivalent and explanation of “the language of stones,” as it 
reads: “t. e. molchalivy, doreflektivny yazyk, otlichny ot nashego, reflektivnogo.”  M. Meilakh, “Yakov 




of the essence of things allows vestniki to reach “equilibrium with some mistakability” or 
to attain the pre-reflective balance of real and mental, of natural and transcendental or of 
word and meaning.
449
  In such a way, vestniki bridge the gap between “this” and “that”—
two of Druskin‟s central categories, which, to quote his comments on the same sentence, 
belong to the “post-reflective language” and signify “the immanent and the 
transcendental.”
450
   
According to OBERIU, the humans have lost their pre-reflective language and the 
ability to recognize the miracles in life, therefore, in order to see the world as it really is 
the Oberiuty set off to destabilize the normative concepts and forms of expression.  
Vvedensky, for instance, regarded his poetry as an experimental inquiry into the 
relationship between the normative language and the world.
451
  Druskin uses the language 
of logic and sequence only to undermine it, while his own philosophical categories “this” 
and “that” become “refutations of science, philosophy and, in general, any 
                                                                                                                                                 
ancient, indiscreet and undivided language of mythological consciousness reemerges also in Kabakov‟s 
take on Yuri Lotman‟s structuralist theory.  See Ilya Kabakov, “Kultura, “Ia,” “Ono” I Favorskii Svet” in 
Beseda 2 (1984): 171-172. 
449
 This is one of Druskin‟s uses of the idiom that the Oberiuty sung, translated into Latin, in an upbeat 
polka rhythm.  In his treatise Classification of Points (Classifikatsiya tochek) the author explains that 
correlation (sootvetstvie) with some mistakeability belongs to correlation.  Rejecting the rigidity of some 
logical constructions, Druskin‟s ironic idiom allows a flexible approach and wider applicability open to the 
great variety and hidden “miracles” in life. 
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 “eto i to—osnovnye terminy dannogo kruga proizvedeniy, otnosyashchiesya kak by uzhe k yazyku 
poslereflektivnomu i oboznachayushchie, uslovno govorya, immanentnoe i transcendentnoe.”  (“this and 
that—the main terms of this series of writings—seem to belong to the post-reflective language and signify, 
to put it in a conventional way, the immanent and the transcendental.”)  M. Meilakh, “Yakov Druskin: 
„Vestniki i ikh razgovory‟” (“Yakov Druskin: Vestniki and their Conversations‟”) 
451
 In the 1930s, Vvedensky wrote: “I raised my hand against concepts, against initial generalizations that 
no one previously had touched.  Thereby I performed, you might say, a poetic critique of reason—more 
fundamental than that other, abstract [critique of Kant].  I doubted that, for instance, house, cottage, and 
tower come together under the concept of building.  Perhaps, the shoulder must be linked to number four.  I 
did it practically, in my poems, as a kind of proof.  And I convinced myself that the old relations are false, 
but I don‟t know what the new ones must be like.  I don‟t even know whether they should form one system 






  Druskin‟s treatises offer a glimpse into the world of the “immanent and 
the transcendental” that is accessible only to intuition which proceeds in leaps and 
bounds in contrast to logical reasoning which rests on order and continuity.
453
  Kharms‟ 
alogist language takes the properties of intuition to their “logical extreme” by using 
statements that are discontinuous semantically, syntactically and situationally.
454
  
Fragmentation and breaking of all established notions of sequence and ordering, 
respectively, are the signature features of Kharms‟ writing—from his “comic-
philosophical sketches and pseudo-tracts” to his poetry and prose.
455
  Fragmentation 
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 The most evocative example is his treatise “This and That” (“Eto i to”) in which he uses his central 
categories to refute, as he explains in the first chapter of the text, “science, philosophy and, in general, any 
knowledge:”   
Vo-pervykh, esli ya khochu skazat' chto-libo, ya ukazhu i skazhu eto.  Vo-vtorykh, skazav eto, ya 
otdelyu ot togo, sledovatel'no skazhu eto i to ili eto v otlichie ot togo, pervoe budet razdeleniem, 
vtoroe otde-leniem.  V-tret'ikh, skazav eto i to ili eto v otlichie ot togo, ya skazhu ne to, no to, 
potomu chto eto dolzhno byt' ne bol'she chego-libo, no to bol'she.  Skazav chto-libo, ya skazal eto.  
Eto tozhe bol'she, no chto by ya o nem ni skazal, budet to.  V-chetvertykh, skazav eto i to ili eto v 
otlichie ot togo, ya skazhu odno i ne bol'she chego-libo, do togo kak ono bylo skazano.  Takim 
obrazom vyskazyvanie nichego ne dalo po dvum prichinam…  
(First, if I want to say something, I will point and say this.  Second, having said this, I will 
separate it from that, so it means, I will say this and that or this in contrast to that—the first case 
will be distinction, the second—separation.  Third, having said this or that or this in contrast to 
that, I will say not that, but that, because this cannot be bigger than that (this cannot be that 
anymore), but that is bigger.  Having said something, I have said this.  This is also bigger, but if I 
do not say that about it, it would be that.  Fourth, having said this and that or this in contrast to 
that, I will say one thing and no more than one thing, before it has been said.  In such a way, the 
utterance has not provided anything for two reasons…) 
Sborishche druzei, ostavlennykh sud’boiu, I: 811-812 
453
 See Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xxiii. 
454
 Ostashevsky provides examples for each type of discontinuation: syntactical (“when Kharms writes 
about ripping lace „from maid from oak‟”), semantic (“when Kharms writes about „white elephants of 
fear‟”—an image painted by Kabakov) or situational (“when Kharms writes about the four-legged crow 
hobbling home on its five legs”).  Ibid. 
455
 According to Yankelevich, in “many of his comic-philosophical sketches and pseudo-tracts” Kharms 
seeks an answer of the question what is between “this” and “that.”  M. Yankelevich, “Introduction: the Real 
Kharms,” in Today I Wrote Nothing, 16.  In his 1930 comic-philosophical poem, for instance, Kharms 
discusses Druskin‟s categories, addressing their relationship (difference and part-whole relations) and 
properties (space, time or the transcendental): 
This is This. / That is That. / This is not That. / This is not This. / What is left is either this, or not 




(often leading to disarrangement) characterizes not only Kharms‟ narratives, situations, 
time lines and locales, but also a major part of the literary characters of OBERIU‟s most 
eccentric writer: 
 
Fed‟ka got Sen‟ka out from under the chest of drawers with a poker and tore off 
his right year.  
Sen‟ka slipped through Fed‟ka‟s hands and holding his torn-off ear, ran off to the 
neighbors. 
………………………………………………………………. 
Fed‟ka got Nikolay out with a poker from under the cupboard and ripped open his 
mouth.   











OKNOV Not content with just having smashed you over the skull 
with this stone, I‟ll rip your leg off as well. 
……………………………………………………………………….. 
OKNOV  (Ripping away at Kozlov’s leg) I‟m right here. 
KOZLOV  Oh, my gosh! He-elp! 
STRYUCHKOV Seems he‟s ripped the leg off him! 
AND MOTYLKOV 
OKNOV  Ripped it off and thrown it over there! 
STRYUCHKOV
 
 That‟s atrocious! 
                                                                                                                                                 
is this and also that, that is itself Itself. / What is itself Itself, that might be that but not this, or else 
this but not that.  This went into that, and that went into this.  We say: God has puffed.   
……………….. 
But now both this and that are there. / But now this and that are here, too. / We long and mope and 
ponder. / But where is now? Now is here, and now there, and now here, and now here and there. / 
This be that. / Here be there. / This, that, here, there, be, I, We, God.  (Ibid., 146-47) 
Playing on traditional logical operations and language, the pseudo-tract defines categories in order to 
destabilize their definitions, established relations in order to reject them and, in the end, pictures a world in 
which things and entities are disjointed, indefinable and unrelated.  Even basic categories of similarity, 
identity and difference collapse into each other through the constant recourses to tautology and disintegrate 
into the dislocated use of temporal and spatial markers (e.g., “here” and “now”).  As a result, the reader is 
left with the sense that the world is an unknowable chaos, that our orderly systems misrecognize and 
misrepresent it, and that our language is incapable of conveying its essences and complexities.   
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 D. Kharms, “A Nasty Character” in Incidences: Daniil Kharms, 132. 
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Blue Notebook #10 
 
There was a redheaded man who had no eyes or ears.  He didn‟t have hair either, 
so he was called a redhead arbitrarily. 
He couldn‟t talk because he had no mouth.  He didn‟t have a nose either. 
He didn‟t even have arms or legs. 
…………………………………. 
There was nothing!  So, we don‟t even know who we‟re talking about. 




A “distinctive feature of the OBERIU universe,” the corporal synecdoche—i.e. 
the atomization of the body part and using it as a substitute for the whole—has been 
attributed to the “model of infantile thinking” and interpreted in social, cultural and 
literary terms.
460
  OBERIU‟s excess of violence which often results in mutilation of the 
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 D. Kharms, “The Hunters,” Ibid., 74-45.  For similar examples of severed and disjointed body parts due 
to violence, absurd circumstances or disease see Kharms‟ texts: “A Sonnet,” 51; “The Plummeting of Old 
Women,” 50 and “the Story of the Fighting Men,” 57; Vvedensky‟s “Conversation About Various Actions” 
and “The Penultimate Conversation, Entitled: One Man and War” in OBERIU: An Apologia of Russian 
Absurdism, 41-42 and 46-48.  See also Vvedensky‟s poems “Znachen‟e morya,” “Krugom vozmozhno 
Bog” and “Chetyre opisaniya,” his play “Elka u Ivanovykh” and his short anecdote “Zabolevanie sifilisom, 
otrezannaya noga, vydernuty zub” in “Sborishche druzei, ostavlennykh sud’boiu,”  I: 407-10, 418-48, 459-
69, 512-533, 548. 
459
 D. Kharms, “Blue Notebook #10,” in Today I Wrote Nothing, 45.   
460
 N. Cornwell interprets the recurrence of Kharms‟ extreme obsessions with falling, accidents, 
victimization, mindless violence and sudden death, as a feature that points to the author‟s “tireless quest for 
means to undermine his own narratives, or to enable them to self-destruct.”  See N. Cornwell, 
“Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 15.  He also refers to psychoanalytic criticism, according 
to which, such motifs indicate the struggle between the body and the society upon which it depends, as well 
as he mentions the theory of the absurd, according to which, the infliction of pain and indignity on the 
human body is a standard feature of traditional farce.  See E. Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism A 
Reappraisal (New York: Routledge, 1998) and J. Palmer, The Logic of the Absurd: On Film and Television 
Comedy (London: BFI Publishing, 1987).   J. P. Jaccard connects Kharms‟ motif of “punishment without a 
crime” with the writer‟s rejection of Dostoevsky‟s cause-and-effect logical sequence.  In such regard, 
Kharms‟ story Old Woman is more than a parody of Dostoevsky‟s Crime and Punishment: it combines the 
elements of grotesque and metaphysical doubt with question-and-answer on the subject of faith, 




characters and reducing them to single body parts or to bodies without certain parts, 
undoubtedly, points to the social turmoil of Russia in the 1930s and to the group‟s 
ambivalent attitude to conventions of plot development and image formation.
461
  
However, it also reflects OBERIU‟s distrust of philosophical systems, logical relations 
and casual sequences in which part and whole represent different hierarchical levels.
462
   
In addition to undermining the hierarchy of part and whole, Kharms‟ texts 
destabilize another type of relation which is essential for any communication, writing and 
system of knowledge.  That is the connection between the sign and what the sign stands 
for—an image, an object or an idea.
463
  Addressing that type of relation, Mikhail 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dostoevsky” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 49-64.  Al. Kobrinskiy, who defines the synecdoche as a 
“distinct feature of the OBERIU universe,” interprets the violated body, death and lack of funeral as a 
“stop-signal” breaking the line of narration or as a “minus-device” creating the effect of deceived 
expectation.  In addition to the traditional reference to Gogol‟s story The Nose, Kobrinskiy connects 
Kharms‟ severed body parts (e.g., Aleksei Alekseevich‟s ripped off nostril) with Dostoevsky‟s narratives, 
the stories of XVIII-c. prisoners as well as with the ancient Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris, arguing that 
both Kharms and Khlebnikov were fascinated with Ancient Egypt.  See Al. Kobrinskiy, “Pokhorony u 
Kharmsa,” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 101-106. 
461
 For example, in Kharms‟ story “Father and Daughter,” the globalized synecdoche is stripped off any 
psychological aspects and becomes equivalent to a literalized metaphor.  Since the entrance to the 
graveyard is guarded, the father buries Natasha on the street, and then Natasha buries on the street the paper 
that documents her father‟s death.  As Kobrinskiy puts it, this becomes a “realization of the popular 
metonymy „person = paper‟” born at a time when the document of identification becomes more important 
than the person.  See Kobrinskiy, “Pokhorony u Kharmsa,” 103-104.  Similar concerns would preoccupy 
Kabakov and his reflections on Soviet bureaucracy in the 1960-1980. 
462
 Kharms‟ signature story “Old Woman” (“Starukha”) offers a complex interplay of destabilized and 
globalized synecdoches: the narrator-character chooses to bury the dead old woman, after misplacing her 
dentures, in the swamp in the woods in Lis‟em Nosu (the Nose of the Fox).  This evokes a chain of 
associations—from the myth of St. Peterburg as a city built in a swamp, to the writing of Gogol and Block.  
See ibid., 105. 
463
 The general approach proposed here unites Saussure‟s and Peirce‟s semiotic models; i.e., it refers to the 
relation between the signifier and the signified as well as to the relation between the sign (“representamen” 
or “representation”), the interpretant (not an interpreter but rather the sense made of the sign or the 
equivalent sign made in the mind of the interpreter) and the object (the the object or the idea that the sign 
stands for in the mind of the interpreter.)  See Saussure, Ferdinand de Course in General Linguistics.  
Trans. Wade Baskin.  (London: Fontana/Collins, [1916] 1974), 67 and Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected 
Writings (8 Vols.). Ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss & Arthur W Burks.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




Iampolsky has noted that Kharms and the OBERIU writers reoriented the emphasis of the 
avant-garde “from the social reality to a semiotic reality,” the reality of signs: 
 
Everything that the earlier avant-garde employed for the magical transformation 
of reality is used by Kharms for the “deconstruction” of the very concept of 





Story # 10 in Kharm‟s Blue Notebook demonstrates one of the most evocative 
examples of destabilizing the literary sign and rejecting all conventions and concepts of 
reality that it represents.
465
  The main character is gradually deprived of all parts of his 
physicality—eyes, ears, hair, mouth and so on.  First, completely fractured in the process 
of writing, the body steadily disintegrates and dissipates into literary and literal 
nothingness (“There was nothing!”) which undermines the very norm of having a 
character, story and subject of narration.  Second, all signs of identity; e.g., name, 
personality or presence, lose their purpose, function and significance.  Appropriated as a 
personal name, the namesake of the nonexistent character, “redheaded,” turns into an 
empty designation since there is no real referent (red hair) and no character, in the first 
place.
466
  So, the act of narration (or talking) problematizes itself as a communicative 
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 Mikhail Iampolsky, Bespamiatstvo kak istok [Oblivion as Source] (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe 
Obozrenie, 1998), 370-71, cited in Matvei Yankelevich, “Introduction: the Real Kharms,” 14. 
465
 See note 458. 
466
 Accordingly, the very purpose of using a personal name; i.e., of pointing to somebody in particular, and 
learning something about them through such designated communication becomes senseless (“we don‟t 
even know who we‟re talking about”).  Ibid.  The character here is an empty function—an absence of a 




situation and, eventually, cancels itself out when it becomes clear that the “speech” has 
no actual message, code or context (“We‟d better not talk about him anymore.”)
467
 
Once the connections between the elements of language are destroyed, and the 
relation between the linguistic sign and the object that it represents becomes unstable, the 
world turns into a “set of discrete, unconnected objects—or so it seems.”
468
  According to 
Ostashevsky, in Kharms‟ early works the physical discreteness generates “ontological 
autonomy”; i.e., the object‟s independence from any relations allows it to be its “full 
self.”
469
  Kharms refers to this state of the object as the fifth state or the essential meaning 
of the object and portrays it through Chagall-like images of flight.  Written in 1930, 
Kharms‟ poem To Ring—To Fly (Third Cisfinite Logic) engenders a world of flying and 
disjointed ontological objects, corporal synecdoches and metonymies: 
 
And now the house flew. 
And now the dog flew. 
And now the dream flew. 
………………. 
………………. 
The balloon flew. 
                                                 
467
 According to Roman Jakobson‟s model of communication, typically applied to spoken language, the 
communicative situation includes the following basic components (each fulfilling a different function): 
sender (emotive), receiver (conative), context (referential), message (aesthetic), channel (phatic) and code 
(metalingual).  See also Chapter 3.  Earlier paradigms, such as the Saussurean model, proposed a “speech 
circuit” in which the comprehension of the listener mirrored the speaker‟s expression of a thought.  
Drawing on the work of Karl Bühler that dated to the 1930s, Jakobson‟s theory takes into account the role 
of various additional aspects and components, which subsequently underwent further moderation.  In this 
sense, it is significant that Kharm defines his text as “talking;” something that is beyond the literary 
character of writing and its convention.  Destabilizing the message, context, channel/contact and code of 
communication, his narrative undermines all speech acts and of language, in general.  See R. Jakobson, 
“Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics” in Style in Language.  Ed. Thomas Sebeok (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1960), 350-77 and F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 11-13. 
468








Now the circle starts to flying. 
A house flies. 
…………. 
…………. 
A clock to fly. 
A hand to fly.  
…………. 
…………. 
A forehead flies. 
A chest flies. 
A stomach flies.  
Oh-no, catch it—the ear is flying. 
Oh-no, look—the nose is flying. 





The autonomy of flying entities is conveyed not only by the lack of any 
relationship between them, but also by the broken grammar or syntax (“starts to flying”), 
the shifting grammatical tense as well as the contradiction between the temporal deixis 
(“now”) and the past tense of the verb (“flew”).  As a result, the objects become liberated 
in both the physical and the linguistic sense by overcoming logical boundaries, cause-
and-effect regulations, grammatical rules and hierarchical norms.  Loaded with non-
Euclidian, Supremacist and metaphysical connotations, the flight signifies simultaneously 
the cause and the result of the object‟s ontological condition in the 1930s.
471
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 OBERIU: An Apologia, 93-94.  For earlier variations on the motif of absurd flight see Kharms‟ poem 
The Aviation of Transformations  in Today I Wrote Nothing, 129-131. 
471
 In the 1930s, both avant-garde artists, such as Malevich, and avant-garde writers, such as Kharms, 
became interested in the non-Euclidian geometry of Lobachevsky who was seen as a creator of an 
alternative reality and “the first liberated person” who rejected the “absolutism of the traditional space.”  
According to Lobachevsky, motion and the tangency or contact of concrete objects constituted the 
foundation of geometric space.  He questioned whether traditional geometric language and notions, such as 
line, point, surface, truly corresponded to the material body of nature.  Motion and tangency give form to 
the space that, in such a way, ceases being absolute, in contrast to Kant‟s absolute space built upon the 




According to Ostashevsky, even the exhilarating, disjunctive world of Kharms‟ 
flying entities becomes a victim of dissolution because when all relations are eliminated 
the object vanishes.
472
  In 1930, Kharms stated “Objects have disappeared,” while in 
1937 in a poem dedicated to the death of Kazimir Malevich he declared “Your life is only 
a fly…,” reducing thus the idea of the free supremacist flight to a banal everyday reality 
(“a fly”).
473
  Such a transition reflects changes in the philosophy of the chinars which, 
after the dissolution of OBERIU, became more concerned with alternative realities, 
relativism and phenomenological description rather than with absolute reality.
474
 
Until 1959, only a few friends and close associates of OBERIU, such as the 
philosopher Jakov Druskin and the artist Pavel Filonov, remembered the work of the 
chinars which was suppressed and deemed unpublishable during the time of Stalin.  After 
Kharms‟ arrest, his archive, or at least a significant part of it, was saved and preserved by 
Druskin who, up until the 1950s, was hoping that his friend would return from a prison, 
labor camp or asylum.
475
  In the 1950s, when it became clear that Kharms was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
venture into parallel realities on the mathematician‟s model of the “imaginary world.”  In 1937, Kharms 
wrote in his notebook “I want to become in life what Lobachevsky was in geometry.”  See D. Lukarelli, 
“Neskol‟ko slov o neevklidovoi geometrii I filosofii chinarei” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 125-131.  In 
Kharms‟ late prose, the state of being motionless signifies death.  See Death of a Little Old Man in Oberiu: 
An Apologia, 123.   
472
 Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xxiii. 
473
 “On the Death of Kazimir Malevich” in OBERIU: An Apologia, 120. 
474
 See Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xxv, Jean-Philippe Jaccard, “Daniil Kharms et la fin de 
l‟avant-garde russe” in Slavica Helvetica 39 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991) and Mikhail Iambol‟skii, 
Bespamyatstvo kak istok: Chitaya Kharmsa (Moscow: NLO, 1998).  The chinari included members of 
OBERIU and other writers loosely associated with its aesthetic.   
475
 During the siege of Leningrad and after the arrest of Kharms in 1941, Druskin, at the time seriously ill 
himself, walked from one end of the city to the other to meet with Khrams‟ wife Marina Malich and rescue 
his friend‟s papers.  Druskin retrieved a suitcase full with the writings of Kharms and Vvedensky which 
miraculously survived Kharms‟ last arrest as well as the search and bombing of his apartment.  Druskin‟s 
account of the story is presented in Mikhail Meilakh “Vokrug Kharmsa” in Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 132-




coming back, Druskin began sorting through the rescued archive which contained the 
majority of Kharms‟ writing and only a small portion of Vvedensky‟s texts, the rest of 
which is now lost.
476
  In the beginning of the 1960s, Mikhail Meilakh was introduced to 
Druskin and became a disciple of the exclusive philosopher who began reading to him the 
manuscripts of Kharms and Vvedensky, adding personal accounts and commentaries.
477
  
After Druskin‟s death in 1980, the archive was lodged in the Leningrad Public (Saltykov-
Schedrin) Library, however, Meilakh managed to publish Russian-language editions of 
Kharms and Vvedensky in West Germany and the United States, two volumes in 1978 
and a third one in 1984.
478
 
Occasional scholarly works, unofficial manuscripts and samizdat publications 
related to OBERIU appeared underground and began circulating long before that, as early 
as 1959.  According to Rosanna Dzakuinta, the “first article” mentioning the “chinars” 
and their performance Tri levye chasy (Three Left Hours) was written by Z. Shteinman 
and published in the important Leningrad journal Zvezda (Star) in 1956.
479
  Describing 
                                                                                                                                                 
that Khrams and Vvedensky wrote between 1929 and 1931, while earlier works written during their zaum 
period are lost.  According to Meilakh, those earlier papers were confiscated during Kharms‟ arrest and 





 According to Meilakh, this was the beginning of the systematic work on the archive which contained 
writings by Kharms, Vvedensly, Lipavsky and Oleinikov as well as the “remarkable drawings of Kharms.”  
Mikhail Meilakh, “Vokrug Kharmsa,” 133. 
478
 The third volume was delayed by Meilakh‟s own arrest due, in part, to OBERIU‟s publishing program 
and other alleged anti-Soviet activities.  See Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xx and Cornwell, 
“Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 10. 
479
 That was the essay Stikhi i vstrechi (Verses and Encounters), partly dedicated to the Russian poet 
Evgeni Panfilov.  It began with an ironic recollection of the performance which was held in the Leningrad 
House of Print on January 24, 1928.  Steinman described the three poets that participated in it and quoted 
the absurdist verses that they recited.  Although the article does not mention names, as Giaquinta 
concludes, it certainly referred to Kharms, Vvedensky and Tufanov.  See Rosanna Giaquinta, “O 




the same event, in 1962 A. Dymshits published an essay on Mayakovsky in which he 
used the term oberiuty, listed the names of three of the performers (Kharms, Vvedensky 
and Tufanov) and quoted the “wildest” verses they recited.
480
  Isolated first publications 
of Kharms‟ short humorous pieces for adults followed slowly thereafter.
481
  It has been 
accepted, however, that the true literary rehabilitation of the chinari began in the field of 
children‟s literature.
482
  In the early 1960s, three different authors published articles on 
OBERIU‟s stories for children.
483
  From 1962, the children‟s books of Kharms began to 
be reprinted in the Soviet Union.
484
  The names of Kharms and Vvedensky were listed in 
the bibliographical dictionary Sovetskie detskie pisateli (Soviet Children’s Writers) which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Stoletie Daniila Kharmsa, 39-48 and Z. Steinman, “Stikhi i vstrechi” in Zvezda, 7 (St. Petersburg, 1959): 
185.  As a witness, Bekhterev gives a more thorough and somewhat different account of the same event in 
A. V. Zabolotskaia et al (eds) Vospominaniia o N. Zabolotskom. 2
nd
 ed. (Moscow, 1984), 89-90.  See 
Anatolii Aleksandrov, “A Kharms Chronology” in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd, 37.   
480
 A. Dymshits, “S Mayakovskym” in Oktyabr’ (October) 4 (Moscow, 1962) and R. Giaquinta, “O 
marginal‟nosti,” 39.  Neil Cornwell also states that from the 1960s onwards Kharms began to be mentioned 
in memoirs and appeared in an “odd scholarly paper.”  N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black 
Minituarist,” 10.  
481
 See Neil Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms,” 5. 
482
 See R. Giaquinta, “O marginal‟nosti,” 39-40 and N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black 
Minituarist,” 10. 
483
 See R. Giaquinta, Ibid., 39-40; K. Chukovsky, Ot dvukh do piati (Moscow, 1960), 354-55; L. 
Chukovskaya, “Marshak redactor” in V laboratorii redaktora (Moscow, 1960), 219-233, 2
nd
 edition 
(Moscow, 1963), 268-275 and I. Rakhtanov, “‟Ezh‟ and „Chizh‟” in Detskya literatura, 2 (1962) and in I. 
Rakhtanov, Raskazy po pamiati (Moscow, 1966): 137-82.  
484
 N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 10.  Kharms was among the most active 
contributors to the children‟s magazine Ezh (the Hedgehog), Organ of the Central Bureau of Young 
Pioneers, after the publication of its first issue in Leningrad in February 1928.  Over the period of a year, 
Kharms—who was invited to participate in Ezh by Oleinikov, the magazine‟s editor—published in it ten 
works, including the poem “Ivan Ivanich Samovar,” the story “The Mischievous Plug” and the “Story of 
how Kol‟ka Pankin flew to Brazil and Pet‟ka Ershov didn‟t believe any of it.”  That coincided with the 
campaign against the “lack of message in children‟s literature” started n 1928 and led to Kharms arrest.  
See Ostashevsky, “Editor‟s Introduction,” xviii.  Recent evidence unearthed by Meilakh also suggests that 
Kharms‟ incarceration in 1931 may have been caused by the publication of the latter story which was cited 
in the report as an example of “dissemination of harmful, anti-Soviet literature in the children‟s sphere.”  
See N. Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Minituarist,” 9.  Kharms also contributed regularly 
to a second children‟s magazine, Chizh (The Siskin), which began in 1930 in Leningrad and which was 
thought up as a supplement to Ezh.  During the 1930, Kharms published four books for children, all of them 




was published in 1961 in Moscow and provided a relatively full bibliographic account of 
their writings for children.
485
  Dzakuinta attributes the first scholarly mentioning of 
OBERIU in the West to the essay of the Italian scholar Vittorio Strada who defined the 
poetics of the group as “Russian surrealism.”
486
  However, the first steps of OBERIU 
scholarship have been connected with the publications of Aleksandrov and Meilakh in the 
1967 Tartu proceedings “Materials from the XXII student academic conference.”
487
 
It was Aleksandrov and Meilakh who established that writings of Kharms and 
Vvedensky were preserved (and often circulated) in places other than Druskin‟s 
collection, even in state archives; e.g., the archives of the Union of Poets, the Institute of 
Art History and the Institute of World Literature.  Aleksandrov discovered chinars’ texts 
in the manuscript section of the Pushkin House, including Kharms‟ poems from the 
archive of the Union of Poets and poems by Kharms and Vvedensky published in the two 
volumes of collective writings of the Union: Koster and Sobranye stikhotvoreniya 
(Collective Poems).
488
  Other OBERIU manuscripts were preserved by friends and 
intellectuals who were close to the group, such as the art historian Vsevolod Nikolaevich 
Petrov, the collector and scholar Nikolai Khardziev as well as the artist Vladimir 
Vasilievich Sterligov and his wife Tat‟yana Nikolaevna Glebova.
489
  It is only logical to 
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 R. Giaquinta, “O marginal‟nosti,” 39-40. 
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 V. Strada, “Oberiu”: l‟ultimo movimento d‟avantguardia russo” in Miscellanea per le nozze di Enrico 
Castelnuovo e Delia Frigessi (Torino, 1962), 62-69.  See R. Giaquinta, “O marginal‟nosti,” 40. 
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 R. Giaquinta, Ibid. 
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 In the manuscript section of the Moscow Institute of World Literature, Meilakh and Aleksandrov 
unearthed a letter to Pasternak written by Kharms and Vvedensky; the poems supplemented to it are now 
lost.  Meilakh, “Vokrug Kharmsa,” 135. 
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 Ibid., 137-138.  T. N. Glebova was a student of Pavel Filonov and a member of the nucleus of the 
“Filonov School.”  She also worked for the journals Ezh and Chizh and illustrated the books of Kharms and 




assume that some of these manuscripts were copied, distributed underground and 
circulated among Russian unofficial circles long before the scholarly rehabilitation of the 
chinari.
490
  A close associate of Malevich, Shkolovsky and OBERIU, Khardziev kept one 
of the rare manuscript copies of Kharms‟ play Elizaveta Bam that contained the personal 
scenographic notes of the author who used the same copy to stage the Three Left Hours 
performance at the Leningrad House of Print.
491
  Khardziev showed the manuscript to 
Petrov who allegedly made a “huge number” of poor, typewritten copies which were 
distributed hand to hand.
492
 
“Published” in the 1960s and 1970s only in suppressed samizdat and foreign 
editions with limited circulation in Russia, the literary output of Kharms nevertheless had 
a significant impact on the Soviet underground of that period.  In the words of 
Yankelevich, Kharms “lurks in the background of Moscow Conceptualism (in the works 
of Ilya Kabakov and D. A. Prigov)…”
493
  In his memoir, Prigov attests: 
 
In the end of the 1960s, copies of Kharms‟ poetry began circulating in Moscow.  
One such publication, a relatively big one, containing poems, stories and 
Elizaveta Bam, was acquired by Kabakov as a gift, and we read aloud with 
                                                                                                                                                 
when she began exploring religious and Christian themes.  See E. Kovtun, “P. N. Filonov i ego dnevnik” in 
Pavel Filonov: Dnevnik (St. Petersburg: “Azbuka”, 2000), 55 and 455-6. 
490
 For instance, Petrov gave some of Kharms manuscripts and his copies of those manuscripts to the 
Pushkin House from which they mysteriously disappeared.  See Aleksandrov, “Materialy o Daniile 
Kharmse i stikhi ego v fonde V. N. Petrova” in Ezhegodnik Rukopisnogo otdela Pushkinskogo Doman a 
1990 god.  (Leningrad, 1993), 201-04 and 208-13.  Meilakh also testifies that a secondhand bookseller in 
St. Petersburg told him that, at some point, he acquired six books by Kharms, one of which he bought and 
immediately sold to somebody who took it to Moscow.  Meilakh‟s conclusion is that those could have been 
parts of Petrov‟s papers that disappeared from the Pushkin House.  See Meilakh, Ibid., 136.  Another 
portion of Petrov‟s archive was inherited by relatives who made copies of it.  Ibid., 137. 
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 See notes 413 and 478.  That version was published by Meilakh and V. Erlem in 1987.  See Meilakh, 
Ibid., 137 and 145, n. 14.   
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 That “disfigured” version was published by Gibian as well as Kleberg, but “wandering” underground 
copies started circulating earlier.  Ibid., 137. 
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delight.  As a whole, those were Kharms years; there was a sense of comical and 




While Kabakov‟s affinity to Kharms in the late 1960s is thus documented, it is 
also safe to assume that the nonconformist artist had encounters with OBERIU-related 
ideas, texts or activities before that, perhaps as early as the early 1960s.
495
  Such a 
possibility gives an additional semantic dimension to the already polysemantic flight of 
disembodied corporeal extremities populating Kabakov‟s 1964 drawings.  Like Kharms‟ 
autonomous objects, they defy any physical laws, causal relations or categorical 
boundaries such as the laws of gravity or the hierarchical ratio between part and whole.
496
  
Soaring into the sky in some kind of predictable yet unexplainable order, they do not 
succumb to any mathematical, geommetric or grammatical earthly attempts to integrate 
them into a larger system of thought and ideas; i.e., ideology.
497
  By the same token, they 
may very well be the “discrete, disconnected” human byproducts of the depersonalized 
machine-system.  At any rate, Kabakov‟s extremities recall the disorganized flight of 
Kharms‟ “autonomous autonomy”—i.e., the essence of the object or the object in its fifth 
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 Victor Pivovarov, Vlyublenny agent (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001), 67.  Matthew 
Jackson similarly verifies that in a conversation with him Kabakov‟s close friend Bulatov stated “there was 
a „Kharms cult‟ among his [Bulatov‟s] friends.”  See Jackson, The Experimental Group, 290, n. 56. 
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 In addition to already mentioned articles, memoirs and children‟s stories published in the early 1960s, 
Kabakov also knew Khardziev and his assistant (and Kabakov‟s friend) the poet Gennady Aigi who 
prepared exhibits at the Mayakovsky Museum, among them shows of Mikhail Matiushin and Pavel Filonov 
in 1961 as well as Tatlin and Malevich in 1962.  As a children‟s book illustrator, Kabakov might have also 
encountered the name and the stories of Kharms as a writer of children‟s literature.   
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 Since any reference to a whole is missing in the drawing as well as in Kharms‟ poem, it is unclear 
whether the disjointed feet and hands are parts of a bigger unity, such as a body or sculpture, or whether 
they function as metonymies (parts not referring to a whole) or synecdoches (parts representing the whole).   
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 In comparison, Prigov, who openly discusses the influence of Kharms on his art, has compiled a small 
interpretative dictionary of his conceptual images-symbols: house, window, couch, separate leg 
(“otdel‟naya noga”), etc.  He relates the latter image to the words of the Teacher in a Gnostic gospel and 




state as the “full self” or the thing-in-itself that is independent of any relations.
498
  In 
1964, after a brief excursion into the geometric and graphic vocabulary of the 1920s 
Russian avant-garde, Kabakov comes back to the language of the fragmented human 
body and banal everyday object.  Such a gesture resonates with Kharms‟ bitter-sweet 
recollection of Malevich “Your life is only a fly…,” in which human life is represented as 
a brief moment in time, and the poetic Supremacist dream collapses into the prose of 




XII. The Flight of the Defamiliarized Object: Pipe, Stick, Ball and Fly 
 
In the same sentence in which Kabakov mentions the drawings of “flying body 
parts” in his memoir Zapiski, the author also discusses another series of works which is 
closely related in terms of dating, subject and artistic intention.  That is a set of drawings 
of “mundane, unrelated” objects such as “pipe and stick, sticks, lines and globes flying 
above the hills.”
500
  The disjunction between these objects is similar to the absurd relation 
between the body parts: 
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 The reference to Kant here is made through Druskin, because the object-in-itself cannot be understood 
or explained via rational means or reflection.   
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 See n. 473. 
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 I. Kabakov, Zapiski, 17-18.  The dating of these series is uncertain.  In his memoir, Kabakov mentions 
that the “flying body parts” and the “flying objects” series followed the drawings of “spheres” completed in 
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(Non)conform: Russian and Soviet Artists 1958-1995: Ludwig Collection, eds. Barbara M. Thiemann and 
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In some respect, they [the flying objects] can be defined as “metaphysical” 
objects in absurd relations—this was their whole metaphysics.  Mundane, 
unrelated objects stand, float in space or become joined in some forced geometric 
relationship.  One common motif—the objects appear “objectified,” yet they are 
arranged along the lines of forced geometry, within the metrics of the sheet 
(diagonals, cross, corners, frame, etc) or, to put it differently, the space “behind 
the sheet” encounters the space of the sheet (and subsequently, based on that idea, 
“Simple coincidence.”) 
The space behind the sheet and the space of the sheet were always white, so this 





According to this passage, Kabakov‟s earliest drawings of “flying objects” 
included two groups of items: “pipe and stick” as well as “sticks, line and globes.”
502
  
The author emphasizes the absurdity of this inartistic congregation: the objects are 
“mundane” and “unrelated,” and their coincidence on the sheet of paper appears as 
accidental as paradoxical is the flight of the “stump,” “balloon,” “circle” and “spear,” 
among the airborne objects in Kharms‟ To Ring—To Fly (Third Cisfinite Logic).
503
  
Though the connection between the OBERIU poet and the nonconformist artist in the 
early 1960s is hypothetical, their absurdism has a common philosophical denominator.  
Kharms‟ objects reached their fifth state of airborne ontological autonomy after the poet 
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object—a fly.  See Wallach, Ilya Kabakov, 42 and (Non)conform: Russian and Soviet Artists, 253, fig. 186. 
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destroyed all hierarchical, logical and grammatical relations.  Similarly, Kabakov‟s 
“metaphysical” objects are “unrelated” to each other (i.e., their sequence is strange or 
illogical) so they behave unusually as they “float in space” and fly “above the hills.”  The 
fact that, in Kabakov‟s words, the objects are “mundane” and “joined in some forced 
geometric relationship” further emphasizes the absurdity of their formal arrangement and 
physical situation.   
As mentioned earlier, in 1964 Kabakov and Grobman discussed one of the 
theories that inevitably affected Kharms‟ writing in the 1920s-1930s—Shkolovsky‟s 
notion of ostranenie (defamiliarization).
504
  Judging by Grobman‟s exact citation of 
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European Literature of the Absurd” in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd, 53.  A. Anemone adds 
that the same article offers “one of the most interesting interpretations of the effects of „defamiliarization‟ 
in Kharms‟s prose…” because, in Shkolovsky‟s view, the “Kharmsian universe is constructed not on 
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engagement of “the absurd in the cultural web of the Soviet society of the 1930s” that Anemone envisions 
would have had serious political repercussions, in addition to the fact that, Kharms‟ philosophical critique 




Shkolovsky‟s neologism in 1964, this central notion of Russian formalism must have 
impacted Kabakov in the early 1960s.  In respect to Shkolovsky‟s ideas, both Kabakov 
and Kharms emphasize the lack of logical, causal and categorical relations between the 
objects which are defamiliarized; i.e., featured in unusual manner and circumstances.  
While in Kharms‟ poetry the essence of the object lies beyond any language and in the 
state of ontological autonomy, Kabakov‟s realm beyond the visual is conjectured as space 
“behind the sheet” and as “varied semantics (meaning).”  As a result, Kharms 
demonstrates the inability of any linguistic and cognitive systems to conjecture the 
ontology of the autonomous object.  With an increasingly epistemological predilection, 
Kabakov explores the tension between syntagmatics (the space of the sheet) and 
paradigmatics (the space behind the sheet) as well as the gap between “visuality” and 
“semantics” to expound upon the relativity of representational systems.   
A different kind of complexity between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations 
emerged when the artist transpositioned the defamiliarized entities into the medium of 
painting.  Following a path he had already tested in the past, in 1966 he created a large 
canvas that repeated the iconographic theme of the drawings, depicting a pipe, a stick and 
a globe (the latter featured in a more mundane fashion as a colorful ball) Fig. 20.  In 
addition, the artist included a fourth object that simultaneously embodied and signified 
the idea of flying—an image of a fly.
505
  The painting is as explicit, ordered and 
                                                 
505
 According to Zapiski, the work Pipe, Stick, Ball and Fly (Truba, palka, myach i mukha) was part of a 
group of four paintings that the author created in 1965-66 and the memoir defines as “large white objects” 
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“objectified,” as its title appears plain, additive and descriptive.  The latter simply states 
the evident visual fact and lists the depicted objects in their obvious positional sequence: 
Pipe, Stick, Ball and Fly (Truba, palka, myach i mukha).
506
  Kabakov‟s memoir, 
however, explicitly overplays and implicitly complicates the painting‟s apparent 
simplicity on both—the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic—planes of its artistic 
expression.   
The first complication originates in the already mentioned incongruity between 
the “space of the sheet” and the “space behind the sheet” and intensifies the tension 
between the tri-dimensionality of the represented objects and the “metrics” of the sheet.  
The flatness of the background is challenged by the bulging reliefs three times (by the 
stick, the ball and the fly) before being broken by the protruding ceramic simulacrum of 
the pipe.  The background, however, has its own dynamic contradictions hidden in the 
metaphysical qualities that Kabakov assigns to the color “white” in his discussion of the 
drawings of flying objects he created between 1965 and the end of the 1960s: 
 
At that time, while constantly creating drawings, I increasingly felt that some 
light, some luminous energy was coming towards me in the process of their 
preparation.  When I started drawing something on the sheet, some unusual light 
from a peculiar source started beaming towards me from the depths of the sheet…  
It seemed to me that I was drawing on the surface that was positioned 
                                                                                                                                                 
brown paint, was supposed to be also white, according to its author‟s intention.  Ibid., 25.  In his more 
recent catalog, Kabakov dates Pipe, Stick, Ball and Fly to 1966.  See Kabakov: Paintings/Gemälde 1957-
2008. Catalogue raisonné, ed. Renate Petzinger and Emilia Kabakov (Bielefeld, Germany: Museum 
Wiesbaden/Kerber Verlag, 2008), 68.   
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 Similarly to Kharms‟ array of flying objects listed one after another with no explanation, connection or 
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other, in a plain and absurd syntagmatic sequence.  According to Kabakov, the title was given at the time of 




perpendicularly to the light.  Therefore, every representation on the sheet appears 
to be floating in light.  As a clouded glass, the flat drawing soils, darkens and 
blocks this light.  To me then, every representation seemed as a dirty glass that 
prevented the light to come from the depth to us.  Paradoxically, however, this 
light appeared, came only when I started to draw something on the sheet.  We 
could say that the light needed the few elements on the sheet and the balance of 
their positioning in order to burst forth with dazzling power from the depth 
towards me.  The drawing became finished when, out of everything lying in front 
of me, steady pulsating light started flowing towards me… if a large object was 




The paradigmatic function of the white background, loaded here with a range of 
spiritual, metaphysical and psychological connotations, lends to the painting a sense of 
depth, freedom and essence (in both the formal and semantic aspects of the terms).  
However, the paradigmatic depth of the whiteness is soon to be challenged by the 
“metrics” of the image which brings the viewer back to the “space of the sheet.”  Spaced 
rhythmically and evenly, the depicted objects are situated within the confinements of the 
painting‟s composition, its highly organized arrangement reinforcing the “diagonals, 
cross, corners, frame” of the visual.  Thus, the structure of the painting underpins the 
“forced geometry” that Kabakov emphasizes in his discussion of the drawings.  The 
objects are positioned symmetrically, as if to balance each other, on the opposite upper 
and lower, right and left ends of the panel.  The fact that that there are two objects, a ball 
and a fly, on the right, as opposed to a single pipe fragment on the left, only comes to 
underline the sensation that the two airborne objects are lighter than the massive lower 
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 Kabakov, Zapiski, 21.  The author adds that the term “metaphysical” in relation to this same 
phenomenon emerged later.  Ibid.  The description of the light coming out of the white background more or 
less repeats the sensation Kabakov felt when he created his first drawings of the Shower series.  Thus, the 
combination of the two motifs—a simple highly charged iconic image depicted on a vast monochromic 




half of the ceramic pipe simulacrum.  As a result, the balanced and proportioned 
composition plays upon the formulaic depiction of a mathematical fracture or any other 
quotation of a codified mathematical language in which the symbols becomes replaced by 
figural substitutions.
508
  Slightly tilted to the side, the stick recalls a divider between the 
numerator and the denominator and plays upon the idea of a central vertical axis.
509
 
The mathematical simplicity of the structured arrangement brings another 
complexity that is also voiced by the author.  Looking back at his “absurd” works on 
paper—a loose group of drawings among which the series of flying objects would have 




In the “absurd” ones [drawings] you can see how the most heterogeneous objects 
are connected in the most awkward order to one another, as they form some 
connections that are logical and precise in their own way, but it is difficult to say 
according to what rules.  The world which is formed from them is also logical and 
structured in its own way and there is no chaos in it, it is just that the general 
principle of this structure is beyond our consciousness.  And there is neither 
metaphysics, nor images, nor allegories, nor surrealistic effects in all of this—all 




 Typical for Kabakov, the stature of “leveling with the viewer,” i.e., of describing 
what seems like an obvious feature or a common response to the work without supplying 
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 This play and objectification of mathematical languages becomes a central motif in Kabakov‟s album 
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 As a central axis, the stick could be referring to the mythological world tree, the cosmic tree of 
Neizvestny or the woman-tree of Sooster.  See Chapter 2.  Echoing the same image, the greenish surface of 
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drawings, the ones that have survived, might have ended up.  See Kabakov, Zapiski, 21-22. 
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an authorial explanation, provides a new clue by drawing a correspondence between the 
space of the sheet and the space behind the sheet.  As it turns out, both planes of 
expression combine absurdity or heterogeneity, on the one hand, with logic and structure, 
on the other.  What is missing on or beyond the white “sheet” is the key or the code that 
would allow one to understand “the general principle of this structure.”   
 As Kabakov‟s Zapiski propounds, in his paintings the situation becomes even 
more complicated, first of all, due to the lack of a “sheet.”
512
  By its very existence, the 
latter makes it easier to “provide light to the drawing on the small white sheet of 
paper.”
513
  It also lends a sense of “conventionality” (uslovnost’): 
 
Bumaga, kak vse v grafike, legko stanovitsya uslovnost‟yu, kotoruyu my 




The paper, as everything else in drawings, easily becomes a convention, 
something that we habitually accept.  The sheet seems to be absent when we look 
at paintings.   
 
As a result of the sheet‟s absence, to expand on Kabakov‟s own thoughts on the 
subject, there is no formal separation between the space of the work and the space beyond 
the work (“the world which is formed from” it).  The white background, absurd logic, 
structural metrics and heterogeneous objects of the painting become indicative of that 
world and signify a change in the author‟s approach to the subject and its representation: 
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 Ibid.  The term “uslovnost‟” or conventionality/conditionality is one of the key notions of Russian 




Pervoe, s chem ya stolknulsya, kogda stal delat‟ pervye tri “kartiny”,—sam 
predmet, veshch‟, voznikaushchaya v protsesse ee izgotovleniya.  Prikhodilos‟ 
imet‟ delo s etoy glupoy, muchitel‟noy “neustranimost‟yu” veshchi, 
sushchestvuyushchey vovne, pomimo menya i kotoroy net v bumazhnom liste iz-
za ego uslovnosti.  Samoe interesnoe, vazhnoe i glavnoe—eto to, chto u etoy 
voznikayushchey “veshchi” ne bylo imeni.  Kogda my chto-to izobrazhaem, my 
imeem pered soboy proobraz—myach, mukhu—i my kopiruem ego.  Esli my 
imeem v vidu chto-to “po tu storonu deystvitel‟nosti”, nechto “inoe”, to ono v 
printsipe ne izobrazhaemo, a lish‟ perezhivaemo; no zritel‟, kak i khudozhnik, 
znaet gde ono nakhoditsya, gde ego iskat‟.  No veshch‟, izdelie, ne imeyushchee 
otnosheniya ni k veshcham real‟noy deystvitel‟nosti, ni k deystvitel‟nosti 
“zapredel‟noy” bukval‟no povisaet kak absolyutnaya nelepost‟, kak neudachny, 
nesmeshnoy anekdot. 
Eto dazhe i ne utilitarnaya veshch‟, kotoraya ot peremeny mesta stanovitsya 
“khudozhestvennoy”, kak u Dyushana. 
Net, ona prosto i navsegda nelepa. 
No imenno takovymi ya i chuvstvoval svoi izdeliya-veshchi.  Oni dolzhny byli 
sushchestvovat‟ lish‟ blagodarya interpretatsii.  I vsyakiy raz ob”yasneniya zhalko 





The first thing that I encountered when I began creating the first three “paintings” 
was the object [predmet] itself, the thing [veshch’] emerging in the process of its 
making.  I faced the necessity to deal with this stupid, painful “irremovability” of 
the thing that existed outside, independently of me and was not present on the 
paper sheet because of the latter‟s conventionality.  What was most interesting, 
major and important was the fact that the same emerging thing did not have a 
name.  When we create the image of something, we have in front of us a proto-
image—ball, fly—and we copy it.  If we have in mind something that is “on the 
other side of reality,” something “different,” in principle, that cannot be 
represented, it can only be experienced.  However, the viewer and the artist know 
where to find it, where to look for it.  The thing, the creation that does not have 
any relation either to the things of the objective reality or to the “other-worldly” 
reality hangs as an absolute absurd, as an anecdote that is neither appropriate nor 
funny.   
That is not even the utilitarian thing which, due to the change of context, becomes 
“artistic” in Duchamp‟s case.   
No, [in our case] the thing is simply and eternally absurd.   






However, that is exactly how I experienced my creation-objects.  They existed 
only thanks to interpretation.  And each time, the explanation poorly explained 




As Kabakov‟s introspection suggests, the series of flying objects demonstrates an 
important change in the semiosis of Kabakov‟s artistic image—i.e., in the way in which 
the image refers to the extra-artistic reality and evokes meaning in the mind of the 
viewer.  Such a change distinguishes the paintings and drawings of flying objects from all 
preceding works discussed in Kabakov‟s memoir.  Not accidently all of the preceding 
works treated, in one way or another, human forms and, therefore, had an autobiographic 
significance—the lost masterpiece, the Shower series, Boy, Head and Sphere and the 
series of flying body parts.  In contrast, the second flying series conjured up another type 
of visual entity—the material thing or object—which opened a new range of ontological 
problems and semiotic possibilities for the artistic image.  In the theory of the OBERIU 
philosopher Druskin, the material thing could lead the interpreter to the realm of “other-
worldly” ideas (vestniki) while in the poetry of the OBERIU writer Kharms the material 
thing dissipated to conjecture that such “other-worldly” connection is impossible due to 
the inadequacy of our interpretative systems and languages.   
American Pop Art, which by 1966 must have been part of the vocabulary of 
Kabakov and his friends, judging by the memoir of Grobman, offered a different kind of 
approach to the object‟s ontology by emphasizing its material presence rather than its 
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epistemological meaning or signification.  The readymade of Marcel Duchamp—the only 
artist‟s name quoted in Kabakov‟s text—preserved and intensified the materiality of the 
thing, but placed it in a different system of connotations in order challenge its meaning 
and function.  Shkolovsky‟s concept of defamiliarization (ostranenie)—a subject of 
another conversation between Kabakov and Grobman, according to the latter‟s memoir—
presents another possibility: to defamiliarize the materiality of the object and thus to 
achieve new artistic effect and content.   
Kabakov is clearly reflecting on such ontological problems and options in the 
1980s when he wrote the passage quoted above, yet he was most probably thinking along 
those lines even in the mid-1960s.  What brings him close to the absurdity of Kharms—a 
term repeated three times in Kabakov‟s rumination—was most probably OBERIU‟s 
epistemological concerns and dimension.  In the 1960s, those epistemological questions 
acquire a more methodological approach in Soviet studies on semiotics which, by 1966, 
has become a familiar name in popular publications and on the pages of the journal 
Znanie.  Kabakov‟s painting problematizes all aspects of the sign—its syntactic, 
pragmatic and semantic relations.  The image emphasizes the material characteristics and 
tangible presence of the objects through the bulging reliefs and vibrant colors of the ball, 
the stick and the fly and through the three-dimensional protruding piece of ceramic 
standing for the “pipe.”  At the same time, the objects seem to float—half-present and 
half-disappearing into the white background.   
The painting‟s things [veshchi] also appear to be fairly straightforward in their 




etc) or to the images of these objects in the mind of the viewer (i.e., proto-images in the 
words of Kabakov).  However, the referentiality of the depicted objects appears 
undermined by their artificial character (the pipe, for instance, is represented by a piece 
of a ceramic pot), disproportioned size and absurd relation.  Thus, if the artistic images 
are pointedly codified, their semantic connection with each other and the whole are 
rendered nonsensical.  As a result, Kabakov‟s creation-objects “hang” on the picture, 
disconnected from the reality and from the world of ideas, without any relation to their 
referent or to their prototype.  Like Kharms‟ autonomous flying objects, they can only 
signify an “absolute absurd” and “an anecdote that is neither appropriate nor funny.”
517
 
 Recalling Kharms‟ poems, Kabakov‟s painting can be seen as an absurdist take on 
the epistemological systems, scientific laws and languages of codifications used to 
structure, explain and understand the word—from physics and mathematics, to semiotics, 
grammar and language.  For instance, according to the laws of gravity, lighter objects 
naturally float and fly (ball and fly) and heavier matter (pipe) rests on the ground, while, 
in relation to the normal sequence of cause and effect, it seems possible that the ball and 
the insect would fly away after one hits the pipe with a stick.  As Kabakov admits, such 
readings are purposefully absurd, illogical and anecdotal in a way that seems 
“inappropriate” to the genre of painting.  The meaning of the four descriptive nouns in 
the title, the sequence of which simply mimics the sequence of objects in the painting 
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 Referring to the same painting, Kabakov quotes the anecdote a couple of pages later: “… the stick hits 
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One of Kabakov‟s drawings depicting the same subject seems to more clearly illustrate that anecdote.  See 








 One specific characteristic, however, distinguishes Kabakov‟s “simply and 
eternally absurd” creation-object from Khrams‟s autonomous and illogical poetic visions.  
That is the conceptual facture of the painted image.  It prevents the work from dissolving 
into complete meaninglessness and keeps it anchored in the viewer‟s or the author‟s 
interpretation.  Each interpretation or explanation, in the view of Kabakov, is incomplete 
because, as he asserts, “each time, the explanation poorly explained only one aspect of 
the „thing‟ without covering or excusing its naked absurdity.”
519
  However, the possibility 
of and openness to interpretation is essential to the creation-objects because, as Kabakov 
concludes, the conceptual image could only exist in interpretation (“They existed only 
thanks to interpretation”).
520
  Departing away from the autobiographic subject, Kabakov 
seems to have arrived at the image that, according to his essay Concealment, is his true 
dialogical partner—the image that can exist outside and independently from its author 
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 For instance, the Russian word for pipe truba homophonically recalls something difficult and heavy 
(trudny), while the word for ball, myatch, refers to soft and light (myakhy).  The idiomatic expression 
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and, therefore, becomes able to speak and evoke associations leading “into various, often 
distant areas of culturology, philosophy, social psychology.”
521
 
 In terms of interpretation, all four objects depicted on the painting point to key 
signifiers employed by Soviet newspeak and cyberspeak in the 1960s.  The pipe, the ball 
and the fly as well as the symbolical variations of the stick (tree, rocket and tower) are 
some of the most frequently depicted visual emblems on the pages of Znanie and Znanie-
Sila.  In fact, in 1966—the year in which, according to all accounts, Kabakov painted his 
work—all four emblem-symbols appeared on the pages of the same issue of Znanie-Sila 
illustrated under the supervision of Sobolev (Figs. 22, 23, 24 and 26).  Pipe, as one of the 
most loaded signifiers of the pompous newspeak of Soviet ideology—e.g., pipeline—was 
quickly adopted by the officialized cyberspeak.  Thus, from a technical device connecting 
the vast territories of the Soviet Union and distributing natural gas to the whole country 
and abroad, it became a circuit of feedback and information (Fig. 23).  Similarly, the ball 
that signified the athletic prowess and physical activities as important aspects of the life 
of Soviet youth began connoting cybernetic game theories (Fig. 24).  Lastly, the fly 
which was used by both the avant-garde poet Khrams and the communist poet 
Mayakovsky to denote the simple, banal and everyday existence, in the mid-1960s 
became one of the key signifiers of cybernetic research in genetics after the discovery of 
the unique chromosome of drosophilae (Figs. 22, 25 and 26).    
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VII. Conclusion: Whose Fly is This? In Wide Retrospect 
  
 The painting shown at the Kunsthalle in Basel under the title Whose Fly is This? 
was created in 1986, while Quartet‟s catalogue dated its earliest version to 1968.
522
  The 
recent Catalogue Raisonné of Kabakov‟s paintings published an earlier version of the 
motif, dated to 1967 and under the same title.
523
  The names of the participants and the 
dialogic exchange between them is slightly different, however, the subject and the central 
image, the fly, remain the same.  Kabakov‟s memoir and a recent interview with the artist 
confirm that a painting under the title Whose Fly is This? was painted in 1965-1966.
524
  
What was then the date of the first “conversational painting” and when was the beginning 
of Moscow linguistic conceptualism?  Why did Kabakov suddenly change his visual 
aesthetic by including words within a painting?  Written words—in addition to or 
complementing the title—certainly appeared in some of Kabakov‟s drawings prior to 
1965-1966 mainly to “label” things and to juxtapose word and image.  However, the 
mysterious Whose Fly is This? from 1965-66 seems to have been the first work depicting 
figure and text within the frame of a single painting.
525
   
 Certainly, the increasing conceptualization of both word and image in Kabakov‟s 
art affected this sudden change and development.  In addition, genetic research on the 
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 Email interview with author, Augusts, 2010.  The other conversational painting To Look for a Scapegoat 
which, according to Zapiski, was created during the period of 1965-66, is dated by other accounts to the 
later 1960s. 
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chromosome of the fruit fly published in Znanie in 1965-66 fueled the imagination and 
induced esteem of the complexity hidden even within the simplest organisms in nature.  
Cybernetic interest in codes and machine translation contributed to the revived attention 
to language, information and Jakobson‟s communicational model.  What the Soviet 
reader was also able to encounter in 1963 was a reprint of Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics by Mikhail Bakhtin and a renewed appreciation for Bakhtin‟s dialogic ideas.  
Kabakov‟s friend Mikhail Grobman attests that Kabakov talked with him “about mono-
consciousness and poli-consciousness, about Bakhtin and so on” on the December 1
st
 in 
1964, i.e., soon after Bakhtin‟s book was reprinted.
526
  This short annotation 
demonstrates that Kabakov and Grobman, the latter well versed in poetry and literature 
and writing fiction himself, not only knew about Bakhtin‟s book, but also had an 
understanding of its fundamental distinction between monophonic and polyphonic 
discourses.  Later interviews of Kabakov have shown his insights into Bakhtin‟s theory, 
however, Grobman‟s documentary writing reveals that his friend was pondering 
Bakhtin‟s dialogism even before he created Whose Fly is This? in 1965-66.  Proposing 
that Dostoyevski‟s novels are polyphonic, Bakhtin‟s study, among other things, discloses 
the non-dialogic authoritarian character of the official Soviet ideological discourse of 
newspeak.  Similarly, Kabakov‟s painting depicts the informal conversation between two 
people who discuss the naming, origin or “ownership” of a shifting signifier—a fly—that 
refers simultaneously to Kharms, genetics, Mayakovsky, Malevich, cybernetics, 
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linguistics, Jakobson and a most banal daily existence.  Such ironic combination of 
polyphony and polysemantics marks the birth of, what would become, Kabakov‟s most 
persistent artistic idiom—his conversational object-painting.  It also signifies the genesis 
of a cultural phenomenon that would soon implement hybrid artistic strategies, which 
would seem simultaneously unsettling, dialogic, dense and provocative, in order to evoke 
various associations and interpretations—the phenomenon of Moscow linguistic 






























Fig. 1 Quartett August 1968 September 2000  
Baldessari, Kabakov, Kosuth, Pistoletto.   
























Fig. 2 Ilya Kabakov, 20. August 1968, 2000. 























Fig. 3 Ilya Kabakov, Whose Fly is This?, 1968, enamel on  




























Fig. 4 Joseph Kosuth, Titled (A.A.I.A.I.), 1968, silver gelatin  
























Fig. 5 Quartet August 1968 September 2000: Baldessari, Kabakov,  
Kosuth, Pistoletto. Kunsthalle Basel, 2000. Verso and recto pages:  










Fig. 6 John Baldessari, Place a Book in a Strong Light  
and This is What You Will See, 1968, acrylic and photo  









Fig. 7 Michelangelo Pistoletto, Metrocubo d’infinito.  









Fig. 8 Quartett August 1968 September 2000  
Baldessari, Kabakov, Kosuth, Pistoletto,  


















Fig. 10 Michelangelo Pistoletto, Outdoor, 2000,  









Fig. 11 Joseph Kosuth, Per Cola et Commata  








Fig. 12 Ilya Kabakov, from The Shower series, 1962, 






Fig. 13 Ilya Kabakov, from The Shower series, 1962,  






Fig. 14 Ilya Kabakov, The Shower, 1964, colored percil, ink and  






Fig. 15 Ilya Kabakov, Head with a Sphere, 1965,  
mixed media, plaster, oil and enamel on masonite,  






Fig. 16 Ilya Kabakov, Boy, 1965, textile relief, oil and enamel on masonite,  
























Fig. 20 Ilya Kabakov, Pipe, Stick, Ball and Fly, 1966, ceramic, relief, enamel and 







Fig 21 Znanie-Sila, (May 1966), illustration Main Station 
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